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the Faculty of Political Science of
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Private Man and Society
OTTO KIRCHHEIMER

Rousseau's Two Models: Sparta and the Age of Gold
JUDITH N. SHKLAR

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THOMAS REED POWELL, with an Introduction by PAUL A. FREUND

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Who Voted for Goldwater: The Wisconsin Case
LEON D. EPSTEIN
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Reviews

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

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Program

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Science as a Social Institution
Jacques Barzun, Dean of Faculties and Provost, Columbia University

Science in the Post-Industrial Era
E. R. Piore, Vice President and Chief Scientist, International Business Machines Corporation

Afternoon Session, 2:15 P.M.

Prospects for the Future

Dean John Dunning, Columbia University, Presiding

Science and the University
Polykarp Kusch, Professor of Physics, Columbia University

Science and Government
Donald F. Hornig, Special Assistant to the President of the United States for Science and Technology

Evening Session

Grayson Kirk, President, Columbia University, Presiding

Science in the Service of Mankind
Caryl P. Haskins, President, Carnegie Institution, Washington, D.C.

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Private Man and Society

OTTO KIRCHHEIMER
Columbia University

"Der wirkliche Mensch ist der Privatmensch der jetzigen Staatsverfassung."

MARX, *Kritik der Hegelschen Staatsphilosophie.*

How does the individual acquire the capacity to participate in the general affairs of the state? How does it become possible for all citizens to approach public affairs, not as particular individuals, but in such a manner that their assembled particular wills embrace the state as their common affair?

The Mirage of Consensus

This alpha and omega of democratic theory would lose its explosive power if we substitute a theory of consensus for concentration on the difficulties of the individual in his capacity as a fundamental constituent of the state. Were we to hypothesize something like a national consensus, sometimes swelling to a mighty chorus, sometimes running underground, but always strong enough to drown out or interpose itself between the thousand individual conflict situations between the rich and the poor, the mighty and the small, we would not need to bother about the riddle of the common will. The individuals spontaneously at one with the state on their most vital common concerns may safely leave to the executive ranks the details of policy. But theorems of the nation as fundamentally one, despite their frequent use, have a fragile existence. In the face of religious, nationality, economic, and ideological cleavages they often are forced to beat a retreat in favor of more pragmatic tests.

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If substantive agreement remains an elusive proposition in societies whose members often have widely disparate goals, consensus might still be saved, so it seems, on a narrower basis. Although difficult to agree on last principles, agreement might still be found on what to do here and now under the changing circumstances of the day. We might decide to emphasize civil rights or international peace, but still be willing, when acute danger threatens, to call out the police or build the arsenal of democracy. Who knows, perhaps we could all follow the Low Countries' *verzuiling* system, and erect our polity on some neatly built up fortresses of separate *Weltanschauungen*. We could then start negotiating endlessly with each other, provided we were reasonable enough to build up an ironclad codex about how to conduct our negotiations. To haggle endlessly over substance but keep the system going via sacrosanct ways of procedure may be one worthwhile and well-known way out of our dilemma. The value of this procedure, however, may be circumscribed by a common sense observation: to ride together in a bus while wanting to go to different places may be all right, provided that the destinations are not too different from each other.

Recently our quantitative brethren have uttered doubts. They indicate that what they are wont to call the influentials and the public at large show, as expected, little agreement on major premises of the political system. Moreover, if questioned closely, and not allowed to mouth conventional phrases, the public appears to be much less concerned over the necessity for procedural guarantees than their more genteel brethren.[1] We could play down this difference, as an American peculiarity, and point out that other industrial countries with a different historical and institutional record may be more universally conscious of procedural values. Or, we might surrender to the happy conscience of the technological elitist, and guess that as long as the going is good, the run of the mill of the citizenry will not enter the political market except in defense of their own specialized interest. Or, if they enter they will be guided by the common man's recognition of the superior workmanship of the more exalted community members in performing particular functional tasks.[2] Or, we could rejoice with the civic culture man over the fact that the citizens

[1] Herbert McCloskey, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," *American Political Science Review*, LVIII (1964), 365.

[2] Carl Joachim Friedrich, *The New Image of the Common Man* (Boston, 1950).

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of this outstanding pilot democracy have such a high estimate of their own political subjective competence, and need not be concerned unnecessarily about the gap between the citizens' assertion of subjective competence and their ostentatious failure to make use of it.[3] Thus, consensus statements of any kind remain rather problematic.[4] Besides, as we have already mentioned, consensus statements might run into the barrier of quantitative inquiries. The less such inquiries are guided by images of desirable participant political structures, the more they are prone to cast doubts on the nature of the ties between the official political establishment and the underlying population.

The Market Definition of Freedom

A closer analysis of the structure of man's mind in relation to the surrounding social universe may put the inquiry on a more secure footing than either consensus theories or selected opinion tidbits relating to a complicated structure of social reality can provide. This hiatus between asserted subjective competence and inability to use it connotes failure to connect official policies with man's fate. From the recent inquiries regarding the average individual's place in society and state, Lane's book seems to offer the best point of departure for our critical enterprise.[5] It accompanies the citizen, so to speak, in his engagement with social reality and watches how he internalizes his various experiences. Thus, society's apparatus does not only appear as an outside agent to be avoided, resisted, managed one way or another, but also as an element in his own personality structure. Instead of juxtaposing, as the civic culture man does, individuals and institutions and tabulating the former's relations to the latter on a preconceived scale of integrative or disintegrative traits viewed through the eyes of the best available model of state organization, Lane tries to show us the results of the individual's confrontation with society's ideologies and realities. Thus the types of answers he receives are not predetermined by his mode of analysis. We are presented with the individual curricula of fifteen native-born white

[3] Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, 1963), 481.

[4] "Consensus is one of the more elusive and misleading concepts to have been introduced into recent political theory," Dankwart A. Rustow, *The World of Nations* (Washington, D.C., 1965), mimeographed, Chap. I, 21. See also Bernard R. Crick, *In Defence of Politics* (rev. ed.; Baltimore, 1964), 24.

[5] Robert E. Lane, *Political Ideology* (New York, 1962).

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people, with quite divergent personality structures, whose occupations run from various kinds of machine operatives to truck drivers, policemen, bookkeepers, and supply clerks. Variations in reaction patterns are as a result probably much broader than if the author had studied people on a somewhat lower rung of the social ladder and with a smaller degree of skill specialization or less regular work habits. Despite these variations, and despite the existence of an irreconcilable minority of four citizens who adopted irrational explanatory schemes and viewed their surroundings with a cabalist's belief in the presence of secret groups behind the scene acting as creators of political reality, enough common themes run through Lane's analysis to merit close attention. Only within their local environment is the political experience of these men an immediate one; within these limits some possibility of access to local machines and political figures exists, and, occasionally, the adjustment of a particular grievance may take place.

Outside the strictly local sphere, the importance of which is dimmed for the individual by the high frequency of interlocal mobility, political experience is mediated through other layers of the social system, such as unions. As none of these upper-working-class groups has a wide range of professional choice, there is little question of having conscious options in social existence. Their liberty, then, is best described as the possibility of foraging around within the confines of the system for a rewarding job combination opening up maximum access to consumer goods. These men's universal liberty is, then, the liberty of the consumer's market. But one would think that liberty must somehow be related to the options in one's life: how to fill one's time after the necessities are taken care of. It becomes readily apparent that in the time horizon of Lane's sample collective, images of nation, religion, or class have little part. One might think that there exist such things as working time and leisure time, individual time and group time, private time and public time, with as many variations in measurements as there are variations in intensity of pursuits and of intergroup and interpersonal relations. Yet, for Lane's men, only one universal equation seems to exist: the endless reversibility of two coordinates which are the men's primary resources, time and money.

This reduction of life into a time-money equation limits the horizon of the future. Not too many time units can be exchanged, as the

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human supply of time runs out rather quickly. In order to escape this natural limitation one would have to convert individual into collective time, switch from short- and middle-range consumer expectation to more universal entities, thus transcending the time-money equation. But Professor Lane is quite emphatic on this point: "the failure to extend their private range of interest and attention beyond their own generation tends to limit the social goals that have much appeal to them."[6]

How do Lane's men then see their relations to the surrounding world? Let us examine two aspects of this problem. The first concerns their notion of how to relate themselves to those on the lower and upper levels of society and through these relations to formulate their particular notion of equality. The answer is clear-cut again. They do not look at the quest for equality as a desirable postulate, but as an unwelcome agent of social destabilization. They have reached a certain plateau—with a slight overestimation of their individual contribution as against more general social conditions as the causal factor—and their psychological investment in this position must be defended against the more unfortunate classes. In order to get the maximum benefit from this form of ego defense, the misfortune of these lower-level groups will be ascribed to their shiftlessness rather than to causes beyond their control.[7] By the same token, their position seems to favor the recognition of a meritorious elite as the precondition for security in their own ranking. Thus the quest for equality disappears or is reduced to small increments of mobility allowing for a limited amount of advancement as a precondition for the smooth functioning of the social system. The status satisfaction of Lane's workers requires that the cleavage between their own ranks and the lower orders be upheld, and at the same time legitimizes the position of their betters.

If equality as a dynamic concept which abates intergroup distance

[6] *Ibid.*, 293.

[7] The inclination to emphasize individual rather than collective or accidental chances of personal success can be seen also in the data in Alfred Willener, *Images de la société et classes sociales* (Bern, 1957), 111, 115. Sixty per cent of his Swiss sample emphasize factors relating to individual effort as preconditions of success; twenty-one per cent emphasize that success is socially conditioned; and nineteen per cent emphasize pure chance. The same distinctions are made in a discussion of the causes of poverty: individual factors, fifty per cent; social factors, twenty-four per cent; chance factors, twenty-five per cent.

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meets with little comprehension, what about social relations in the worker's own world made up of factory, office, and colleagues? A wide variety of evidence would show, at best, a somewhat narrow range for initiative and autonomy, varying from oppressive to tolerable according to the job structure and form of authority. A half-hearted camaraderie may occur, resting on shared experience and limited by the continual presence of competitive elements; such camaraderie scarcely extends to the level of shared purpose and close friendship. In Lane's interpretation, the lessons of industrial discipline, punctuality, attention to detail, and avoidance of waste, help to create the self-reliant man. The industrial citizen accepts responsibility for his own destiny, though in a more limited way than did his forefathers. While this knowledge has not yet been rationalized into a new belief system, the worker has come to rely on the helping hand of the state in an increasing number of situations in which his own willingness to do his stint would not suffice.

Yet with all his understanding for the world of the self-reliant industrial man who lacks a sense of shared purpose or evil, Lane has little confidence in man's political ability or judgment. With slightly condescending praise for their sturdy qualities, Lane turns toward the professional classes rather than the business and laboring classes for the realization of the major democratic values, liberty and equality. Given the picture he draws of his sample's distinctive qualities, I fail to see what else he could have done. Captives of their surrounding civilization in more than one sense, industrial jungle-dwellers and one-dimensional privates in the consumers' army, Lane's workers contribute little to the public enterprise beyond their presence as producers and consumers.

What do we need to add to Lane's description? That liberty from the viewpoint of the population at large is first and above all perceived in consumer terms is by now a well accepted thesis. But what is the genesis of this freedom? Does it rest on the accidental juncture of mass production, higher wages, and some sort of communal care? Social security and medical services have allowed the lower strata, for the first time in history, to think in terms of consumer goods beyond the area of primary needs. The lower strata's initiation into consumer society required nothing but the exchange of their work time for desirable consumer goods. This initiation took place with a

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high degree of spontaneity and a marked absence of coercion, which was present in the previous major social experiences of this group.

Moreover, what was the alternative? How frequently has advanced industrial society offered these executants[8] the possibility of parlaying their earnings into enough power to work a radical transformation of their present occupational position? Whatever their chances for social mobility, such chances did not essentially depend on doubts about fully entering the consumer goods market. Yet, the restriction of freedom exclusively to consumer goods orientation may also be grounded in something like substitute satisfaction. It seems, therefore, to the point to look at the position of various working-class strata in the production process and to see to what extent their position offers an explanation for the shrinkage of freedom to the choice of consumer goods.

Privatization, Competition, and Isolation

What strikes us first is the great variety of positions in the industrial process. The problem is to find a common denominator between the pre-industrial artisan, still abundant in many regions of southern Europe, the often-analyzed automobile worker whose rhythm is set by the conveyor belt above him, the girl in the textile mill simultaneously supervising a dozen looms, the chemical operator watching his dials at regular intervals and adjusting instruments correspondingly, and his higher level maintenance colleague reading the funnies while waiting to hurry to some repair job. If one thinks primarily in terms of outlets for initiative and variation, there exists little common measure for their respective job experiences. Initiative would become a disturbing factor if the pace of work and the time allowed for it is exactly regulated by the rhythm of the performance required from the individual. A work group or an individual might petition a foreman, and through him the engineer, to change the rhythm; if either attempted to do so on his own, chaos would result. The girl watching the looms may determine in what order to examine the machines, and not much else. Nonetheless, the operator and

[8] The executant class comprises all positions, whether blue collar or white collar, where a job is narrowly circumscribed by strict hierarchical subordination and/or restriction to a single phase of a larger project.

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the maintenance man in a fully automated enterprise can use their ingenuity and play around with alternative solutions to obtain the organizationally prescribed goals.

There is no reason, however, to expect automation will be introduced in the entire industrial field. Many industrial jobs are too marginal to warrant the necessary capital outlay for automation. Automation will also limit the workers' individual discretion in handling their particular problems. Frequently a new layer of office workers or plant engineers will appear; they are expected to calculate or lay out in detail the most economic performance for the worker's particular job. In many jobs educational requirements will increase drastically, not simply (as has often happened previously in times of growing unemployment and job insecurity) by upgrading job qualifications without corresponding changes in needed skills, but by raising the number of jobs combining a variety of skill elements. Skill group differentials may become increasingly important factors in determining how one conceives relations to the outside world. A recent inquiry in a New Jersey car assembly plant has shown, for example, that a threefold distinction between skilled, repair, and line workers with corresponding differences in initiative, security, and status are, without further mediating agencies, immediately translated into different attitudes toward a wide range of social phenomena. Confidence in the future, acceptance (with some reservation) of social, institutional, and state organizations marked the higher group; so-called radicalism, mistrust of the surrounding world, and expectation of violence as a regulator of world affairs marked the lowest skilled group.[9]

These differences appear as barriers to the formation of common horizons and bonds of experience between workers, both within the same enterprise and between various units. But a type of common experience also exists. When Lane speaks of the self-reliant industrial man as a prerequisite for the functioning of democracy, he makes a political virtue out of common social necessity. Job risk is still individualized in the sense that society does no more than furnish a favorable or an inhospitable climate for job hunting. The socialization process which the worker undergoes when he enters

[9] Lewis Lipsitz, "Work Life and Political Attitudes: A Study of Manual Workers," *American Political Science Review*, LVIII (1964), 951-63.

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the work group includes acquiring a sense of balance between cooperation and the distance necessitated by the universal fact of interpersonal competition. The balance between cooperation and competition is quite different from the specific role which goes with each individual job. Two processes must be differentiated from each other: the specific role change, supposed to take place only at the time when a person steps up the ladder from, say, worker to foreman, connotes a mask which can be slipped on and off at will,[10] but, in addition, there is more universal and constant behavior, the gyroscope activity of scanning the horizon for yet undetermined pickups to improve one's position.

The model of fully competitive interpersonal relations may be subject to various gradations. At one end we find Crozier's model of fully bureaucratized industrial state organizations.[11] Here there is a differentiated system of conditions for entrance into the organization, and within the organization there is watertight compartmentalization allowing a minimum chance of moving upward on the hierarchy of functional levels. Correspondingly, the cadres have only a minimal right to interfere with the work and position of either the individual or his functional group. Under such conditions there is a far-reaching convergence of the horizons of individual and group expectation. The incidence of submission to hierarchical discipline, frequently the most resented part of the worker's existence,[12] may not altogether disappear, but it loses much of its substance. Changes in the individual situation no longer derive from a mixture of individual accommodation and the discretion of a determinate superior, but appear to be the work of a *deus ex machina*, orders of an anonymous ministry without the participation of a proximate superior. Here the element of insecurity is transferred from dependence on the interest and evaluation of one's immediate superiors to the interference of unknown forces, the operation of which cannot

[10] Harold L. Wilensky and Hugh Edwards, "The Skidder: Ideological Adjustment of Downward Mobile Workers," *American Sociological Review*, XXIV (1959), 215-31.

[11] Michel Crozier, *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon* (Chicago, 1964).

[12] The point is scarcely controversial. See the instructive tabulation in Andrée Andrieux and Jean Lignon, *L'ouvrier d'aujourd'hui sur les changements dans la condition et la conscience ouvrières* (Paris, 1960), 81. Of ninety answers to the question, "What displeases you most at your enterprise?" forty-two named "subordination and dependence."

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be calculated in advance and consequently cannot be influenced by modifications of one's own behavior.

Of the two levels of insecurity, insecurity by virtue of a life situation's dependence on proximate superiors or by virtue of impersonal decisions deriving from major organizational changes, bureaucratic structure eliminates most of the former. Their distance from the fountainhead of authority prevents the lower strata from catching more than an occasional glimpse of decision-making; the missing link between high-level decision and individual fate shows up,[13] however, to the same degree in bureaucratic and competitive organizations.

To what extent upper-level decisions may be changed by low-level pressure depends as much on the cohesion of the lower ranks as on the form of organization in which the work takes place. Thus, protection, both against job risk and the weight of organizational structure, may be obtained through the introduction of bureaucratic rigidity, but such rigidity provides no guarantee against major organizational change. Hierarchical dependence is also mitigated in proportion to: (1) the complexity of the task performed, (2) the acquisition of a high degree of technical sensitivity in servicing machines, and (3) the extent that performance is intricately geared to and dependent on the individual effort of other group members. Hierarchical dependence is also mitigated when automation substitutes the job of recurrent observation and possible modification of an uninterrupted production system for exactly-timed repetitious physical labor. A greater degree of work initiative, except under the conditions of Crozier's fully bureaucratized model, does not, however, exclude a certain amount of competition to improve one's position in relation to wages, job type, and work schedule.[14] It is through the agency of personal improvement that hierarchical dependency again enters working relations in automated industries, although it plays a somewhat smaller role in the work performance itself.

Could the consumer goods society ever have prospered without the notion of the supremacy of one's private existence within the bosom of the nuclear family over all other competing values?

[13] See the typical workers' responses in Otto Neuloh, *Der neue Betriebsstil* (Tübingen, 1960), 101, and Heinrich Popitz *et al.*, *Das Gesellschaftsbild des Arbeiters* (Tübingen, 1957), 227.

[14] Robert Blauner, *Alienation and Freedom* (Chicago, 1964), 161.

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Whether we are dealing with Crozier's sheltered employe in the accounting office or the tobacco monopoly, or with Zweig's and Hoggart's British workers,[15] Popitz's German foundry workers, or Lane's self-reliant industrial men, the experience is everywhere the same, the increasing isolation of the working-class individual. Here we are dealing not only with the side effects of boundary lines between groups, the fact that each professional group tries to surround itself with an artificial barrier as a protective shield against erosion of its occupational basis by advancing production techniques. Nor are we merely dealing with the impact of isolation of work places in non-automated industries. It is to the point that workers frequently prefer to work in isolation rather than as members of a group.[16] This attitude is in line with the tendency to reduce risks and avoid conflict situations potentially damaging to one's own prospects. Thus, projects for collective workers' action against management can run counter to the presumed interest of the members as individual parts of a hierarchically ordered factory organization.[17]

Self-isolation and withdrawal from participation in collective action, even at the cost of lowering the climate of the work place to a temperature which excludes the possibility of collective action, may be perceived, at whatever psychological cost, as the best means to avoid immediate damage to a personal interest situation. But the problem may go deeper than the ambiguity inherent in a person's choice between upholding collective action on the basis of shared experience and the safety of prescribed correctness within the work organization. The climate of isolation is also part of a pseudo-bourgeois pattern of existence. Professional or commercial elements may continuously coalesce to explore situations affecting them, rally in defense of an acquired position or battle those of others. After each short-lived combination, there may remain a nucleus of strong personal relationships to be recombined and reactivated at the spur of the moment. In contrast, for the executant, congeniality of environment and people[18] may seem desirable, but possibilities of control-

[15] Ferdinand Zweig, *The Worker in an Affluent Society* (London, 1961); Richard Hoggart, *The Uses of Literacy* (London, 1957).

[16] See Neuloh, 236-37.

[17] See Daniel Mothé, *Journal d'un ouvrier, 1956-1958* (Paris, 1959), a running account of such a situation.

[18] Herbert H. Hyman, "The Value Systems of Different Classes: A Social Psy-

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ling and manipulating the job environment are restricted; narrowly conceived economic necessity remains the primary consideration. Once "their social rights to a living wage"[19] have been secured by the evolution in production techniques, with some assistance from the state and from union representatives, the executant's interest in his position as an industrial citizen recedes. His reactions to the endeavors of official spokesmen to interest him in any kind of socialization or co-determination schemes are mildly enthusiastic, somewhat like a child's feelings toward a complicated gift which will bring more joy and excitement to the donor experimenting with it than to the recipient. The executant's interest leans more in the direction of intra-organizational rewards, enhancing his status, initiative, and salary.[20]

Would the experience of Crozier's fully bureaucratized organizations contribute major modifications to this picture of the worker's passivity and isolation? The competitive situation which creates ambiguous relations between personal interest and collective action may be absent in the fully bureaucratized organization. Since he is protected in his relations with his hierarchical superiors by the working of impersonal rules, the possibility of formal and informal pressures on the worker is at a minimum.[21] Could one not argue that with the existence of this universe of protective groups and individual positions, the blossoming of personal friendships free from all impediments of interest and loyalty claims should be the order of the day? But the absence of competition as a major agent of instability in intragroup relations does not seem to have had the expected consequences. Crozier's explanations, which emphasize the con-

chological Contribution to the Analysis of Stratification," in Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds.), *Class, Status and Power, A Reader in Social Stratification* (New York, 1953), 426, 433, Table 5.

[19] T. H. Marshall, *Class, Citizenship, and Social Development* (Garden City, N. Y., 1964), 106.

[20] See Blauner, 206, Table 45. It should be especially noted that only thirty per cent of the workers gave cynical answers in regard to the factors determining advancement chances and that advancement chances are more favorable in automated industries. This is in contrast to previously prevailing opinions that workers expect more benefits from collectively granted awards, an opinion still upheld by Lipset in "Trade Unions and Social Structure: I," *Industrial Relations*, I (1961), 75-89. The same type of factory management organization orientation is reported in Neuloh, 205.

[21] Crozier, *Bureaucratic Phenomenon*, 286.

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tinued isolation of individuals in their bureaucratic milieu, rest on reasons peculiar to the French psychological and social structure. We should prefer to look at this isolation and at the shallowness of interpersonal relations, which engulf human beings working in subordinate positions under different types of social arrangements, as a more generalized phenomenon in our society.

Lack of initiative, compartmentalization, feelings of dependence (resulting either from direct supervision, or from the decision of an anonymous ministry reaching down to the lowest-level executant) go hand in hand with an appreciable easing of both the physical burden of work and an increase in material benefits. It is on the basis of both the confining condition and the increase in material rewards that worker response must be considered. In a previous generation, when work was more arduous and material rewards less abundant, those workers who translated their personal experience into a larger social framework often espoused concepts of social equality. Vague ideas of a more just society were accompanied by more concrete images of what equality would mean in the context of work organization. These images included fraternal relations of mutual respect which would prevail between all ranks; hierarchical relations with strict subordination of the lowest rank were expected to fall by the wayside.

During the course of the last decades, workers have learned that increasing material benefits and a much greater amount of social security were not accompanied by greater equality on the job.[22] Whatever may have been changed in the organization of the group in command of the enterprise, the workers' visions which had the least chance of realization were those colored by any type of egalitarian ideology. Expectations of more egalitarian working conditions faltered when faced with the realities of the industrial situation. In this respect it seems significant that, considering the great difference between various job situations described in this paper, a majority of American workers would not choose again the type of work in which they are engaged now.[23]

[22] Until recently the exception would have been printers who were considered craftsmen rather than industrial workers.

[23] This is true, even though in the majority of cases the same workers had no objections to the specific enterprise in which they were working. See Blauner, 202, Table 37.

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It is in this context that the question of equality and status consciousness takes on new contours. If work hierarchy is unavoidable, if "the horizon is closed and the chain is quite solid,"[24] maintenance of social status becomes simply a matter of protecting one's own interest. This is all the more the case when the conditions leading to a better job in the work hierarchy are of purely accidental nature (seniority, business requirements at a certain date, etc.), and therefore require more rationalization and fortification, or, as the case may be, more cynicism. Yet, the workers' status consciousness, as distinct from that of their artisan predecessors, does not give rise to any special pride.[25] Their reaction may depend on the exact place they hold in the working hierarchy. Those who are able to maintain their status may at times chase away moods of self-flagellation by upgrading their own relative success and enhancing their self-esteem through thinking of their less fortunate brethren. Yet, such tendencies are quickly counterchecked by industrial man's interest in some of the material aspects of social equality, helping him toward construing a state obligation to provide for the essentials of life running parallel and being supplemented by his own efforts. The worker has had enough experience with the quirks of the economic system to want the state to put up both a permanent collateral to be drawn on in case of necessity and possibly some extras to be distributed unconditionally right now. While the existence of an insurance policy may enhance feelings of security, it does not change environment and style of living.

Many attempts have been made to develop typologies of how to relate executant class experience to the surrounding world. The predominance of family involvement will, especially in the case of female workers, displace the effect of work experience. The same work experience may lead to a variety of reactions according to the degree of intensity with which the particular job experience is internalized by the respective individuals. But there are relatively few ways to translate this reaction into specific attitudes toward the outside world: an executant may look at the relations between himself and management as an individual or as a collective conflict situation in which management holds most of the trump cards, and he or his

[24] Worker quoted in Andrieux and Lignon, 210.

[25] Mothé, 15. For the opposite tendencies toward self-devaluation, see Andrieux and Lignon, 192.

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group relatively few and weak ones.[26] There may be, on the other hand, a complete absence of any societal image and a complete refusal to consider what is going on in the stratosphere above him. Both ways of experiencing his job will frequently emerge as two often-overlapping escape routes, and give rise to a type of existence in which those conditions which he misses most take a pre-eminent place: greater degree of personal initiative, and independence from hierarchical orders. On the upper fringes, especially, of the white collar workers, the executant may feel confident to take his own risks.

There is ample evidence throughout industrial society that many have considered attempting escape with varying degrees of intensity. The most frequent goal, the hope of building a small business, frequently serves as a psychological escape mechanism rather than an actual alternative.[27] If the conditions of personal existence cannot be changed, the individual can strictly compartmentalize his command performance at the work shop and his private life. It should not be said, however, that this renunciation and withdrawal come easily. There are a large number of workers who want to connect their activity meaningfully with the goals of the organization.[28] To the extent that these hopes of participation are fulfilled, the worker can internalize the enterprise as a system of participant order rather than as a grudgingly recognized, but psychologically resisted, necessity. There is also the more ambiguous situation of part of the white collar group. To whatever small extent they participate in the command function while they are still at the bottom of a ladder, they are nevertheless on it, and take attitudes that are helpful in climbing it.[29]

In the majority of cases, however, such conditions are absent. This is due in part to the intrinsic difficulties of overcoming basic antagonisms in worker-management relations. In part it is also due to a policy barrier; the right to meaningful information and discussion

[26] Popitz, 233.

[27] The point has been discussed frequently. See, for example, Ely Chinoy, *Automobile Workers and the American Dream* (Garden City, N.Y., 1955), 86, and Andrieux and Lignon, 104.

[28] The point comes out most succinctly in Neuloh, 86 ff., who, however, due to his constant "harmonizing" tendency, makes no attempt to assess the reasons militating against the fulfillment of the urge to participate.

[29] See Michel Crozier, *Le monde des employés de bureau* (Paris, 1965), 39, and his discussion of Kroner's Theory of Delegation.

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can shade imperceptibly into the right to disagree and challenge, which so far neither public nor private enterprise wants to recognize.

Thus the main tendency is separationist. Job life and private life have no common denominator. There is a scarcity of private contacts between co-workers. Eighty-five per cent of Crozier's sample never socialize with their colleagues.[30] Such separationist tendencies may be reinforced by isolation at the work place or by a competitive work situation. Twenty per cent of the working force consists of so-called "skidders," people who have been unable to hold on to their positions. In anticipation of the loss of a job, restriction of one's contacts may minimize the psychological damage caused by such a threat. At the same time, a policy of shunning deeper personal involvement might not stand in the way of upward mobility, but favor it by the lack of affective ties. Whatever the impoverishment of the individual's existence, isolation releases the individual for a vigorous participation in consumer society, thus increasing the chance for a more tolerant acceptance of his job, which may now be reinterpreted as a kind of precondition for his consumer existence. "To be socially integrated in America is to accept propaganda, advertising and speedy obsolescence in consumption."[31]

Limited Intermediaries

With privatization of existence synchronized with consumer goods orientation, where does this leave the executant's ability to make contact with the wider purposes of society? If we say that his contribution restricts itself to his consumer role of making planned obsolescence a success, we are asserting that acting out his private desires remains his only public contribution. The executant's problematic ties with the affairs of the wider polity have been the object of numerous discussions within the framework of pluralism and mass society schemes. This discussion has emphasized mainly the destabilizing political consequences of isolation, especially for members of the lower classes, and resultant easy accessibility to extremist politics. Executant elements, who in emergencies may be mobilized by extremist dynamism, are more likely to stick to minimal

[30] *Ibid.*, 114; Zweig, 75-88.

[31] Harold L. Wilensky, "Mass Society and Mass Culture," *American Sociological Review*, XXIX (1964), 176.

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political engagement in more settled times. They may respond only in case they feel their immediate interest situation is threatened.

How do these various theories see the executant's position in the polity? In theories based on pluralistic models, emphasis lies in maximal voluntary participation in intermediate social organizations which are strong enough to operate autonomously, having access to the political elite, yet existing independently of it. At the same time, it is expected that the participation of members in a system of linked pluralism which rests on simultaneous membership in various organizations enhances the chance of maintaining group balance effectively.

How does such pluralism fit the life experience of the executant class? The most important organizations for the rank and file of the executant class are trade unions and religious groups. The qualifications of thousands of other organizations, from stamp collectors and glee clubs to antivivisectionists and beekeepers, are doubtful. Participation may possibly be intensive, but I fail to see how these groups qualify as intermediary powers between the official state organization and the individual except on a very narrow front. The Germany of the Weimar Republic had an untold multitude of associations of this hobby type which quickly took to the prescribed brown coloring in 1933. Intensive participation in hobbies—often another form of escapism from political reality—left the people stranded in their political ignorance, just as it left the country without a government enjoying sufficient political backing by major intermediary social organizations.

Few members of the executant group will become involved in special *ad hoc* protest or promotion groups on a national level. A sharply delineated local situation—the change of or an exception to a zoning regulation, a hospital or school building program, a slot machine or a liquor license problem—may be a different story. People in the executant category who are both familiar with the issue and possibly have an active personal interest in it may bring their otherwise dispersed and isolated political resources to bear on the decision.[32] To the extent that a particular constitutional settlement (the U.S. and Switzerland, for example, as against France and Ger-

[32] For the by now classic description, significant both for the description of the possibilities and limits of mobilizing individual resources for local action, see Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven, 1961), Chap. 16.

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many) favors participation of the local citizenry in the settling of local financial issues, *ad hoc* groups may arise and compete with the political influentials for actual decision-making, without entering the political arena in a more steady fashion.[33]

What, then, is the meaning of membership in the major organizations of the executant classes, the trade unions and religious bodies? Union membership is often a required passport for certain jobs. Under such circumstances, membership may imply only a remote or perfunctory participation in the union's activities. Correspondingly, the degree of acceptance of the union's decisions, closely analogous to that of governmental decisions, may relate mainly to factors having to do with power rather than with loyalty, and therefore fit only moderately well into the pluralist scheme. But the nature of decision-making may shift and with it the nature of membership ties to the organization. In some categories of automated enterprises, closer relations within the work group may develop, including a greater amount of cooperation between operators and engineers. These closer relations may allow some successful localized collective action against a management more concerned with uninterrupted production and more willing to compromise on the wage claims of an increasingly smaller number of executants, at least among their working class staff. The central union type of organization would be relegated to purely legitimizing bodies. Instead, decisions would be taken on the spot by decentralized types of worker organizations with firmer roots in the workers' consciousness, and consequently with a greater chance of membership participation.[34] Of course, opposite tendencies are as likely, if not more so. The stake of workers in the enterprise may be so high as to lead to clearcut identification with the enterprise. This identification may engulf the existent elements of workers' representation. The workers might accept the enterprise fully as their intermediary for dealing with the outside world. Were this to occur, such conditions would create, instead of

[33] The manifold social, economic, and political variations of new group entry into and exit from the local political process are now unraveled in Robert E. Agger, Daniel Goldrich, and Bert E. Swanson, *The Rulers and the Ruled* (New York, 1964). The authors rectify the somewhat over-optimistic conclusions in regard to non-elite participation in the local political process which readers might draw if they were to generalize from Dahl's New Haven picture.

[34] This hypothesis is discussed in Serge Mallet, *La nouvelle classe ouvrière* (Paris, 1963), 27-69.

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bureaucratic paper giants, dispersed centers of more firmly rooted authority for the participants.[35] Unions would become a more vigorous and promising candidate for the role of the major intermediary organization.

The possible role of religious organizations is still less easy to circumscribe without considering the particularities of case and country. In spite of a thorough secularization of industrial society, and a corresponding increase in purely nominal membership, religious bodies still reach potentially more members of the executant groups than any other organization. Yet, to qualify as an effective intermediary organization, such bodies need not only have an existence separate from the state, but also need to appear to their members as separate entities. This requirement certainly raises questions for a country such as Italy[36] and, to a somewhat minor degree, for West Germany. In both cases the major denominations today are official bodies.

The United States system, on the other hand, operates on the basis of separation between state and a multiplicity of religious bodies, none of which has a predominant position. In the mind of an optimistic sociologist,[37] this arrangement has been one of the sources of success of the United States establishment. According to this interpretation, disestablishment has been an incentive for turning churches into secular, utilitarian, and democratic establishments, with a high degree of "religious mobility." The very use of the expression denotes a late stage of development in commercial civiliza-

[35] An extreme case of management-worker collusion against the state has occurred recently in Germany. Management and works council often agreed on the introduction of a private kind of court system for employes guilty of asocial conduct extending from infractions of factory rules to larceny and sexual misdemeanors. Fines meted out by a combined worker and management representation would settle problems, expeditiously preventing the wasting of scarce labor power of defendants and witnesses and the disturbance by outside interference of enterprise harmony. For some details, see Herbert Lederer, "Betriebsjustiz etwas ausserhalb der Legalität," *Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte*, XVI (1965), 215-19.

[36] For Italy, see Joseph LaPalombara, *Interest Groups in Italian Politics* (Princeton, 1964), Chap. IX. The author has coined a new concept, "parentela," for the interrelation between church, ancillary church bodies, political parties, and state administration. This state of affairs, however, is subject to changes—*vide* Austria—where the dominant Catholic Church has, in the last decades, and despite its character as a public institution, become independent from the political setup.

[37] Seymour Martin Lipset, *The First New Nation* (New York, 1963).

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tion where religion may be primarily viewed as a social promotion scheme.

Within this system, sects retaining elements of an apocalyptic theology continue to preach to their flock the promise of future glory. These sects render the social system another significant service by reconciling their flock to the notion that the social system's inequalities and iniquities are of strictly secondary importance. In exchange, the political system, in spite of the sects' refusal to join the bandwagon of consumer goods orientation, grants them the same type of protection and recognition given to the major church organizations which are more intent on transforming themselves into institutions providing social service and status satisfaction.[38] The difficulty of this position, if looked at rather as an operative device within a pluralist society than as a description of previous development in the field of religious institutions, concerns the impact of those denominations which continue to play a role in confirming status while their social service function is atrophying.[39] By raising specific social and moral problems on the basis of revealed truth accepted as a binding norm by the community, the churches create an incomparably firmer position for formulating and pressing demands on government authority than were they to opine on a broad front of contemporary issues merely on the basis of the *Zeitgeist*.

In contrast, various sects which serve as institutionalized devices for the incapsulation of their members against the surrounding world exercise a much stronger hold on their members. Because they radically divert their members' interest from the hopeless affairs of this world,[40] they arrive—except for occasional clashes with the

[38] Rodney Stark, "Class, Radicalism, and Religious Involvement in Great Britain," *American Sociological Review*, XXIX (1964), 698-706. The author shows that—with associational affiliation kept constant—differences between upper-class religious affiliation, seventy-three per cent, middle-class, fifty-six per cent, and working class, thirty-nine per cent, are quite appreciable (p. 703).

[39] The facts are scarcely controversial. See, for example, Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman, *Small Town in Mass Society: Power and Religion in a Rural Community* (Princeton, 1958), 313. For the corresponding fading of religious consciousness see Lane's instructive case studies, 129, 137. For the British material compare Zweig, 146-53, and Hoggart, 93-99.

[40] See, for example, Wilbur Cash, *The Mind of the South* (New York, 1941), 291 ff.

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state authorities over compulsory participation of the sects' members in state-ordered functions—at easy coexistence through nonparticipation. This may be a welcome feature for a state authority hard-pressed by many demands, but it provides somewhat problematic support for the model of a society resting on the participation of independent intermediaries.

A more favorable candidate for the role of such an intermediary is offered by the experience of a predominant, yet independent type of church, as is presently found in France. The absence of any competition encourages experimentation, yet prevents fragmentation according to social status categories. These categories are a considerable barrier to moral effectiveness and to the claim to representativeness for any religious organization which has left the sect stage behind it. The French type of independent church tries to solve the problem of relating its core activities to various social subdivisions by encouraging a multitude of ancillary organizations with a certain amount of initiative in their respective fields of action. In this way, the church enhances its legitimacy in its dialogue with the state, addressing the state either in the interest of special disadvantaged and under-represented groups or as a spokesman for broader social objectives. Knowing that its effectiveness would not reach further than the active support of its members allows, the church tries the difficult experiment of combining forms fixed by tradition and dogma with a wider range of social and political choices. The church has an impact on both members and polity, which is the more pervasive and ubiquitous for only rarely mounting a direct challenge to the official state authority. Factors favoring the church's position are its independence and distance from the official state apparatus, some cohesion in its religious core, absence of a rigid political and social doctrine, and solutions of vexing decentralization problems through a multiplicity of semi-independent ancillary organizations.

Malleability and Distance

The associational balance sheet of the executant is a checkered one. The increasing thought and effort the official world gives to the improvement of his condition serves, to use T. H. Marshall's words, not only "to raise the floor-level in the basement of the social edifice," but "to remodel the whole building."[41] The offerings of the

[41] Marshall, 106.

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mass media, in short, the possibility of partaking in civilization's wares without the necessity of any active engagement, coupled with a heavy dose of skepticism toward the motivations of those doing the offering ("we are not buying it") saps the executant's commitment to any of the various policy centers of society. He is their client, and thanks to the universalization of some political competition and industry's interest in any outlets, the executant's needs and reactions have become a matter of steady preoccupation for those centers which x-ray and analyze the needs and reactions of the executant as a precondition for carrying out their combined service and domestication job.

But the occasions when the executant enters into communication with these centers remain limited. Even during the work process, which provides his most vital, frequent, and direct contact with the world outside the shopping center horizon, the executant's social communication is restricted to his peers and the next higher executant echelon.[42] Otherwise, vertical relations are conducted either on a purely ceremonial level or through a class of professional social middlemen: the clergyman, the labor politician, the personnel officer, who serve as links or, to put it differently, check up on, or orient, the world of the executant.

One might therefore turn around, as has recently been done, and contest the validity of the pluralist assumption altogether.[43] There are enough examples of how the channeling of intensive loyalty to cohesive and strong intermediary organizations of the movement or sect type may deprive the state or official participants in the political process of communication with the adherents of such movements or sects, while allowing such bodies to checkmate and atrophy the official machinery. To avoid such a misfortune, one might feel constrained either to put more reliance on the individual again, or resort to the beneficial equalizing tendencies of mass culture which will in time even out the differences between the various popular strata in the industrial uniculture. Meanwhile, the most resourceful individuals of the executant classes may have developed enough upward social mobility and found their way into the executive

[42] See the figures given by Neuloh, 88-89.

[43] Joseph R. Gusfield, "Mass Society and Extremist Politics," *American Sociological Review*, XXVII (1962), 19-30. See also Charles Perrow, "The Sociological Perspective and Political Pluralism," *Social Research*, XXXI (1964), 411.

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classes. Their self-reliance may be sufficient to allow them to find their way through the jungle of the industrial landscape; their contribution to the political process is likely to be more modest. The executant is unlikely to disturb the political process, but, if called upon, he makes his legitimizing gesture. Wilensky insists that mass culture will even out the apparatus of perception in use by different groups, and create, in the long run, consistent behavior between various groups, classes, and fields of activities.[44] To the extent that this contention makes the point that pluralistic man and mass man are not essentially different entities, it is well taken. Pluralistic organizations such as the media, the established churches, the *meneurs des masses* (as Raymond Aron calls the political as well as the industrial leadership) which channelize, indoctrinate, and amuse the masses, will continue to speak in different tongues. Their message remains the same: You never had it so good, be friendly to each other, and, above all, do not upset the applecart.

But what will be the reaction among the executants? Or is even such a question illicit? Has not indoctrination in the ways of mass society produced a common way of experiencing reality? Would one not want to conclude that whatever differences do exist are due either to different people exercising different functions in line with their capacities, or to very personal deviations, that is, reactions to the common fare of civilization which can be explained by differences in personality? But is it true to assert that all classes perceive reality in the same way because they are all subject to the same leveling mass culture influences in after-working-hours? Does this way of looking at things not neglect the different role of media in the life of various classes? Is the perception of a different capacity to manipulate reality not a more constant and more powerful element in human behavior than the unifying mass culture theory? Is the phenomenon of isolation and withdrawal, conditioned as it is by the experience of the executant and his position in industrial society, not identical with the permanent helplessness which he feels because of the narrow limits within which he is able to manipulate reality? Yet the only thing which mass culture cannot do is to change these limitations in dealing with reality. To that extent the growing identity of consumer reaction in the field of political and economic consump-

[44] Wilensky, "Mass Society and Mass Culture," 180.

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tion will not close the gap. It may well be that electoral response to Ike's personality can be closely correlated with responses to undiscussed gasoline ads.[45] Does this mean that the executant's vistas are infinitely malleable by all organizations working in the context of mass society? I think that the combined system of consumer goods orientation and withdrawal to one's privacy allows a different interpretation.

Most of what can be singled out as relevant behavior are reactions within the context of mass-consumer institutions. Which candidate of two competing catch-all mass parties the executant votes for, to which brand of gasoline he gives his temporary allegiance, what TV program he switches on, may have important consequences for the purveyor of the respective goods. But for the individual these decisions draw their importance only from the fact that they create the illusion of a margin of initiative. For a fleeting moment he may enjoy this initiative and then become a victim of subliminal guidance by the purveyors of these articles. While he might care for the illusion of initiative, he cares for nothing else in this decision, because it does not constitute a meaningful contribution to his problem of how to enlarge his control over reality.

Thus, the privacy of mass civilization is at the same time privacy and protection against mass civilization. The mass man as a producer and as a consumer may overlap, but they are not identical. The fact that mass man escapes from the first role to the second does not give the second role complete control over him. Thus, from the viewpoint of mass civilization, the executant's withdrawal and isolation remains ambiguous. It makes him the customer of mass civilization, but as in the case of the associations which the mass man joins, he does not become their prisoner. Mass man's withdrawal is not related to self-confidence or coolness toward those agencies which guide his consumer and leisure time satisfactions. The reason is that these agencies are insufficiently related to the major problem of his existence: his purpose in life. Even if tomorrow's consumer society could fill his last desires, therefore, and do a still more perfect job in creating uninterruptedly new ones, mass man would still have a chance to escape. The consciousness of his inability to control his job is at the same time the measure of mass man's distance from being irrevocably engulfed by mass society.

[45] *Ibid.*

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Rousseau's Two Models: Sparta and the Age of Gold

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Jean-Jacques Rousseau was not a professional philosopher. He never pretended that he was. His great claim was that he alone had been "the painter of nature and the historian of the human heart."[1] It was an art that did not demand great logical rigor or systematic exposition of abstract ideas. Rousseau did not even aspire to these accomplishments. He did not think that perfect consistency was really very important. What did matter was always to be truthful.[2] By truthfulness he meant what we generally tend to call sincerity, and in his case it involved an overriding will to denounce the social world around him. It made him one of the greatest of the nay-sayers. His denial was comprehensive, embracing civilization as a whole. And in his tone of undeviating contempt for all he saw around him, he was singularly consistent. Moreover, if he was the very prototype of the "homme revolté," he was not without a deep sense of order, and his ideas found expression in a form of social criticism that was both formal and traditional in its structure.[3]

[1] *Rousseau Juge de Jean-Jacques* in *Oeuvres Complètes* (ed. Pléiade, Paris, 1959), I, 728. (Hereafter cited as *O. C.*) (My translation.)

[2] *La Nouvelle Héloise* (hereafter cited as *N. H.*) "Seconde Préface," *O. C.*, II, 27.

[3] For Rousseau as "homme revolté," see Sven Stelling-Michaud, "Rousseau et l'Injustice Sociale," Samuel Baud-Bovy *et al.*, *Jean-Jacques Rousseau* (Neuchatel, 1962), 171-86, and Eric Weil, "Jean-Jacques Rousseau et sa Politique," *Critique*, VII (1952), 4-28.

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For Rousseau was the last of the classical utopists. He was the last great political theorist to be utterly uninterested in history, past or future, the last also to judge and condemn without giving any thought to programs of action. His enduring originality and fascination are entirely due to the acute psychological insight with which he diagnosed the emotional diseases of modern civilization. Both the radical new ideas and the tradition of utopianism were essential to his critical task.

I

The classical utopists, of whom Sir Thomas More was both the first and the greatest, were not visionary reformers. Their aim was to picture the awful distance between the possible and the probable by showing in great detail how men *could* live, even though they *always* refuse to do so. Utopia is an attack on both the doctrine of natural sin, which imposes rigid limits on men's social potentialities, and on all actual societies, which always fall so short of men's real capacities. The object of these models, however, was never to set up a perfect community, but simply to bring moral judgment to bear on the social misery to which men have so unnecessarily reduced themselves. For the fault is not in God, fate, or nature, but in ourselves—where it will remain. To recognize this, to accept it, to contemplate and judge; that was the function of the classical utopia. Utopia was neither in space nor in time. It was designed solely to induce moral recognition in the reader.[4] If one thinks that the only purpose of political philosophy is to provide serviceable guides to action for politicians and political groups, then indeed utopia was a useless enterprise. If critical understanding and judgment, however, are also real ends, then the construction of such models is not only justifiable, it is a perfect instrument.[5] In neither case is the commonplace contrast between "realism" and "utopianism," as one between the practical and the impossible, relevant.[6] Whatever value this distinc-

[4] For a more general account of utopian political thought, see the author's "The Political Theory of Utopia: From Melancholy to Nostalgia," *Daedalus*, XCIV (1965), 367-81.

[5] This point has been especially recognized by the distinguished anthropologist and ardent admirer of Rousseau, Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Tristes Tropiques*, trans. by John Russell (New York, 1964), 61.

[6] Jean Fabre, "Realité et Utopie dans la Pensée Politique de Rousseau," *Annales Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, XXXV (1959-62), 181-216.

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tion may have in discussing the political thinking of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it is pointless when applied to classical utopianism, which was neither historical nor activist in its concerns.

In Rousseau's case utopia was a perfect way to express ideas that were dictated by personal imagination and by a profound need for self-revelation and self-vindication. Of metaphysics he knew little, nor did he care. There is no sign that he took an interest in history as the study of man's actual development in time. Neither his correspondence nor his public writings show the least concern with current affairs. Only when he was personally involved did he finally turn to a serious investigation of Genevan politics. It has indeed been well noted that Voltaire had his Calas affair and many like it, but that Rousseau was interested in only one case: his own.[7] The result of this self-absorption was, however, not just a quantity of autobiographical writing. It also led to an outraged awareness of the distance between the self and the hostile external social world which he could express in quite impersonal terms. The utopian form was ideally suited to convey his concern for the contrast between what is and what ought to be. With it came the characteristic indifference to history.[8] Moreover, Rousseau shared the typical utopian sense of the distance between the probable and the possible. He also knew God and nature to be kind and "had discovered that the source of all men's miseries and wickedness was in their false opinions."[9] The only task, therefore, was to show men models of what they could be, if only they were to abandon their chains—an eventuality he did not in the least expect.

[7] Jean Starobinski, *Jean-Jacques Rousseau: La Transparence et l'Obstacle* (Paris, 1957), 25. However, even this egoism can be defended as the necessary stance of a self-aware observer; see, for example, Claude Lévi-Strauss, "Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Fondateur des Sciences de l'Homme," in Baud-Bovy *et al.*, 239-48.

[8] "Lettre au Prince de Wurtemberg," Nov. 10, 1763, *Correspondance Générale de Jean-Jacques Rousseau* (ed. Théophile Dufour, Paris, 1924-32), X, 205-17. (Hereafter cited as *C. G.*) The only discussions of historical events occur in his commentaries on the writings of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre and these were commissioned articles which he found uncongenial work. *Confession, O. C.*, I, IX, 407-08, 422-24. Certainly he presented no alternative, more "realistic" plans, nor did he investigate any historical examples other than those mentioned by the abbé. C. E. Vaughan, *The Political Writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau* (Oxford, 1962), I, 359-422 (*La Paix Perpetuelle et la Polysynodie: Extraits et Jugements).*

[9] "Lettres à Malesherbes," *O. C.*, I, 1136 (my translation).

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II

One difficulty presented by Rousseau as a utopist is that he offered two models rather than one. One model was a Spartan city, the other a tranquil household, and the two were meant to stand in polar opposition to each other. Most of Rousseau's interpreters have felt that somehow or other these two should be reconciled.[10] In fact there is nothing astonishing about his proposing these two models, rather than a single utopia. It had often been done before. Plato and Seneca have never been accused of being half head and half heart, part classical and part romantic, yet both used two models, an age of innocence and an age of conscious virtue, to illuminate actual corruption. To be sure, both argued that the age of reason must absorb and rise above the virtues of the lost natural state.[11] However, other writers, most notably Fénelon, did not use the two models in this way, but rather treated them, as Rousseau was to do, as two equally valid, though different utopias. And Fénelon was one of the few authors of whom one can say with some assurance that Rousseau had read him. Certainly he admired him.[12] One must, to be

[10] For example, J. H. Broome, *Rousseau* (London, 1963), 103; Robert Derathé "L'Unité de la Pensée de Jean-Jacques Rousseau," in Baud-Bovy *et al.*, 204-18; Bertrand de Jouvenel, "Théories des Formes de Gouvernement chez Rousseau," *Le Contrat Social*, VI (1962), 343-51. Some writers have, of course, suggested that Rousseau was simply incapable of choosing a consistent model; for example, Albert Schinz, *La Pensée de Jean-Jacques Rousseau* (Paris, 1924), 42-45, 102-06, 247.

[11] Plato, *The Statesman*, 217b-277a; Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius*, Nos. 90 and 95. There is no particular reason, however, to suppose that Rousseau was a close student and follower of these two, or any other, classical authors. Tracing his sources would seem to be both futile and impossible. See Georges Pire, "De l'Influence de Sénéque sur les Théories Pédagogiques de J.-J. Rousseau," *Annales Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, XXXIII (1953-55), 57-92, and "Du Bon Plutarque au Citoyen de Genève," *Revue de Littérature Comparé*, XXXII (1958), 510-47. A similar neo-Stoic "solution" to Rousseau's models was presented by Ernst Cassirer, *The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, trans. by Peter Gay (New York, 1954), 65, 98-99, 104-05, 122. However, it has been just as plausibly argued that, far from preferring Sparta, Rousseau *really* chose domestic bliss as his ultimate model; for example, see H. Gaston Hall, "The Concept of Virtue in *La Nouvelle Héloise*," *Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Yale French Studies* (Fall-Winter, 1961-62), 20-33.

[12] Albert Cherel, *Fénelon au XVIIe Siècle* (Paris, 1917), 143-44, 321, 393-98, 466-68. For Rousseau's admiring remarks about Fénelon, see *Confessions*, O. C., I, VI, 229, XII, 620; *Rousseau Juge de Jean-Jacques*, O. C., I, II, 863-64; *Les Rêveries du Promeneur Solitaire*, O. C., I, III, 1013; *Emile*, trans. by Barbara Foxley (London, 1948), 367, 376-77, 431.

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sure, be very cautious in linking Rousseau to Fénelon, or to any other religious moralist of the century preceding his own. No superficial similarities can hide the fact that Rousseau was concerned with earthly felicity and they with eternal salvation. Moreover, Fénelon's *Télémaque* is a "mirror of princes," and that is something Rousseau could not conceivably have wanted to imitate. However, the "mirror of princes" has the same function as utopia: to judge the actual by confronting it with the perfect. Moreover, Rousseau fully understood the aim of Fénelon's *Télémaque*. Fénelon prepares Emile to recognize the evils that he will meet on his travels. Emile is taught how to observe, not how to act.[13]

The most significant aspect of *Télémaque* is not its possible direct influence on Rousseau, but simply that it illustrates a tradition of using different utopias together without suggesting any contradiction. *Bétique*, the utopia of spontaneous rural simplicity, illuminates all the vices of a denatured civilization.[14] *Salante*, the creation of a single legislator, is a model of organized civic virtue, which serves to show up the social degradation of France under Louis XIV.[15] Although Rousseau did not choose to adopt Fénelon's thin mythological disguises, the purpose of his two utopias was quite similar, and certainly no more mystifying. His quiet village, and golden age, also held a message addressed to all men, while his Spartan city was a damning mirror held up to the élite of Paris. What is strikingly novel is his insistence that one must choose between the two models, between man and the citizen. This necessity for choice, moreover, is not a call for a decision, but a criticism. It contains the core of Rousseau's diagnosis of mankind's psychic ills. All our self-created miseries stem from our mixed condition, our half natural and half social state. A healthy man, the model for any system of education, would have to adhere consistently to either a natural or civic mode of life. Negatively, either model shows up the painful consequences of our actual failure to choose: war between men, conflict within each soul.[16] Above all, because these two possibilities are so entirely incompatible, the strain under which men actually labor is

[13] *Emile*, 431.

[14] *Télémaque*, *Oeuvres Choises de Fénelon* (Paris, 1879), Book VII, 78-83. See also the tale of the good savages, the Manduriens, *ibid.*, Book IX, 94-96.

[15] *Ibid.*, Book X, 112-27; Book XVII, 215-19.

[16] *Emile*, 6-10; Vaughan, I, 305 (*L'Etat de Guerre*); II, 128-29 (*Contrat Social*).

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so intense and demoralizing. For there is no compromise that can be worked out between self-repression and self-expression. Each has its rewards and penalties, but the two cannot be reconciled. That is why one *ought* to choose, even if no one has, or is likely to do so.

The possibility of making this choice is not impaired, any more than is its rightness, by the fact that it has never been and is not going to be made. Rousseau was, to be sure, simply not interested in the past as such and he looked to the future with fear and trembling. He was always ready to "put the facts aside."[17] The golden age is not an early stage of man's development. It is a condition which he has never known and never will enjoy.[18] However, it is necessary to know both it and the state of pure nature, if one is to have a clear vision of man's present life, and if one is to judge the latter properly.[19] To abandon the golden age, to say that it is a mere chimera is, above all, to renounce forever the belief in human virtue.[20] The golden age of domestic happiness is both a moral necessity and a possibility. Rousseau had seen intimations of it in rural Switzerland. And even if he had never known a happy family or true friendship, he found it so easy to picture them in his imagination, and felt so profound a longing for them, that he could never doubt that psychologically they were feasible. Historically they were never achieved. However, history itself is for the wise man but "a tissue of fables whose morals are well adapted to the human heart."[21] He did not really believe that Lycurgus' Sparta or men as virtuous as Brutus and Cato had actually existed. He did, however, think that the ancient historians had known men sufficiently like these heroes to make their portraits seem at least plausible.[22] Again, he found it so easy in his imagination to identify himself, a citizen also, after all, with these types, that their psychological possibility could not be denied.

To revile his contemporaries it was not necessary to prove more than the mere possibility of ancient virtue. What would the Parisian

[17] Vaughan, I, 141 (*Discours sur l'Origine et les Fondements de l'Inégalité Parmis les Hommes*, hereafter cited as *Inégalité*).

[18] *Ibid.*, I, 448-49 (*Première Version du Contrat Social*).

[19] *Ibid.*, I, 136 (*Inégalité*).

[20] *Réponse à M. Bordes* (*Oeuvres Complètes*, Hachette, Paris, 1905). (Hereafter cited as Hachette), I, 54.

[21] *Emile*, 120-21.

[22] Vaughan, I, 320 (*Fragment*).

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scribblers not give for that fatal Sparta never to have existed? For the most virtuous of Greek cities had no philosophers![23] As long as such civic virtue was a possibility, they stood condemned. As long as those Swiss peasants seemed content in their vegetative life, how could Voltaire, or any other champion of civilization, compensate the victims of urban complexity for their lost bliss?[24] As instruments of condemnation the models were more than adequate. Rousseau never meant them to be anything more. "I intend to attack error rather than to establish new truths."[25] "I am an observer, not a moralist. I am the botanist who describes the plant. It is for the physician to order its use."[26] Let the states of Europe run to their ruin, Rousseau was convinced that reform was useless and impossible.[27] Even Geneva, in the days when he still loved it, was not a place in which he expected to see Sparta resurrected.[28] Rousseau went well beyond disdaining the very idea of historical progress.[29] He made passivity his central principle, and a necessary one. For nothing less was compatible with the total condemnation of his age. To make his rejection complete and to justify his sustained attack, he had only to show that the ills of actuality were as irreparable as they were unnecessary. They were too immense to be altered, yet not so inevitable as to make outrage seem foolish. Utopias were genuine portraits of the human heart, but they were not photographs of actual people.

III

The Spartan model is, in time at least, the first one. It made its appearance in the first of Rousseau's major writings, the *Discourse on the Arts and Sciences*, in which the ancient virtues and the modern

[23] *Réponse à M. Bordes*, 55-56.

[24] "Lettre à Voltaire," Aug. 18, 1756, *C. G.*, II, 303-24.

[25] Vaughan, I, 342 *(Fragment)*. (My translation.)

[26] *Mon Portrait*, III, *O. C.*, I, 1120; *Réponse à M. Bordes*, 65.

[27] "Je vois tous les Etats de l'Europe courir à leur ruine." Vaughan, I, 425-26 (*Considérations sur le Gouvernement de Pologne*, hereafter cited as *Poland*). As for the futility of reform, it was a constant theme; see, for example, Vaughan, I, 489, 490-91 (*Première Version*).

[28] *Politics and the Arts: Letter to M. d'Alembert on the Theatre*, trans. by Allan Bloom (Glencoe, 1960), 67. *Préface à Narcisse*, *O. C.*, II, 971-72.

[29] *Rousseau Juge de Jean-Jacques*, II, 805-06; "Lettres Morales, II," *C. G.*, III, 351-53; "Lettre à M. de Mirabeau," July 26, 1767, *C. G.*, XVII, 155-59. This denial was, moreover, the essence of both of the two *Discourses* and the attending correspondence.

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decline of citizenship were eloquently proclaimed. The origin of the Spartan image, like all his works, whether pedagogic, political, or fictional, was, according to his own testimony, in his daydreams. He had read his Plutarch in early childhood and had indulged in heroic fantasies ever since.[30] Like many timid and frail people, Rousseau was probably given to compensating for a sense of his own failings by dreaming of being a heroic figure. In this there was surely a good deal of self-hatred as well. His contemporaries were not wrong in ascribing his "lacédémonisme aigu" to an overheated imagination.[31] For there was an element of personal identification with the ancient ideal here that was entirely lacking among those many pupils of the Jesuits or Jansenists who also admired antiquity.[32] It was as a "citizen of Geneva," a republican, especially, that Rousseau felt exceptionally close in spirit and in social experience to the ancient heroes. This feeling did not usually survive any direct contact with Geneva, but it did sustain Rousseau's spirits in his bruising encounters with the great world of Paris and its class system.[33]

Sparta and Rome were, however, not merely private daydreams for Rousseau. They had social functions as well. Negatively they

[30] *Confessions*, I, 9. "De là se forma . . . ce gout heroique et romanesque qui n'a fait qu'augmenter jusqu'à present, et qui acheva de me degouter de tout, hors ce qui ressembloit à mes folies." *Lettres à Malesherbes*, II, *O. C.*, I, 1134. For his heroic fancies see *ibid.*, III, 1140, and I, 1131; *Ebauches des Confessions*, *O. C.*, I, 1157; *Confessions*, VI, 256; Vaughan, I, 314-15 (*Fragment*).

[31] Pire, "*Du Bon Plutarque au Citoyen de Genève*," 515.

[32] It is, nevertheless, important to remember their existence and influence, if one wishes to understand Rousseau. See Peter Gay, *The Party of Humanity* (New York, 1964), 9-10, 242-44.

[33] Thus in the *Epitre à M. Bordes* of 1741, *O. C.*, II, 1130:

> "Mais mois, qui connois peu les usages de France,
> Moi, fier républicain que blesse l'arrogance."

And the no less bitterly class conscious *Epitre à M. Parisot* of 1742, *ibid.*, 1137, 1138:

> "Tout petit que j'etois, foible, obscur Cytoien
> Je fesois cependant membre du souverain,
> Qu'il faloit soutenir un si noble avantage
> Par le coeur d'un Heros, par les vertus d'un sage."
>
> "Nous n'y connoissons point la superbe arrogance."

Years later Rousseau could still let one of his heroines exclaim after a visit to Geneva that had she been born there she would have had "l'âme toute Romaine." *N. H.*, Part VI, Letter V. For other identifications of Sparta and Geneva, see Vaughan, I, 133-34 (*Inégalité*).

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served as swords with which to smite his contemporaries. Positively he drew from them an image of the perfectly socialized man, the citizen whose entire life is absorbed by his social role. In its turn, this picture of an integrated existence could not but illuminate the distress of actual men, who had never known the patriotic life.

The structure of argument in the *First Discourse* is a series of contrasts. The Spartan model is deliberately contrived to be the polar opposite of modern actuality. It mattered far less to Rousseau whether the heroes of Sparta and Rome had ever really existed, than that such men could *not* be found at all in modern times.[34] The vision of classical heroism is always followed by an example of modern corruption. It is an itemized account of ancient virtue and modern delinquency. Any serious criticism that could be raised against the Spartan-Roman idol was immediately met with the reply that matters were even worse now.[35] A random glance at any of Rousseau's later works, moreover, reveals that he consistently clung to these images. Sparta was a mirror that could always be raised to reveal modern man at his worst. To the self-satisfied, to men proud of their civilized ways and confident of the future, it was a devastating challenge.

Not the least striking aspect of Rousseau's classical model is that it is so overwhelmingly military in character. Throughout the *First Discourse* there is little discussion of any virtues other than military valor and endurance, and success in battle.[36] Nor was this a passing fancy. Admiration for the soldierly spirit was a recurrent theme in all of Rousseau's work. Geneva itself, when admired, was praised for its "ésprit guerrier," happily divorced from the furious spirit of conquest.[37] Even Emile, who certainly would never go to war, is trained to be ready for a military expedition.[38] And so late a work as

[34] *Réponse au Roi de Pologne*, Hachette, I, 35-36; Vaughan, I, 314 (*Fragment*); *Rousseau Juge de Jean-Jacques*, II, 819. Saint-Preux tells Julie to read only ancient and Swiss history, for only there can men of valor and character be found. *N. H.*, Part I, Letter XII. See also *Préface à Narcisse*, 971-72; *Letter to d'Alembert*, 19, 77-79; *N. H.*, Part II, Letter XVII; Vaughan, I, 260 (*Economie Politique*); *Emile*, 308; Vaughan, II, 427-30 (*Poland*); *Emile*, 7-8, 418.

[35] For example, see Vaughan, II, 97, 124-25 (*Contrat Social*); *Emile*, 7; *Réponse à M. Bordes*, 62.

[36] *Discours: Si le Rétablissement des Sciences et des Arts a Contribué à Epurer les Moeurs*, Hachette, I, 5-6, 12-15.

[37] Vaughan, I, 127 (*Inégalité*).

[38] *Emile*, 84, 102.

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Considerations on the Government of Poland shows no discernible abatement of the military enthusiasm with which Rousseau's career as a writer had begun. It is here, in fact, that the quality of the soldierly ideal is most completely revealed. It has almost nothing to do with war of any sort, and certainly nothing with the warfare of Rousseau's own age. To be sure, he recognized that Poland's problems were primarily military, and even assured the Poles that they could count on military success if they followed his plans.[39] However, he did not show the slightest interest in, or understanding of, eighteenth-century warfare. He certainly did not offer any discussion of the military policies of Poland's mighty neighbors, nor did he present a single reason for believing that Poland, with a classical militia, would overcome their organized mercenaries. Indeed, the pseudo-realism of his Polish plan, with its endless descriptions of the details of organization and ritual, make it the most visionary, pejoratively utopian, of his works. What it is, at best, is a plan for the spiritual survival of the Poles as a distinct national entity. Even in this it was unsound. For what is Polish spiritual life without Roman Catholicism? What does emerge, however, is the degree to which Rousseau's military schemes were instruments of political education.

In Poland the choice between man and citizen is to be clear-cut. A young Polish adult is not a man, he is a Pole. He may dislike and shun all foreigners as long as he is at one with his fellow-citizens. What is needed is a national soul. For, sensibly enough, Rousseau knew that Polish survival would be salvaged in the minds of the Poles, not on the battlefield.[40] The soldierly ideal finds its justification here. For the military life is the most perfect model of public service. Here, as in no other form of social endeavor, the individual loses his personal identity and becomes a part of a purposive social unit. Here alone the group absorbs all his resources, emotional as well as physical. For this, among other aspects, is an exclusively masculine society, a point not lost upon Rousseau. The one Spartan custom that he really disliked was the military training and equality of women. Secluded and excluded Roman matrons suited him far better.[41] In the citizen-army the *moi humain* really is crushed by the

[39] Vaughan, II, 431 (*Poland*).
[40] *Ibid.*, 438, 434, 432, 486, 491.
[41] *Emile*, 326, 329-30; *Letter to d'Alembert*, 82-92.

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moi commun. And this is the very essence of the psychological transformation of man into a citizen.[42]

Rousseau's admiration for the physical and ethical life of the ancient soldier did not extend to the obvious ends of classical military policy: territorial expansion and conquest. Indeed, he rejected them completely. In this he was not terribly "realistic." Perpetual military alertness, for defensive purposes only, has never been a convincing policy. Rousseau, however, was not concerned with policy. He hated mercenaries, not because they were impolitic, but because they served no moral ends.[43] Nor did he treat the examples of ancient soldierly asceticism, as Jesuits and Jansenists did, as part of a purely personal morality fit for any age and viable under any circumstances, even those of the modern age. Certainly he was not interested in replacing those classical social values he rejected with Christian ones. For him self-repression was a psychic end in itself, but only if it was exercised in a Spartan social order. For it was only in this setting that, what might now, perhaps vaguely, be called a "meaningful" life, was possible. By completely internalizing public ends the soldier-citizen can justify and explain his every action in terms of values that are external, shared by those around him and more general in scope than any that his purely private self could offer. He has an undivided moral self-assurance and an inner poise that are unknown to the victims of a half-socialized system; for he is not helplessly driven by a private *amour propre.* His vanity has not been destroyed, but reoriented toward communal, public ends.[44] As such, it may make him a xenophobe, but he lives at peace with himself and with his immediate neighbors.[45] It is, thus, when he appears to be most collectivist, in his military-patriotic pose, that Rousseau's concern with the psychological condition of individual men is really at its most intense. In the case of the Polish plan there is at least the semblance of a collective aim: national survival. In most of his descriptions of the Spartan-Roman model even this is lacking. It is a picture of the public education of perfectly socialized men—who do not suffer the miseries of actual men.

[42] Vaughan, I, 248 (*Economie Politique*).

[43] *Réponse à M. Bordes,* 55; *Vaughan,* I, 264 (*Economie Politique*).

[44] *Ibid.,* 251 (*Economie Politique*); *ibid.,* II, 344-45 (*Projet de Consitution pour la Corse,* hereafter cited as *Corsica*).

[45] *Ibid.,* I, 242, 250-51 (*Economie Politique*).

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Because citizenship is a matter of *self*-repression, Spartan man is also free, in at least one of the senses that Rousseau attached to that word. Not only is he secure from the hostility of his fellow citizens, he is not subject to *external* coercive pressures, because by the time he reaches maturity his education has made him completely self-disciplined.[46] He does not need a law to reward or punish him.[47] It may be a morality of a lower order than that of the pure voice of conscience, or of a perfectly absorbed Christian love.[48] However, it remains self-directing, for although society supports and encourages the individual, making it relatively easy for him to do his duty, it does not go so far as to impair his independence and moral responsibility. The good of the whole never existed for Rousseau apart from the well-being of its members. Indeed, it was one of his most telling arguments against the belief in human progress and any sort of cosmic optimism that the gains made by the race as a whole in no way compensated individuals for their immediate personal sufferings.[49] In his most rigorously Spartan picture, that of *Economie Politique*, he also insisted most on the rights of the individual, whose person and property must receive complete respect.[50] That was not all. Rousseau did not think it either right or possible to ignore personal moral consciousness once it had been awakened.[51] Not even actual society which mutilates moral man can totally obliterate conscience. Spartan society, to be sure, does not allow that "divine instinct" the scope that Christian morality would give it. There is not much room for choice in a system where education engraves the law upon the hearts of its children, and public opinion is always watchfully at work. Within these civic limits, however, the individual is free, needs to fear no one, and can give his moral consent to the society in which he lives because it is just. What he utterly lacks is any opportunity for self-expression. Moreover, it emerges clearly in the *Social Contract* that there are other moral and political costs. For no society of men can be perfect.

Not the least remarkable aspect of Rousseau's Spartan reveries

[46] *Ibid.*, 246-48 (*Economie Politique*).
[47] *Ibid.*, 323 (*Fragment*).
[48] *N. H.*, Part III, Letter XVIII.
[49] Vaughan, I, 203 (*Inégalité*); 224 (*Letter to M. Philopolis*).
[50] *Ibid.*, 253-54 (*Economie Politique*).
[51] *Ibid.*, 449 (*Première Version*); II, 36 (*Contrat Social*).

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was that out of this "tissue of fables" he was able to draw a system of political principles.[52] For the *Social Contract* was not meant to be a plan for any future society, but a standard for judging existing institutions. It was a yardstick, not a program.[53] Even as such it is not a model of a flawless political order, but of one to which men *might* aspire. Above all, that means that some degree of inequality in wealth and power must be endured. For this, the heaviest cross that social life imposes upon us, is ineradicable, once we leave nature behind us.[54] That is why civil society can be made morally justifiable, but cannot be perfected. The recognition that political society is bound to involve some form of inequality explains why Rousseau was able to be relatively complacent about Spartan slavery and Polish serfdom, even though he knew them to be so utterly wrong.[55] The just civic order is not based on extremes of inequality, but it cannot expect to be either fully egalitarian or democratic.

Given these assumptions, it is not always perfectly clear what Rousseau meant when he insisted that the liberty and equality of the citizens are the only legitimate ends of civil association. In what forms of behavior do freedom and equality manifest themselves? As in so many other cases, Rousseau was most explicit in showing what

[52] While Rousseau eventually claimed that the principles of the *Social Contract* were drawn from Genevan practice, there is little reason to accept this, especially as the remark was made in order to defend the book against the attacks of the Genevan authorities. *Lettres Ecrites de la Montagne*, Hachette, III, Part I, Letter VI, 204-05. In fact, Rousseau admitted to a friend that he had never examined Genevan institutions seriously until that time. "Lettre à M. J-F. De Luc," Oct. 25, 1763, *C. G.*, X, 188-90. Even on those occasions when he praised Geneva as the place he loved best, he held up Rome as the model of all free peoples; for example, see Vaughan, I, 126-27 (*Inégalité*). Thus, though a flowery dedication to Geneva opens the *Social Contract*, its institutions and history are scarcely ever mentioned again. Sparta and Rome are the models, and it is the institutions of the latter that receive an exhaustive discussion. Vaughan, II, 23, 91, 109-23.

[53] "Je cherche le droit et la raison, et ne dispute pas des faits. Cherchons sur ces règles quels jugements on doit porter des autres voies d'association civiles. . . ." Vaughan, I, 462 (*Première Version*). Also *Emile*, 422.

[54] Vaughan, I, 167, 190-92 (*Inégalité*); 497 (*Première Version*); II, 61 (*Contrat Social*).

[55] *Ibid.*, II, 27-29, 97-98 (*Contrat Social*); 445-46, 499 (*Poland*). There was thus nothing particularly "realistic" in his acceptance of Polish serfdom and of a very slow process of enfranchisement. He was only repeating the principles of the *Social Contract*, as he, indeed, announced quite explicitly; *ibid.*, II, 448, 449, 504 (*Poland*).

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they were not, what he wished to avoid. The political participation that liberty and equality demand is not a matter of self-expression. The citizens are not meant to bring their private interests, hopes, and opinions to bear upon public affairs. On the contrary, political participation is a potent form of civil education. Its importance is not in what the citizen contributes to the polity, but in what it does for him. Everything that threatens his *moi commun* is bad. All that supports it is good. Even inequality, the worst of all social evils, is deplored because it prevents the love of country from becoming the dominant passion of the citizens. People cannot acquire a civic self if they are unable to identify with a social order in which they count for nothing, like the Polish peasants and burghers.[56] His entire case against Christianity is based on its incompatibility with the civic ethos.[57] Political participation, on the other hand, is the best and most necessary way of maintaining the civic sense. That also determines its quality.

Rousseau complained bitterly, and with some justice, that the readers of the *Social Contract* refused to keep apart what he had been so careful to separate: sovereignty and government. The principles of the *Social Contract*, he insisted, were reducible to two: that sovereignty must rest in the hands of the people and that aristocratic government is the best of all.[58] His readers cannot be blamed entirely for their difficulties, for Rousseau made many remarks favorable to democracy and his discussion of sovereignty is not always lucid. Nevertheless, the limits of democratic government are clearly stated in the *Social Contract* and should surprise no one. Democracy may be the form of government most natural to mankind, as equality in general is natural. Civil government, however, is not natural. On the contrary, the more perfect it is, the more denatured it must be.[59]

[56] *Ibid.*, II, 61 (*Contrat Social*); 436, 443 (*Poland*).

[57] *Ibid.*, I, 503-05 (*Première Version*); II, 128-31 (*Contrat Social*); *Lettres Ecrites de la Montagne*, Part I, Letter I, 130-32; "Lettre à Voltaire," Aug. 18, 1756, *C. G.*, III, 303-24; "Lettre à M. Marcet de Mézières," July 24, 1762, *ibid.*, VIII, 35-38; "Lettre à Usteri," April 30, 1763, *ibid.*, IX, 264-66; "Lettre à Usteri," July 18, 1763, *ibid.*, X, 36-40.

[58] Vaughan, I, 241, 274-75 (*Economie Politique*); II, 40-41, 69 (*Contrat Social*); *Lettres Ecrites de la Montagne*, Part II, Letter VIII, 224; "Lettre à M. Marcet de Mézières," July 24, 1762, *C. G.*, VIII, 35-38.

[59] Vaughan, I, 189 (*Inégalité*); 312 (*Fragment*); 447-83 (*Première Version*); II, 51-52, 91 (*Contrat Social*).

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Tendencies toward self-government in republican orders such as Athens and Rome were entirely deplorable. They were lapses in civic discipline.[60] For purposes of day-to-day government frequent assemblies are not advisable. And the glory of republican citizens is in obeying their legitimate magistrates.[61] The proper sphere of popular action is in the exercise of sovereignty, not in that of government, and the scope of governmental power is very wide, including matters of such importance as war and peace.[62]

What, then, is sovereignty, the realm of popular civic action? That it is popular and that it is limited to the framing of general laws is clear. Beyond that, however, there is much doubt as to what sorts of activity are involved. Its ends are, however, much more certain. The fixed periodic assemblies of the people, at which they express their sovereignty, are primarily preventive in purpose. Their chief political aim is to halt the all but irresistible tendency of any government to become arbitrary and despotic. Their positive function is symbolic and ritualistic. They actually *do* very little. The "great legislator" must initially give a people its fundamental institutions and put men in a condition fit for civic life. Their consent to his laws and to the forms and personnel of government is, to be sure, essential.[63] They are, however, passive even in this. Their will, the character of their consent, is created for them by an outside agent and maintained by a variety of educative pressures.[64] The very occasion of consenting, the assembly, is a device for keeping their country before their eyes, and their public selves intact.[65] Like the endless ceremonies and festivals that Rousseau urged upon the Poles, the assemblies exist to remind men of their public role.[66] Even if in just republics there is no need for public ceremonies to alleviate the stress of inequality that prevails in places like Poland, the

[60] *Ibid.*, II, 45, 73 (*Contrat Social*); *Lettres Ecrites de la Montagne*, Part II, Letter IX, 255; "Lettre à Coindet," Feb. 9, 1768, *C. G.*, XVIII, 98-105.

[61] "Lettre à M. d'Ivernois," Feb. 9, 1768, *C. G.*, XVIII, 114-15; to same, March 24, 1768, *ibid.*, 175-78.

[62] Vaughan, II, 41 (*Contrat Social*).

[63] *Ibid.*, II, 39-46, 101-02 (*Contrat Social*); 447 (*Poland*); 98-100 (*Contrat Social*).

[64] *Ibid.*, II, 51-54 (*Contrat Social*); I, 322, 328, 336 (*Fragment*); 248-50 (*Economie Politique*); II, 427, 440 (*Poland*); *Letter to d'Alembert*, 22, 67, 74.

[65] Vaughan, II, 95-96 (*Contrat Social*).

[66] *Ibid.*, II, 434-35 (*Poland*).

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pull of the *moi humain*, of the natural self, is so great, that the artificial civic self needs constant reinforcement. The sense of citizenship cannot be left to take care of itself.

The social contract, the creation of a rightful bond of association, is not only an act and an agreement. It is a continuing process. To keep a man in a psychological state in which "he was neither Caius nor Lucius, he was a Roman" is a perpetual affront to his nature, and one that cannot be relaxed. The social contract is a constant transformation. For justice to replace instinct, and the idea of duty that of appetite, requires an unceasing effort. Self-love and distaste for the sight of suffering, man's uncertain and impulsive natural equipment, must be superseded at every turn, if patriotism and the morality of general rules, impersonally applied, are to dominate his behavior. That is why government is a matter of education in the truly civic order. Its benefits are not negligible. The citizen is a man without inner conflicts and he finds it easy to do his duty.[67] His *amour propre* is socialized and does not fill him with insatiable personal ambitions and frustrations. And an active soldierly life leaves him no idle hours in which he might indulge in reflection and regret. In every way he is free from the miseries that haunt the inhabitants of modern cities. Fortunately for Rousseau and his readers this is not the only model of a better life open to mankind.

IV

The full cost of Spartan life can hardly be estimated until civic man is compared to a member of a happy family, living in the golden age. For Rousseau's other model, that of the quiet village, is in every respect the very opposite of the ancient city. The happiness of men in the golden age, the paradigm of the utopia of innocence, springs from one source only, unspoiled family love. And the Spartan city is explicitly built on the destruction of the family and of all its emotional and social gratifications.[68] The perfect Spartan

[67] *Emile*, 7; Vaughan, II, 88-89, 36-37, 40, 69-70 (*Contrat Social*). He may not be happy, but he is at one with himself and others. Vaughan, II, 326-27 (*Fragment*).

[68] Vaughan, I, 237-40, 280 (*Economie Politique*), 462-66 (*Première Version*). In the *Social Contract* Rousseau was later to say that the family was the model of political society because it was the oldest and most natural. The only meaning this could have, given the principles developed later in that work, is that

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mother is indifferent to the death of her sons as she gives thanks for victory on the battlefield. Brutus kills his sons to preserve the republic. These conquests over natural feeling are not easy, but they are the very essence of citizenship.[69] If citizens are to be denatured so as to identify wholly with the republic, then their loyalties must not be shared with a family. That is why paternal authority, which is a mere expression of natural solicitude, cannot be a model for republican magistrates who need "more sublime virtues." Indeed, within the city the family cannot even play an educative role. The rearing of young citizens must be left to distinguished magistrates and soldiers, not to the personal inclinations of parents.[70]

Although it is more spontaneously natural than the civic order, the family household is also a social institution, and not the real, primitive state of nature.[71] As such it is, in its perfect form, quite as unattainable as any other social model. This, too, is a utopia, not a plausible plan of action. To be sure, its realization would not depend on a great leader and collective conditions, as the setting up of a republican order does. Anyone *can* simply leave civilization behind him and set up an isolated family. Indeed "one of the examples which the good should give to others is that of a patriarchal, rural life, the earliest life of man, the most peaceful, the most natural, and the most attractive to the uncorrupted heart.[72] Unhappily there are no good men and no uncorrupted hearts left in a world in which inequality has destroyed simplicity. And inequality is not just the lot of modern man. It is the fundamental condition of all historic life, ever since "grain and iron" were introduced to end the prehistoric age.[73] "Neufchatel perhaps unique on earth," and an occasional village in the Alps, remind us of what we might have been.[74]

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the family is the proof of man's capacity for association in general. Vaughan, II (*Contrat Social*). Only once, in *Emile*, did he really wonder if the family would or should be destroyed; 326.

[69] *Réponse à M. Bordes*, 59-60; *Emile*, 8; Vaughan, I, 337 (*Fragment*).

[70] Vaughan, I, 255-58, 278-79 (*Economie Politique*).

[71] A. O. Lovejoy, "The Supposed Primitivism of Rousseau's Discourse on Inequality," *Essays in the History of Ideas* (New York, 1960), 14-37; H. V. S. Ogden, "The Antithesis of Nature and Art and Rousseau's Rejection of the Theory of Natural Rights," *American Political Science Review*, XXXII (1936), 643-54.

[72] *Emile*, 438.

[73] Vaughan, I, 176 (*Inégalité*).

[74] *Letter to d'Alembert*, 60.

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However, these outposts of uncivilized happiness are doomed by history.[75] Even Rousseau's two imaginary accounts of isolated family bliss end in failure. Emile, brought up so carefully to be a man, leaves his rural abode, and he and his wife destroy their marriage in Paris.[76] Julie recognizes as she dies that her perfect family life had not made her happy, since she could not bear to renounce Saint-Preux's love.[77] This almost perfect woman is doomed to misery because of her "mixed state," half natural and half social. Torn between sexual inclination and moral duty she can find happiness in neither. Sooner or later her effort to live in isolated rural bliss must fail, because it is psychologically impossible to overcome the effects of social life: inner conflict.[78] The model of simplicity is no more available to actual men than the civic one. Both should be contemplated and sought, but neither can be attained.

Although the golden age is one of villages, the only social life that matters is within each household. This, moreover, shelters not a clan, but only a primary family, parents and their children. Self-sufficient and self-contained, they need no one but each other. Theirs is the only relationship free from *amour propre*. Only within the family is perfect uncompetitive affection possible. Here alone self-love and love for others are one. Only here are goodness and happiness inseparable, as "égalité d'ame," instead of inner tension, is the common state of man.[79] And this is as true of the family of a Swiss peasant as of the Wolmars at Clarens, as long as they do not step outside their intimate circle. For the individual households ought not to meet frequently and must in no way depend on one another. In Neufchatel during the long winter the weather keeps each family confined to its own house.[80] In the Haut Valais the rarity of strangers of any sort has reduced suspicion and self-consciousness so much that its families are the most generous and hospitable people on earth. The adjacent Bas Valais, in contrast, is much frequented by travelers and merchants. Its inhabitants are inevitably

[75] "Lettre à M. Jacob Vernet," Nov. 29, 1760, *C. G.*, V, 270-72; *Réponse au Roi de Pologne*, Hachette, I, 46.
[76] *Emile et Sophie*, Hachette, I, 1-22.
[77] *N. H.*, Part VI, Letter XII.
[78] *Emile*, 9.
[79] *N. H.*, Part V, Letter II; Part I, Letter XXIII.
[80] *Letter to d'Alembert*, 60-63; *Emile*, 26.

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hostile and mean.[81] The peasantry of France, of course, oppressed by tax collectors, is reduced to a state of constant fear and mistrust.[82] It is not peasant life as such, but the absence of social contacts other than family relationships, that creates ease and happiness.

Once the autonomy of the family is established it can remain happy in a variety of ways. The men of the golden age were ignorant boors, whose only intellectual attainment was the acquisition of language.[83] The mountaineers of Neufchatel, however, are not badly educated.[84] Emile is not illiterate, even though his intellectual equipment is not very complex. Rousseau did not favor a brutish ignorance, but he thought that knowledge should not exceed the faculties of ordinary people, that it should limit itself to a human scale.[85] Above all it should not become an instrument of *amour propre*, a weapon in social combat. When opportunities for mischief are few, and when man's natural laziness has been overcome without reaching the perpetual activity of the civilized, then the arts and crafts and books are not at all harmful. They are neither means for self-disguisement, nor manifestations of luxury, but innocent and useful entertainments.[86] As long as families stay away from each other, there is no reason why they should long for the pure state of nature, which is one of fear and suspicion, fed by ignorance.[87]

The real joys of the golden age, in all its versions, arise from the relations of the members of the family to each other. It is the *absence* of strangers that allows one to say exactly what one thinks, to express all one's feelings in perfect confidence, and simply to be whatever one is. It is the very paradise of unrestrained self-expression, but it is not an idle one. The family has a purpose, and an overwhelmingly important one: the education of the children. This is

[81] *N. H.*, Part I, Letter XXIII.

[82] *Confessions*, IV, 163-64. For the importance of Rousseau's encounter with an oppressed peasant see C. J. Friedrich, *Inevitable Peace* (Cambridge, Mass., 1948), 161-63.

[83] Vaughan, I, 153-54 (*Inégalité*); *Essai sur l'Origine des Langues*, Hachette, I, 384-85.

[84] *Letter to d'Alembert*, 60-63.

[85] *Emile*, 82-83, 147, 151, 161; *Réponse au Roi de Pologne*, 31, 33, 44.

[86] Vaughan, I, 172-73, 175 (*Inégalité*); *Essai sur l'Origine des Langues*, 388; *Préface à Narcisse*, 969-70.

[87] *Essai sur l'Origine des Langues*, 384; Vaughan, I, 293-94 (*L'État de Guerre*).

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the Wolmars' chief occupation.[88] The child-centered family was undeniably born on the pages of *Emile* and *La Nouvelle Héloise*. It is not altogether surprising. Rousseau thought domestic re-education the last faint hope for European men.[89] Moreover, the creating of new men has its gratifications for parents, too; it is their final self-fulfillment, the completion of their own education. That is why complete solitude cannot be an ideal condition. It is not good for man to live alone. Emile must marry and raise a family.[90] Solitude is, at best, the last resort of those who have lost all hope of friendship. The ultimate end of man, the condition that makes a Wolmar god-like, is to be a father and the head of a household.[91] A man is complete only when he is ready to become a father. That is the last act of the drama of Emile's education—of man, that is.

Within the happy family there is no inequality, according to Rousseau. In fact, however, he was a firm believer in paternal supremacy. This was the one form of inequality that he did not even recognize as such, because he did not think that it created any of the emotional miseries that every other sort of inequality brought with it. In any case, paternal authority, at its best, is limited. Children who have reached the age of reason ought to become the equals of their parents as in the Haut Valais.[92] Women, however, are always meant to be the obedient inferiors of their husbands, in principle at least. When Rousseau came to draw a picture of the perfect family, he made the mother fully the equal of the father. It is she, in fact, who is the dominating spirit of the family.[93] The only real form of inequality that exists as part of domestic society arises when servants and laborers are employed. It is only when there are human relationships other than those between members of the primary family and, perhaps, their dearest friends, that inequality appears. A wise, patriarchal employer can do much to diminish its injustice and its impersonal cruelty, but he cannot erase it. The family is the one and only society that is not subject to the evils of inequality. That is why it is the essence of the golden age.

The equality of the golden age throws a harsh light upon all other

[88] *N. H.*, Part IV, Letter XI; Part V, Letter II; Part V, Letter III.
[89] *Ibid.*, "Séconde Préface," 24.
[90] *Emile*, 321.
[91] *N. H.*, Part IV, Letter X; Part III, Letter XX.
[92] *Ibid.*, Part I, Letter XXIII; Vaughan, II, 24 (*Contrat Social*).
[93] See the author's "Rousseau's Images of Authority," *American Political Science Review*, LVIII (1964), 928-29.

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forms of society, for it reveals the psychological destructiveness that rendered inequality so odious in Rousseau's eyes. It is, indeed, the absence of inequality, rather than equality as a positive benefit, that, in his usual negative mode of thought, concerned him most. When inequality and *amour propre* do not exist, as they do not among people who enjoy a perfect intimacy, then each one can express fully his undisguised self and recognize others as they really are, not as assumed *personae*.[94] In the letter about his visit to the Swiss peasant family, Saint-Preux is even allowed to dwell freely on the sexual attractions of the women. The tone is quite unlike the prudish circumlocution in which he and his mistress generally engage. In the Swiss village the constraints imposed by civilization and inequality are so relaxed that there is even no tension between masters and domestic servants. Consider the contrast presented by Paris, where Saint-Preux sees "many masks but no human faces!"[95] Here master and servant live in a state of mutual hostility and common corruption; "neither belongs to a family, but only to a class."[96] Above all, how could one ever forget Mme. de Vercellis, who would never see a person, but only her footman, in Rousseau?[97] For it was less the injustice than the coldness of wealth that infuriated Rousseau. The sympathies of the rich simply atrophy as they cut themselves off from the poor.[98] However, just because inequality is so much a matter of attitude, much can be done to alleviate its effects, if not its actuality. The rich have a duty "never to make people conscious of inequalities of wealth." They also must work, shun luxury, and remain open to pity.[99] If this does not bring about perfection, it at least allows people to accept their positions.[100] Recognize the dignity of physical labor, remain on the land, and preserve the peace of society.[101]

Rural society is not, of course, necessarily moral, just as not all families would flourish simply by leaving the city. In the large

[94] *Rousseau Juge de Jean-Jacques*, II, 812-13; *N. H.*, "Séconde Préface," 16; Part IV, Letter XI.
[95] *N. H.*, Part I, Letter XXIII; Part II, Letter XIV.
[96] *Emile*, 369; *N. H.*, Part IV, Letter X.
[97] *Confessions*, II, 82.
[98] *Ibid.*, IV, 147; *Emile*, 182-87, 190.
[99] *Emile*, 314.
[100] *N. H.*, Part IV, Letter X; Part V, Letters II, VII.
[101] *Emile*, 158; Vaughan, II, 310-11, 317, 346-47 (*Corsica*).

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city it is, however, impossible to be moral. The family living in the midst of polite society, which allows conventional public values to intrude into every corner of its life, can offer no moral or psychological support to its members.[102] The family which withdraws both physically and spiritually from the city at least provides a setting within which self-communion and self-expression could flourish. But it is not isolation as such that has a universal value; it is the mental ability to escape into oneself that matters. Men must learn to enter into their own hearts to find again the sources of virtue that society has stifled. This is a form of self-healing, a recovery of one's true self, which can always be attempted.[103] The good family encourages it, the bad prevents it. In these reflections Rousseau surely had a profound intuition of one of the functions that the primary family would fulfill in modern civilization: to shut out the public world and to protect its members against its pressures. Even when the social prerequisites of rural self-sufficiency have been destroyed, the family remains as the last refuge from a hostile external world, and also from those competitive and aggressive urges within each person which create and sustain organized oppression and which drive him back into it. The family might preserve at least a semblance of those gratifications which the progress of inequality has so systematically undermined.

Given the negative, defensive social purpose of the autonomous family group, it is not altogether surprising that Rousseau found it quite difficult to envision any communal ties among the separate households. The golden age is less pre-political than anti-political. "The entire universe is nothing to its inhabitants." After arranging marriages, neighbors do not have to meet often, and, indeed, prefer not to. There are no nations, no public units at all.[104] Nevertheless, Rousseau did suggest that these families might overcome their indifference to each other sufficiently to form some sort of political society. The Swiss canton is praised as the replica of such families, and the peasant in a "free state" is said to be the happiest of men.[105] This notion also guided Rousseau in his plan for Corsica. However,

[102] *N. H.*, "Séconde Préface," 19; Part II, Letter XVII.

[103] *Rousseau Juge de Jean-Jacques*, 687; "Lettre à Vernes," March 25, 1758, *C. G.*, II, 314-15; "Lettres Morales," VI; *ibid.*, 369-70; Starobinski, 50, 126.

[104] *Essai sur l'Origine des Langues*, 385, 392; Vaughan, II, 320 (*Corsica*).

[105] *N. H.*, Part I, Letter XXIII; Part V, Letter II.

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it is precisely this attempt that also reveals the political limitations of familial society. For it becomes plain that as long as it flourishes there is no real need for public organization and for the human dispositions that this involves. The first part of the Corsican project holds up rural Switzerland as the model to be imitated. Even the *Social Contract*, which is so much a distillation of the Spartan dream, contains a hint of this village model. The pure democracy of the Swiss canton shows the possibility of men who are as happy as they are equal and wise in their collective behavior. The Corsicans, afflicted by a general poverty, might learn to live as democratically, if they made equality the fundamental law of all their institutions. This, the true "système rustique," would give each family no object beyond keeping itself comfortable and perpetuating the existing state of affairs. Above all, no cities! There would be no conflicts of interest, since a shared poverty would give rise to no resentments; it is inequality that generates hostility. Under such circumstances a few magistrates chosen at frequent elections would provide all that was needed in the way of imposed government. Direct self-determination, as in the Swiss cantons, would take care of all other political needs.[106]

Idyllic as this prospect must have semed to Rousseau, he was not able to believe that the "true rustic system" could endure. Sooner or later *amour propre* would emerge to do its destructive worst. Moreover, he had been asked to provide a plan of government for the whole island of Corsica, not only for its individual villages. Both of these considerations forced him to abandon the Swiss canton and to return to Sparta for a model. After all, had he not, in the *Social Contract*, declared Corsica to be the last remaining place fit for civic legislation? With the discussion of public finances, the need for which is never made clear, Swiss imagery suddenly disappears from the Corsican project and is replaced by Spartan-Roman tones. The socialization of *amour propre* through civic integration replaces the calm of family life. Public pride, patriotism, and the whole program of denaturation are brought out again, implicitly demonstrating the fragility of the golden age.[107] The Corsican project is the only one of his works in which Rousseau seemed unable to choose between his two models. His failure to complete it may well owe

[106] Vaughan, II, 102-03 (*Contrat Social*); 309-34 (*Corsica*).
[107] *Ibid.*, 61 (*Contrat Social*); 336-38, 343-47 (*Corsica*).

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something to that fact. But his main concern was not forgotten, even here. The Corsicans are to remain underdeveloped, at any cost. Whatever they chose to become, men or citizens, Swiss or Romans, they were to avoid material progress, and with it, the implacable advances of inequality. Rousseau never wavered in this denial.

In advising the Corsicans to remain primitive Rousseau was not only protecting them against the evils of civilization. He was also expressing a general dislike of all change as such. Change was, in Rousseau's eyes, the proof of the imperfection of all human life. For it is imagination and memory, the sense of a lost past and of future possibilities, that prevent men from enjoying the present and from prolonging it by remaining inactive.[108] The golden age is dull and men are restless. That is its great defect.[109] It cannot last. It is a fault that also afflicts civic society.[110] Rousseau here went well beyond the obvious utopian consideration that a perfected model can suffer only changes for the worse, that here alteration and deterioration must be synonymous. He thought that any experience of change was always psychologically debilitating. Change meant uncertainty and upheaval for those who lived through it and as such it was at all times a source of suffering. Hope itself was psychologically disruptive, because it disturbed one's inner repose. Nothing set Rousseau more drastically apart from the prophets of progress than these psychological considerations. They also led him to regard social immobility as the best possible policy under all conditions, even iniquitous ones. Thus ancient Egypt, surely not his ideal, could be praised because sons had been forced to follow the occupations of their fathers.[111] The laws regulating inheritance of property and taxation should always aim at stabilizing the prospects of families.[112] Wolmar does his best to persuade his peasant neighbors to accept their social positions and to stay in their native village.[113] The purpose of these policies is always the same: to avoid ambition and frustration and to foster resignation.

Not only change, but social complexity also is disturbing. In fact

[108] See, for example, *Les Rêveries*, V, 1046.
[109] *Essai sur l'Origine des Langues*, 392-93.
[110] Vaughan, II, 91 (*Contrat Social*).
[111] *Emile*, 9; "Lettre à Christophe Beaumont, Archevêque de Paris," Hachette, III, 96.
[112] Vaughan, I, 259-60 (*Economie Politique*); II, 479-81 (*Poland*).
[113] *N. H.*, Part IV, Letter X; Part V, Letter II.

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the two go together. The division of labor is the source of both these related evils. Village society is not only uneventful, its social structure is elemental. In this it is the non-city, rather than any actual place. It is the sum of all that Rousseau missed in Paris. It is not a complex web of relationships, it is not based on specialization of functions, and, above all, it is not riven by the inequalities that necessarily mark urban life.[114] The division of labor, the vehicle of progress, was evidently nothing but an infernal engine in Rousseau's eyes. It is part of that process by which men have become the victims of a system they have themselves created.[115] Not only does it make for hostility between men forced to depend upon each other, but it deforms each one. Even in the unlikely event that there should be a society in which talents and employments were perfectly matched, and each person were to occupy the position for which he was suited, the division of labor would still impose hardships. For the cultivation of specialized talents does not fulfill any basic human need, while living a quiet and self-sufficient life does. Whatever the "objective" needs of society, the cost to its individual members was too high.[116]

V

The combination of a psychology and a moral outlook exclusively concerned with the needs of the individual, an extreme egalitarianism, and an intense dislike for change make it particularly useless to impose the conventional classifications of later political theory upon Rousseau. He was neither a traditionalist nor a revolutionary of any sort. So deep a hatred of inequality is a perpetual challenge to any known society. The demand that the psychological and moral integrity of individuals must be served before all else is always radical. Before such uncompromising standards all history stands condemned.[117] Nothing could be more radical than this criti-

[114] Vaughan, I, 176-79 (*Inégalité*).

[115] *Rousseau Juge de Jean-Jacques*, II, 828.

[116] *N. H.*, Part V, Letter II.

[117] Indeed, it is only by slighting this element in Rousseau's thought that it is possible to call him a "reactionary utopist"; for example, Alfred Cobban, *Rousseau and the Modern State* (London, 1934), 198. No less misleading are efforts to reduce him to a respectable conservative moralist; for example, Iring

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cism. It is just as clear that Rousseau's preference for peace, stability, and resignation is incompatible with any sort of social activism or programmatic politics. And, in fact, Rousseau was intent upon only one thing: judgment. To reveal the failures of actuality and to condem the unpardonable was enough. It was an exercise in indignation. To this end his two models were admirably suited. Together they showed what men had lost by failing to make their choice between humanity and citizenship, and how they had forever denied themselves both inner and social peace.

Although both models are remote from history and although men are never likely to be capable of making the necessary choice between them, they did represent the psychological poles between which the generations since Rousseau have oscillated. Whether to lose oneself in the service of the public cause or to cultivate the private joys was to be a choice that was to confront men continually, and which defined the possible forms of behavior open to them. It was not the least of Rousseau's merits that he was perfectly clear about the costs of either choice. The denial of one's *moi humain* and the rejection of a *moi commun* are both losses. The Spartan city excludes all private affections and associations, not only the family. It precludes contemplative and universal religiosity, as all inclinations are bent before xenophobia, communal isolation and pride, and a virtue that is sustained by the pressure of public opinion rather than by benevolence or love.[118] Village life would seem infinitely more attractive by comparison. Self-love here leads effortlessly to a love of humanity. A Christianity designed to comfort and console can flourish here.[119] Education is made to support the more amiable aspects of man's endowment, and to suit him to society without destroying these.[120] The lazy and stupid animal is socialized without being denatured. Nevertheless, this is not a faultless state either. It is stultifying in its dullness. The peasant or man of the golden age is brutish and stupid. He is quite capable of irrational

Fetscher, *Rousseaus Politische Philosophie* (Neuwied-Rhein, 1960), 259-62 and Bertrand de Jouvenel, "Essai sur la Politique de Rousseau," *Du Contrat Social* (Geneva, 1947), 18-20, 35-36, 131.

[118] Vaughan, I, 242-43 (*Economie Politique*); II, 42-43, 103-04 (*Contrat Social*).

[119] *N. H.*, "Séconde Préface," 16-17; *Rousseau Juge de Jean-Jacques*, I, 669-72, II, 864-65.

[120] *N. H.*, Part V, Letter VIII; *Emile*, 57-58.

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violence when he confronts anyone other than his family.[121] Happily he rarely does see anyone else. Rousseau was not blind to the coarseness of village life. Only the artificially created village, the cultivated family withdrawing to the land really seemed idyllic. This, too, has its flaws; the impact of civilization cannot be shaken off by mere physical escape. Its psychological imprint is indelible and warps or destroys these efforts to retreat into rustic life. To live like a peasant one must be a real peasant, and that is a condition which, although it is golden, is not lacking in blemishes. The wish to play a public role, to develop one's civic capacities, to belong to a purposeful order, to take part in an organized drama, is as much a part of a morally adult life as the desire to be a self-sufficient whole, united only with those whom one loves and independent of all that interferes with one's real needs. Choose, however, one must, or rather ought, even though one never does. To recognize the choice, at the very least, is to escape from the unthinking misery of actuality. Even if nothing is gained thereby in inner peace or social unity, one has been forced into an act of awareness which can never be undone. It was Rousseau's purpose to disturb the unconcerned, and he succeeded simply by drawing a map of the worlds that might be, but that never were or would be.

[121] Vaughan, I, 174-75 (*Inégalité*). In writing to his patron, M. de Luxembourg, Rousseau gave delightful and humorous accounts of Swiss peasant life which were not free from malice and certainly did not ignore the crudities of rustic man. Whether Rousseau was simply trying to amuse a great nobleman at the expense of his folk-heroes, or whether he was, for once, describing actuality as he knew it to be, is hard to say. In any case, it does point to the function of his model, which was less to idealize the simple life than to show up the evils of contemporary society. "Lettre à M. le Maréchal de Luxembourg," Jan. 20, 1763, *C. G.*, IX, 61-68.

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A Comment on Professor Sabine's "Pragmatic Approach to Politics"

THOMAS REED POWELL
With an Introduction by
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Introduction

At the meeting of the American Political Science Association held in New Orleans in December 1929, Professor George H. Sabine of Ohio State University delivered a paper entitled "The Pragmatic Approach to Politics," which was published in the November 1930 number of the American Political Science Review. *At the meeting Professor Thomas Reed Powell of the Harvard Law School delivered a prepared comment, which was not published. Recently Professor Lindsay Rogers discovered a copy of Professor Powell's manuscript, which had been sent to the* American Political Science Review *but had not been published for reasons that are not clear and on which one need not speculate publicly. Deeming the paper to be interesting enough for publication, he gave it to the editor of this* Quarterly, *who kindly asked me to supply an introduction that would give the setting.*

Professor Sabine's address was an earnest plea for what he called the pragmatic approach to political science, an approach which did not in his view entail any commitment to the more general philosophical position of pragmatism. After a brief statement of John Dewey's pragmatic view of knowledge, Professor Sabine de-

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voted the bulk of his paper to an account of studies in economics and law that might be taken as models for political science, notably the work of Thorstein Veblen and Wesley Mitchell and that of Walter Wheeler Cook and Herman Oliphant. In economics, he argued, what was called for was much greater attention to the interactions among numerous social processes, requiring for their understanding historical studies, quantitative analysis, and an institutional focus. In law his exemplars had shown what could be done through a more self-conscious examination of the ends of public policy coupled with a methodical and even experimental examination of possible means, doctrinal and institutional, for achieving those ends. The political scientist as well, he insisted, must concern himself with the interrelations of what have been conventionally regarded as separate lines of legal, political, and economic behavior.

The selection of Thomas Reed Powell as a commentator was a happy choice. He held a doctorate in political science and had of course served as managing editor of the QUARTERLY *before coming to the Harvard Law School; he thereby attained the distinction of becoming the enfant terrible of two disciplines. He liked to recount the reference to him by Justice Robert H. Jackson at a meeting of the American Political Science Association: "Professor Powell stands high in the imagination of two professions. The political scientists imagine him to be a great lawyer, and the lawyers imagine him to be a great political scientist." Beyond these professional credentials, and of greater relevance, was his attraction to the ways of thought of his friend, Columbia colleague, and fellow Vermonter, John Dewey. It was a highly fruitful colleagueship. Powell was fond of describing table talk with Dewey during which the philosopher would generalize about ways of thinking and the lawyer-political scientist would document the insights with illustrations from his own fields. Powell's own work showed his preoccupation with analysis of concepts in terms of their consequences in order to reach what he called judgmatical conclusions.*

But if he was intellectually an operationalist, he was operationally an intellectual, and thereby hung an uneasy problem for him. Could he claim to be a member in good standing of the society of pragmatists? Professor Sabine's paper caused him to wonder. In his commentary Professor Powell chose to eschew six-syllable words and to employ what he sometimes called his A. Simpleton style. In this vein

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and this style he reflected on the folkways of political science, the professors and departments thereof. I happened to be a student of his at the time the paper was delivered, and I remember how he shared his pleasure in it with companions of the day.

Professor Sabine's paper, by virtue of the very earnestness of its advocacy, no doubt betrays its date. Whether Professor Powell's essay ought to be regarded as a period piece or a blossoming perennial will be for the reader to decide. But at least it can be said that the essay is faithful to the Vermont sagacity of Robert Frost: "The way of understanding is partly mirth."

I have had the privilege of reading Professor Sabine's paper in full, and I have to confess that I have found it, in one important respect, quite disappointing. Professor Sabine cannot be a very profound philosopher, for he is quite easy for me to understand. But I do not know whether he will be so easy for the rest of you unless you know all about what John Dewey thinks about Why We Think, If We Do. So I will try to put it to you a little easier than Professor Sabine did.

In order to do any thinking, you first have to begin. You would think anyone would know that, but some people never thought about it. When you do think about it, you will see it is so. The next thing is, why does anyone begin? If everything is running all right, you can let it keep on running without thinking about it. You begin to think only when something comes up that makes you feel like it, like breaking your shoe-string. That puts you in a hole, and so you try to find out what the hole is and how you can get out of it. Then you begin to think so you can make up your mind what to do.

You can't know what it is you want to get out of unless you know what you are in. So when you begin to make up your mind about something, you have to find out what it is you are going to make up your mind about. How can you think about anything without knowing what you are thinking about? What is the use of thinking about anything unless you know what you are thinking about it *for*?

Now you aren't really thinking, they say, unless you are making up your mind to something. What you are making your mind up to is one of the things you are making up your mind about. This is the

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way it is. You have to think about all the different things you might make your mind up to before you can make up your mind which one it will be. If you pretend you will make up your mind one way, then you have to think what will happen if you do. I don't mean what would happen if you just made up your mind on its own inside, because probably nothing would happen, but I mean what would happen if you or somebody else did what you made up your mind it would be a good thing to do. When you get to thinking what would happen, you may make up your mind not to make your mind up that way. So you begin all over again and pretend you will make it up a different way and then think what would happen then. And so you go on and on. By the time you are an old man you may know what you are making your mind up about and what you are making it up to.

Now that, I think, is what Professor Sabine meant to tell you about the pragmatic thought about thinking. So you see it is very plain you should know what you are thinking about and what you are thinking about it *for* before you begin to think about it. Everything you can think about is hitched to some other things and you can't really think about one of them without thinking about the others, because anything that happens to one of them will make something else happen to the others that it is hitched to, and so on to the other things that are hitched to them. You can see from this how much time it will take if you really get started thinking, and so you want to be careful before you begin.

Right here is where I must begin to criticize Professor Sabine. He came way down here from Ohio to talk to some people called political scientists and he didn't start by thinking what kinds of people political scientists are. He just started off with a notion about them without thinking whether his notion was so. In the first place he took it for granted that political scientists are thinkers. Now that was very polite of him and I am sure we all appreciate the compliment. Since he thought that without really thinking about it, perhaps we may as well go on and make believe it is true, though it seems to me it is just the kind of thing Professor Sabine says we ought not to do without finding out whether we are right about it. The only reason for making believe something is just to get started, and just as soon as we start we should stop, and begin to think whether we can believe what we make believe we can.

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But I haven't time to stop to think about whether political scientists are thinkers, and I would rather not think about it anyway. In one way you may say that shows I am not a pragmatist, but in another way it shows I am, because I want to get back home without getting hurt.

The next thing I must criticize Professor Sabine for is that he seems to take it for granted that, if political scientists did think, it would be so they could do some good to the world. He seems to think they think about what they think is political science so they can help to turn government into better ways than it would be if they didn't think about it. Maybe that is another make-believe and maybe it is not true. That isn't the reason why they *have* to think. If they think for that reason, it is just because they want to. They can make their living and have a pleasant time without thinking how they can help to help government be better.

When we all began to think about government it was most likely because we had to pass an examination in a course that was called government. That made us think about what kind of a man the teacher was and what he would think about what we would write in an examination paper or say in a two-hour talk we would have to go through to get a doctor's degree. We knew what we were thinking about government for, and that helped us a lot in thinking what to think about and how to think about it.

It is the same now we are teachers and have stopped being students. The reason why we have to think about government is that we have to give courses in it or get another job and it is easier for most of us to keep on giving courses called government than to go to work. If we are smart enough, we find out we can keep on giving our courses without doing any very hard thinking. We have to find out some new things every now and then, unless all we are teaching is political theory, but it isn't so very hard to find them out. We belong to an Association that runs a magazine so we can find out new things without looking them up for ourselves. So few of our students take the magazine that it is pretty safe for us to say what it says without saying *it* is the one that says it. We can find out how many new cities have taken up with the city-manager plan, how many states have stopped electing the state engineer and turned to having him appointed, how many days Congress has spent in not doing anything, what cases the Supreme Court has decided that

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we can add to the list of those we learned from our teachers, and a lot of other things it is very useful for us to know so we can let our students see how we keep up to date and can teach them things our teachers didn't teach us because they hadn't happened then.

Perhaps I am speaking just as an older man who has as good a job as he can ever get and so doesn't have to do anything more than just keep on meeting his classes. There are younger men who would like to get better jobs either in the place they are in or in some other place. They know that the way to get a better job is not usually just to grow older but to do something else besides. It probably wouldn't help them much just to be better teachers, because that is something you can't see and feel and weigh, and it can't travel about to other places the way a book can. So those who want to get better jobs have to think about how to do it. There are people called publishers who send men around to tell them how. They tell them to write a textbook and to write it so it will be used by a lot of people. So they do. If all you want is a better job right in your own place, a textbook will usually bring it, no matter what kind of a textbook it is. If you would like to move to a new place, you may decide it would help to write a textbook with new ideas in it, or anyhow with some ideas in it. So when you begin to try to think up some new ideas, you may get to thinking that government is mixed up with other things and that it would be a good idea to write about these other things when you are writing about government. You may think that government *is* what government *does* and when you get to thinking about what it does you may get different names to your chapters than you would if you thought about government as something just hanging around like political theory without doing anything. But by the time you got this far, the man from the publisher would tell you he didn't know any college with a kind of a course like that, and so you would have to give up writing a textbook and then if you weren't too tired you might decide to write a book instead. If you keep on going much farther, you may turn into the kind of man Professor Sabine thought you were when he was writing his paper all by himself in Columbus before he came down here and met you.

Now perhaps I was wrong when I thought Professor Sabine thought that to start pragmatic thinking in political science you must want to help the world. He seems to think that is what starts John Dewey thinking pragmatically and that Walter Cook and

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Herman Oliphant are the same. They are all friends of mine and I know John and Herman do want to help the world because I have seen them actually spend time at it. I am not so sure about Walter. He may be just one of those queer creatures that want to feel satisfied inside themselves about whatever it is they are thinking about. Some folks are like that. They don't want to do anything to anyone else or to the world but they just want to get answers to questions in their own minds. I have seen Walter Cook spend time doing that about a thing called domicil. Sometimes he goes on and shows that other people's answers are bad answers and reached in a bad way, but that may not be to help the world but for some other reason. I don't feel sure that Mr. Veblen wanted to help the world. I think perhaps he just wanted to find out how it really was and when he found it out for himself he wrote it up in such a way as to make folks see that the way some other folks saw it was just a silly and funny make-believe way.

Perhaps Professor Sabine would agree with me that a man can have a pragmatic approach without wanting to help the world. I think John Dewey wants to help the world because he is John Dewey and not because he is a pragmatist. I don't think I think he is a pragmatist because he wants to help the world. I know some people who think they want to help the world and yet they think pragmatism is awful. Now you take Mr. Nicholas Murray Butler. He wants to help the world to stop fighting and to stop electing Democrats, but he thinks pragmatism is like osteopathy. I heard him say sociological jurisprudence was legal osteopathy, but that was before the Columbia Law School went into it and called it functional approach. Now he says it is fine for a law school to study what law does to what is not law, and at Columbia they talk about what good it will do to the law to study it the way they do with new names and new arrangements and a lot of new knowledge about the family and the business unit and the credit structure that you can't find printed in the reports of law suits. There is a lot of help-the-world talk about their program, but I think anyone might get up such a program just because he was curious to find out how the world really was without wanting to do anything about it. I think one reason why men who call themselves scholars or scientists talk so much these days about helping the world is that they like to get money to hire stenographers and get other people to

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work for them so they won't have to do it all themselves, and they know of big things called Foundations that have money to give away to help the world with. So if you make the Foundations think you want to help the world, you may get the Foundations to help you do what you want to do.

But I don't see that this is tied up especially with pragmatism. You take the American Law Institute. They want to help the world. They want to write up the law so it will be simple and easy for judges who need to have it simple and easy in order to know it when they see it. Somehow they think the law will be better if judges can have the law written up for them this way. But most of the men who are doing the writing are men who say that law is law and nothing else. They don't write about business because business is not law. They don't write about psychology because psychology is not law. They aren't like Mr. Veblen or John Dewey or Wesley Mitchell or Herman Oliphant who think that when things are hitched to other things in real life you have to study what they are hitched to if you want to know anything really true about them. If you have ever heard the American Law Institute kind of man talk about "the legal mind" you will know that they are the kind of pure thinkers that the pragmatists think are not a whole thinker but just a little part of a thinker.

So I guess we will all agree that just because you try to help the world you aren't turned into a pragmatist. Look at the preachers. But the real hard question is whether you can be a pragmatist without wanting to help the world. I think you can. I think you can be a pragmatist if all you want is to really find out about the world. Now of course if you really do find out something about the world, what you find out is likely to be useful to other people who want to do something to the world. But I should think it would be useful to those who want to hurt the world just as much as to those who want to help it. If anybody wants to do anything to the world or to any part of it, he has to know what he wants to do it *to* before he can know how to go about to do something to it.

Now you take coal that Professor Sabine spoke of and that Walton Hamilton wrote about with Miss Wright. They knew there was a coal problem because the papers said so and perhaps their pocketbook said so. Suppose they wanted to find out about it just so they could know. Wouldn't they do just what they did? If they had come

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to me to learn all the constitutional law there was about coal and I had told them, they wouldn't have got very far with the coal problem. They couldn't stop there if they really wanted to find out. You don't know very much if you know just constitutional law. No one would stop with knowing just constitutional law if he couldn't make his living by it. And it is just the same with political science or government or administration or whatever you call it. Political science isn't just about political science any more than constitutional law is just about constitutional law. They are handles to other things, and you have to know the things they are handles to if you want to know what kind of handles they are. No one would ever have thought anything different if they couldn't write books and give courses and make a living by just knowing parts of things even though you can't really know about those parts unless you know what they are part of and what part they are of it. You can't know what part they are of it without knowing the other parts, too.

Of course here is where the trouble comes in. The world is so full of a number of things that you have to stop somewhere. I suppose just the coal problem might take all your time. Then you would have to be a coalist instead of a political scientist. I don't say this would be a bad thing for the world, but it might be a bad thing for you. There would be new cities that had got city-managers and new states that had got budgets and new counties that had consolidated with cities and you wouldn't have time to find out about them and you might not get promoted. So it would be better to pick some little tiny problem to know all about instead of a big problem. Perhaps the only way to go after the big problems is to get a Social Science Research Council to get some money from a big Foundation and then hire other people to hire other people to find out instead of doing it yourself. But then it might be that the only pragmatist was the Foundation and every one else was just a political scientist or a statistician or a constitutional lawyer or something small like that.

Now what is really worrying me is whether a man can't be a pragmatist all by himself and still be a political scientist. I wish Professor Sabine had written about that, for it is a very pragmatic question for most of us. I don't see why you can't think pragmatically even if you don't think very far, so long as you know there is farther to think and that somebody ought to go ahead where you have left off. You take any law case in the Supreme Court where Mr.

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Butler or Mr. Sutherland writes an opinion on one side and Mr. Brandeis writes one on the other, and I think you will see that one of them thinks pragmatically and the other two don't. This may not be a good example because Mr. Brandeis doesn't just think, the way the other two do, but he looks up a lot of things besides or has his secretary do it for him. But Mr. Holmes thinks pragmatically part of the time, and he doesn't look up anything outside the law books. I wish Professor Sabine had told us something about how to think pragmatically without doing a lot of outside researching. I can't help thinking it can be done, especially if you are a philosopher. They can think just about thinking, and they can think pragmatically about it if they have a mind to.

Now you take sovereignty that Professor Sabine spoke of. I have read a lot of thinking about sovereignty that wasn't anywhere near being pragmatic. It was just making-believe pictures about ideas. But my friend John Dickinson wrote two pieces about sovereignty a while ago that were different. He showed how it happened that folks got to thinking about sovereignty and that what they thought about it *for* was what made them think about it the way they did. It was an idea made up to use for a certain purpose. I think the purpose was to make one law grow where a lot grew before. Now if they make up a legal idea for a certain purpose, people ought not to try to turn that legal idea for that purpose into an economic idea for another purpose. It is all right for them to get up a new idea for a new purpose, but it isn't right to make believe that it is really the same old idea just shined up a little and then try to put it over people when they aren't watching. If the idea is an idea about getting folks to mind when you tell them to, you turn it into just the opposite idea if you make it an idea to save them from minding when they don't want to, and you don't keep it from being a different idea by sticking to the same old name. So if the idea was made up just to cover things all inside a country, you shouldn't try to make believe that the idea has anything to do with things between two countries. We all know what the preachers do with creeds so people will have the fun of belonging to the church and still being sensible at the same time. That is pragmatic in one way but not in another. Now I don't know whether my friend John Dickinson is a regular member of the pragmatist church, but I think he thought pragmatically in those two articles when he said something like what I just

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told you. So thinking pragmatically doesn't mean you have to give up thinking about sovereignty but it just means you have to think about it sensibly. What John did was to think about what the idea was for, instead of doing like the others who thought about it as if it were just for itself or else stole the clothes off the idea to put them onto another idea and make believe it was the same idea when it was just the opposite.

Now it is time for me to stop although I have a lot more to say. I agree with all those examples Professor Sabine gave about Wesley Mitchell and Herman Oliphant and Walton Hamilton showing a pragmatic way to ask questions and get answers. That is one way to do it and a very good way. But I just wonder if it is the only way. I wonder if you can't be a pragmatist and still stay a political scientist. I wonder if there isn't a pragmatic way of looking at whatever you are looking at, even if you do it all by yourself and don't go around looking up a lot of things in the outside world and don't care whether the world is going to be helped by anything you are doing or thinking about. I don't know enough to answer these questions. It takes about all I have in me just to raise them. But I think they are worth raising. I want to be a pragmatist, but I don't want to work very hard. I think there must be other folks who feel the same way. So I wish Professor Sabine would tell us what he thinks about it. It was very good of him to come way down here to talk to us and I know he has done us a lot of good even if we are just political scientists and have got to stay so, now that we have got our Ph. D's and our jobs in that subject and the subject has a name in the college catalogues with a department and a head who has to keep the department going to keep being a head. I don't think Professor Sabine meant to be unkind, but some of the things he said sort of made me wonder whether it was so very much of a thing just to be a political scientist. I don't know as I would want to ask him whether he really meant it that way, but if he could think of anything to say that could give us some comfort and still help us to be better than we are, I know we would all be very grateful to him. Anyway I know we all want to thank him for what he has done already and we would thank him still more if he would answer some of the questions I have asked.

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A Prolegomenon to Reformation

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Three times in the past ten centuries faith has broken free of the shackles of institutionalized tradition and confounded the mighty and the learned by claiming to preach anew the Gospel of Apostolic Christianity. Three times in the second Christian millennium religious controversy has powerfully shaped the course of social change. The first of these great upheavals was the Gregorian reform in the second half of the eleventh century; the second was the reformation of the sixteenth century; the third is only now emerging and bids fair to be the most critical intellectual and social movement of the later twentieth century.

I

The experience of our own day has at long last allowed us to understand the naure of the sixteenth-century reformation. From the second decade of that century some of its very best minds constantly addressed themselves to one set of questions to the exclusion of all others: What is man's relationship to God and what kind of church and society does this kind of relationship demand? Out of this reconsideration of the meaning of Christianity came the new Protestant churches and sects and the reformed Catholicism engendered by the Council of Trent. Not since the eleventh century had the in-

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tellectual and emotional capacities of European society been so exhaustively devoted to religious debates, and not again until the late nineteen-fifties and sixties would ecclesiastical and secular institutions be so critically examined by a reforming spirit which found sanction against established authority in its consciousness of the recovery of the power and the spirit of Apostolic Christianity.

Historians have in general been a little embarrassed by the unrestrained intensity of sixteenth-century faith. It did not quite fit into the standard picture of the dawn of the modern world, an era which in contrast to the medieval age of faith that preceded it was supposedly characterized by secularism and materialism, by the sovereignty of the state, and by the proliferation and intensification of the capitalist mentality and new forms of business enterprise. For a hundred years, therefore, historians of the sixteenth century have desperately tried to establish a positive relationship between Protestantism on the one side and statism and capitalism on the other, so that reforming faith could be viewed as working together with royal sovereignty and entrepreneurial commerce and industry to give birth to the modern world. Liberal historians have consistently emphasized that Protestant teaching induced subjection of the church to the authority of the state and also valued the rights of individual conscience, in both these qualities standing in stark contrast to universalist and intolerant medieval Catholicism. Close examination shows that this interpretation is founded upon an anachronistic romanticization of sixteenth-century Protestantism, which was no more hospitable than medieval Catholicism to liberal ideals of an open society and freedom of conscience. The obscure voices on the extreme left wing of Protestant sectarianism who proposed respect for individual conscience of whatever religious persuasion were ignored or regarded as conducive to dangerous social subversion. At least 99½ per cent of sixteenth-century Protestants firmly believed that it was both just and necessary to use force to suppress intellectual error and propagate doctrinal truth. There were plenty of martyrs in the sixteenth century for one or another kind of theological proposition; there were no martyrs for freedom of conscience. In its Lutheran and Anglican forms, sixteenth-century Protestant thought did support and enhance royal authority, but in its Calvinist and radical Anabaptist varieties, Protestantism marked the revival of the doctrine of a purified Christian society under the

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absolute rule of a saintly theocracy, a doctrine which had been propounded by the Gregorian reformers in the eleventh century and Donatist heretics in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and which had been rejected by the consensus of theologians in the medieval church.

In the past half century several eminent scholars have found it necessary to establish a causal relationship between Protestantism and capitalism. In retrospect it now appears that they were agitated to undertake this difficult task by a fundamental misunderstanding of the pattern of economic growth in sixteenth-century Europe. They were fascinated by what appeared to be the rapid upsurge of commercial and industrial capitalism in Protestant Holland, England, and Northern Germany, while Catholic southern Europe was held to have slid into a precipitous economic decline marked by the Italian cities' failure to maintain their leadership in finance and trade and by the catastrophic inability of the Spaniards to take advantage of their imperial American wealth.

Subsequent research has severely weakened this clear-cut contrast between the aggressive northern Protestants advancing into the modern world with bourgeois thrift and enterprise and the Mediterranean peoples sinking into stagnation and poverty under the dead weight of medieval Catholicism. This interpretation of sixteenth-century economic history was a favorite liberal Victorian myth but does not quite fit the facts; twentieth-century scholars who felt impelled to establish a direct relationship between Protestantism and capitalism accepted the Victorian assumptions too easily at face value. The weight of empirical evidence strongly supports those astute critics, such as Winthrop S. Hudson and Sidney A. Burrell,[1] who have dissented from the facile association of Protestantism and capitalism. The Flemish cities remained loyal to traditional Catholicism while continuing to enjoy substantial commercial and financial prosperity, and the supposedly steep economic decline of Spain and Italy in the sixteenth century has been disproved by F. Braudel and other scholars. At the end of the sixteenth century the Mediterranean world, for all its devotion to the Council of Trent, the In-

[1] Winthrop S. Hudson, "The Weber Thesis Reexamined," *Church History*, XXX (1961), 88-99; Sidney A. Burrell, "Calvinism, Capitalism and the Middle Classes: Some Afterthoughts on an Old Problem," *Journal of Modern History*, XXXII (1960), 129-41.

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quisition, and the Jesuit order was still a thriving economic unit. The economic decline of Spain and Italy is largely a seventeenth-century phenomenon to which strictly political problems made important contributions.

Nor is it so clear that Protestant fervor necessarily implied capitalist enterprise. Fanatically Calvinist Scotland remained an intensely rural and backward economic area until the eighteenth century, while the Scandinavian countries, after their acceptance of Lutheranism, slowly retreated from their medieval involvement in international commerce, and by the end of the seventeenth century, at least in the case of Norway and Sweden, had become the underdeveloped areas they were to remain, for all their Protestant piety, until the twentieth century. Nor does the economic development of even Holland or England in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries represent the steady and unmitigated advancement of capitalist enterprise. The Dutch burghers flourished in commerce and banking in the late sixteenth and first three-quarters of the seventeenth century, but they proved totally incapable of effecting the industrialization which would have allowed them to maintain their leading place in European economic life; the hegemony of the merchant oligarchy of Holland proved as transient a phenomenon as the prominence in international finance and trade once enjoyed by the Florentines and Venetians. Nor did the break with Rome and even the spread of Calvinism in England prevent severe difficulties for English commerce and industry, periodic depressions, and a great slowing down of the pace of economic growth in the later sixteenth and earlier seventeenth centuries, as shown in the careful studies made by F. J. Fisher and B. E. Supple.[2]

The great debate which has waged among historians for four decades about the validity of the theses propounded by Max Weber and R. H. Tawney on the causal relationship between Protestantism and capitalism has, therefore, to some extent been needless and vain, since it has been based on false assumptions about the

[2] F. J. Fisher, "Commercial Trends and Policy in Sixteenth Century England," *Economic History Review*, X (1940) reprinted in E. M. Carus-Wilson (ed.), *Essays in Economic History*, I (London, 1954) 152-72; Fisher, "Tawney's Century," in Fisher (ed.), *Essays in the Economic and Social History of Tudor England* (London, 1961); B. E. Supple, *Commercial Policy and Change in England 1600-1642* (Cambridge, 1959).

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actual course of economic change in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe. When Weber tells us the Protestant ethic of asceticism-in-the-world (self-restraint, hard work in one's calling, frugality) fostered modern capitalism, we can admit that there may just be some merit in this psychological proposition. But our general reaction must be the skeptical comment that the capitalist spirit, defined as viewing business success as the primary motive in life, was painfully prominent in medieval urban society, and that the Protestant ethic by no means of itself furthered entrepreneurial enterprise in the sixteenth century. When Tawney, with the righteous and commendable indignation of a Christian socialist, argues in his justly celebrated *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* that capitalist greed corrupted Protestantism into a conformist social ethic, and that there was a potential inherent defect in the Calvinist mentality from the beginning which made it susceptible to becoming soft on capitalism, we again have to express grave doubts about the validity of this thesis. Our initial response is to point to the violently anti-capitalist character of sixteenth-century Protestant teaching and to the fact that in Scotland and Scandinavia Protestantism became ossified and stultified into social conformity by 1700 without the debilitating impact of capitalist greed. That later seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Protestant divines were sometimes apologetic for the accumulation of wealth is true enough, but then they were generally easy-going and conformist toward the world. As Winthrop Hudson has said, it was "the waning of Protestant faith," rather than the nature of the faith itself, which made possible this blessing of business success. Finally, it is necessary to reiterate that the advance of Protestantism in England was by no means concomitant with the steady rise of capitalist enterprise; the evidence perhaps reads more the other way. The period 1560-1640, which marks the rise and apotheosis of English Puritanism, was a very difficult time for English merchants who were frustrated by severe chronic trade depressions. They did far better in the first three decades of the sixteenth century, when they were still papists. The sermons of Puritan divines did not seem to have given the London merchants the inspiration to overcome some very fundamental obstacles which every capitalist entrepreneur must face, in the way of solving the problems of supply and demand. It would not be too far-fetched to draw from recent scholarship the ironic conclusion

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that the more devoutly Protestant the English became from 1560 to 1640, the less successful were they in business. Following Tawney's reasoning, the time is ripe for one of his many devoted disciples to write a book on "Religion and the Decline of Capitalism."

No other great movement in history has been as afflicted as the reformation of the sixteenth century by sober nonsense flowing from historians' pens. During the first half of the twentieth century historians have tried to ascribe the origins of the reformation to almost every conceivable cause and motive except religious ones. In particular, Marxist historians made an unholy alliance with partisan Catholic writers to discredit the profound religious experience of the sixteenth century and to vilify the spiritual quest of the reformers as either conscious or unconscious subterfuge for materialist or secularist ambitions. It is only the great Christian revival of the mid-twentieth century that has allowed the emergence of a new historiography of the reformation era. Out of this background both Catholic scholars like Hubert Jedin, who has given us an extremely perceptive account of the Council of Trent and its background, and Protestant historians like Gerhard Ritter, E. G. Schwiebert, G. H. Williams, and A. G. Dickens have emerged to interpret with a high seriousness the complex religious quest of sixteenth-century European society.[3] The great upheaval in twentieth-century Christianity engendered by neo-Pauline Protestantism, the ecumenical movement, Pope John XXIII, and the Second Vatican Council have impelled scholars to turn back to the sixteenth century and to find therein the similar impress of charismatic leadership, a similar manifestation of evangelical revolt against traditional authority, and a similar power of the Gospels to reach across institutional barriers of centuries' duration and to raise up a whole generation of missionary teachers brave enough to take on and transform the world. Once again the message of the present has alowed historians to comprehend the meaning of the past. They have at long last begun to examine the religious history of the sixteenth century from within and not merely as the appendage of statism and secularism.

[3] Hubert Jedin, *Geschichte des Konzils von Trient*, 2 Vols. (Freiburg, 1949-57; English translation, London, 1957-61); Gerhard Ritter, *Die Neugestaltung Europas im 16. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 1950); E. G. Schwiebert, *Luther and His Times* (St. Louis, 1950); G. H. Williams, *The Radical Reformation* (Philadelphia, 1962); A. G. Dickens, *The English Reformation* (New York, 1964).

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II

The history of the Christian faith has a life and integrity of its own. Until the latter part of the seventeenth century there is no reason to doubt that spiritual calling was as fundamental a cause of social change and a motive of individual action as political ambition and business profit-seeking. The reformation was by no means simply or even mainly a stalking-horse for statism, capitalism, or liberalism, although it ultimately contributed in one way or another, often very tenuously and indirectly, to the making of these conditions of modern society. At heart Protestantism was not modern or progressive; it was self-consciously reactionary. It was founded in attempts to rediscover the temperament and doctrine of Apostolic Christianity and to apply them in personal and social life. It may be that these efforts to rediscover and revaluate the pristine message of the church were foolish and troublesome, naive and imprudent, and that the result was liable to be anarchic and confused, so that a variety of new churches and sects would be the inevitable consequence. It may be that the reformers were recklessly rejecting the institutional wisdom derived from fifteen centuries of ecclesiastical development and undermining the stability of the social order. But the fact remains that the significance of the reformation can only be understood when we view it as a movement arising out of the depths of man's spiritual experience.

The more closely the religious history of the sixteenth century is investigated the more evident does it become that there were two reformations. One was a reforming of institutions, whether it involved the assertion of royal sovereignty over the church or the reconstruction and revitalization of existing ecclesiastical organization. The other reformation was a genuine *reformatio*, a reconsideration of the nature of Christianity. The first kind of reformation was an external phenomenon; the latter reformation looked inward in trying to discover how corrupt and impotent humanity could be made righteous by faith.

The two reformations loomed on the European horizon at roughly the same time, for while a professor of theology named Martin Luther, who taught in a new and second-rate German university, was struggling to understand the meaning of Pauline doctrine, monarchy throughout Western Europe was asserting an ever stronger

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control over the territorial churches, and ecclesiastical scholars were searching for ways to improve church government, religious education, and clerical discipline. The two reformations went along together, interacting with each other, now cooperating and now entering into conflicts which showed the underlying disparity, even contradiction, of the two movements. The two reformations overlapped not only in the same era and in the same country but within one individual, so that the young Luther was the greatest spokesman for spiritual reformation, while the older Luther, saddened and frightened by the apparent social anarchy his teaching had induced in the shape of the rebellion of the German peasantry, valued the external reconstruction of ecclesiastical institutions. And John Calvin was at all times a bifurcated religious teacher, who cemented together by the unsurpassed synthetic power of his towering intellect a radical theology and a conservative ecclesiology.

The resulting pattern of religious settlement in Europe was infinitely complex and varied markedly from country to country; it was a pattern that neither the institutional reformers nor the spiritual reformers had envisaged, but was the consequence of the confluence and interaction of their efforts, as well as of regional political, social, and economic peculiarities. Left to itself, the reforming of the church would have brought about a reconstruction or updating of medieval Catholicism to meet the circumstances of sixteenth-century civilization only a little more bold than the decrees of the Council of Trent. Left to itself, it is hard to imagine what would have been the result of the unchallenged running of the course of spiritual *reformatio*—perhaps the apocalyptic triumph of Apostolic Christianity over the forces of greed and power in society; perhaps the achievement of a puritan world-order in which the saints would guide men to living the life which Jesus had advocated, a life of love and humility; perhaps social upheaval and political anarchy; perhaps the turning of the world into a monastery, in Max Weber's phrase, beside which the demands made upon people by the sovereign state would appear moderate indeed. But neither the conservatives nor radicals were to have their own way in the sixteenth century. We must remember that the upshot of all the yearning, controversy, ardor, hatred, and bloodshed was no man's plan, but the legacy of the interlacing and clash of the two reformations

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operating within the context of royal government and landed and mercantile society.

III

Both sixteenth-century reformations had a common starting-point in widespread disaffection with the ossified and decadent late medieval church. They also had a common enemy in the familiar type of aristocratic Italian canon lawyer who made of the church a corporate jurisdiction and denounced anyone as a heretic who said this was an empty, unspiritual thing; therefore, the fundamental difference in the direction of the two reformations was easily obscured. Sixteenth-century religious leaders had a marvelous penchant for ambiguity and inconsistency, for talking at cross-purposes, for misunderstanding the drift of each other's doctrinal pronouncements, and for subtly shifting their own ground, sometimes without realizing it. They were constantly groping around the central issue of the struggle between institutionalized Christianity, more or less enlightened, learned, and benign, on the one side, and evangelical, personal faith on the other.

The young Luther of the period 1517-25 clearly defined the issue at the start, and in so doing shook European civilization to its foundations. His teaching was remarkable, as J. S. Whale has said, for "heartbreaking simplicity." Luther held that men are made righteous by God alone and not by institutions. "True faith is a work of God alone in us which transforms and regenerates us by the Power of God. . . . Oh, it is a living, energizing, active, powerful thing, this Faith." This obscure German friar had recaptured the central message of the Christian faith. St. Paul had understood it, but could not make it compatible with his concern to keep order in the church; St. Augustine had powerfully expressed this doctrine, but he was too much a Roman to escape from the traditional acceptance of institutionalized authority. St. Bernard of Clairvaux had glimpsed it, but he was too much a French aristocrat to fathom its social implications. Above all the twelfth century Donatist heretics had understood it, and from them it passed to William of Occam and the radical Franciscans, and in muted form to the fifteenth-century German mystics and the "modern devotion" movement in the Low Countries. These

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last three communicants of evangelical Christianity had a strong influence on the young Luther. But the old Luther mitigated his own doctrine; its social implications were found to be too radical—it put faith above not only bishops but kings and princes. The sixteenth century's morbid fear of anarchy closed in upon the evangelical spirit and tried to make it a less radical doctrine, one compatible with the world. In later Lutheranism and orthodox Calvinism, the evangelical reformation was muted and weakened, but in Anabaptism and left-wing English Puritanism it found an outlet which continued the struggle between the two reformations down to the second half of the seventeenth century.

Thus sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century Protestantism was divided into conservative and radical, institutional and evangelical forms. The young Luther, with his firm vision of the immediacy of man's experience of God's love, was the founder of the radical movement in Protestantism; the older Luther with his pettifogging replacement of transubstantiation by consubstantiation, his hierarchic social doctrine, his acceptance of princely authority over the church, was a leading advocate of the conservative institutional reformation. Catholicism, which in the medieval period offered the alternatives of institutional (orthodox) and evangelical (heretical) Christianity, elected at the Council of Trent to extirpate all vestiges of the evangelical tradition from its midst, a choice which some of the more sensitive minds of the mid-twentieth-century Catholic Church now find to have been mistaken. It is possible that in the late twentieth century Catholicism will, by fostering a radical evangelical movement, assume the historical role of left-wing Protestantism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

IV

The course of the reformation of the late nineteen-fifties and sixties allows us to understand the nature of the sixteenth-century reformation. The role which Pope John XXIII has played in our day was taken by Erasmus of Rotterdam, the universally respected Christian humanist, in the two decades after 1500. Both Pope John and Erasmus called for a modernization of the church, the common sense adaptation of its increasingly outmoded institutions and teachings to the circumstances of the contemporary world. Both gave release

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to long pent-up dissent from the overly legalistic attitudes and rigid doctrines of the canon lawyers who controlled the papal curia. Both wanted the church to become more of a religious institution which could move the hearts of men and to rely less on legal authority over its members; they wanted more love and spirituality and less business and politics on the part of the hierarchy. In a way they could only vaguely define, John and Erasmus wanted the priesthood to take as its model the earliest, apostolic church which had to win men's hearts and could not yet possibly subject them to judicial and political authority, which only became available to ecclesiastical leaders when the first Christian Roman emperor, Constantine, ascended the imperial throne in 313 A.D. This reforming program gained a chorus of approval throughout the church, and particularly from laymen. But the Erasmian program, and, it appears, the Johnine as well, opened the way for a radical, evangelical movement which did not simply wish to humanize and soften the church's institutional authority—it aimed to substitute the power of individual faith for the authority of ecclesiastical institutions.

The young Luther who contrasted *fiducia* with *assensus*, inner faith as against external, formal assent, was the spokesman for the evangelical reformation. For a century historians have tried to determine the roots of the Lutheran gospel and to account for the fantastically quick and profound response he stirred among so many of the best minds of Western Europe in the fifteen-twenties. Many of these explanations of Luther's rise have been vitiated by a failure to distinguish between the institutional and evangelical reformations, thereby completely missing the significance of Luther's teaching, and by searching for the causes of reformation in every form of human endeavor except the obvious one of religious experience. The demands for a higher standard of clerical learning and conduct coming from humanist circles, the new facility in communicating ideas through the printing-press, the use which princes could make of anticlericalism to strengthen their authority over the territorial churches, the transmission of reform ideas and the patronage of reformers by great merchants—these common explanations reveal the occasion but not the cause of Lutheranism.

Here again the course of the reformation of the nineteen-fifties and sixties illuminates the religious change of four centuries ago. A world without reason, a world where traditional leadership has

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failed to provide for human happiness, a world where all traditions and institutions have become corroded with absurdity, has left only individual feelings, personal commitment, and immediate experience to claim the sanctions of goodness and common sense. The bankruptcy of authority and tradition and the categorical imperative of personal relations and private morality—this is the dogma of the new generation of the nineteen-sixties. But the best theologians have been thinking along these lines for four decades. The sickness of Western society after the First World War forced the more sensitive religious thinkers to confront the primary facts of human existence —the weakness of man and the omnipotence and goodness of God: all else is dung and dross. The existential "decision" of full commitment to God propounded by Karl Barth and the neo-Lutherans in the nineteen-twenties has now a very wide currency in Protestant thought and has been taken up by the radical wing of the Catholic church; the latter, too, see faith in God's love as the only thing in the world not tinged with rottenness and absurdity.

This was the way it was, too, for many of the generation which came to maturity around the year 1500—Luther's generation. It was a peculiar generation, with little or no faith in institutions and traditions, whether of monarchy, aristocracy, church, or business, because for several decades all these social and political agencies had failed to achieve anything good or rational. For close to two centuries there had been chaos and decay in government, society, church, and economy. The traditional institutions of monarchy, aristocracy, and hierarchy seemed to have nothing to offer but corruption, anarchy, and misery. For the generation of 1500 the only fixed points left in the universe, the only things which did not carry the stamp of rottenness and absurdity were personal experience and the God of love. God alone could give meaning and hope to human life—not the kings, not the lords, not the bishops, not the guilds.

Luther's generation was astonishing for the extent of its cynicism and vulgarity and, at the same time, for the irresistible intensity of its religious and moral commitments, and for its compulsive exultation of nonconformity in the face of traditional authority—the contemporary parallel does not escape us. The generation of 1500 was that rare thing in European history, an existential generation, one which had no consciousness of anything good in the world except humanity transformed by faith in God's majesty and love. So many

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of the very best of this generation, many of enormous talent and energy, sacrificed their careers and even their lives to give themselves immediately to God, to be filled with energizing, living faith. To "have" God, Luther said, "is to go down on your knees," to commit your existence entirely to Him. There is no other meaningful and rational starting-point in life, there is no other authority for conduct that is not a snare and a delusion, a sick joke. The only categorical imperative is an inner one; as Luther's contemporary and disciple, the first great English Protestant writer, William Tyndale, expressed it, "As a man feeleth God in himself so is he to his neighbor. . . . Deeds are the fruit of love, and love is the fruit of faith."

V

Luther probably came to his existential doctrine by way of realizing that his father, who represented for him the best the world had to offer, was a hollow man. But in one way or another, hundreds of the best of his generation had similarly lost faith in the best the world had to offer, and instantly recognized their own convictions when the young German professor defined the primary fact of human existence: all righteousness is God's grace, not human merit. Justice is God's redemption of men, not the ordering of society. For Catholicism (and again, later for Calvin) the world can be transformed into a holy community. Luther thought this a ridiculous and dangerous delusion. The world, he said, has no goodness in it; it is and remains "refractory to the Holy Spirit." There can be no salvation in institutions. Faith for the young Luther is a total personal commitment, an "active" thing which consumes the whole of our existence and leaves no room for the absurd demands of institutionalized tradition and false claims for the goodness of societies. Social justice is the reflection of personal righteousness, not the other way around. "We become divine through love," says Luther, "which causes us to do good to our neighbour."

It was not so much the printing press which gave such wide currency to Luther's writings in the fifteen-twenties; it was more his ability to articulate the deepest anxieties and yearnings of the better minds of his generation. But for those who came to maturity in the fifteen-thirties, Luther's teaching no longer induced a spontaneous shock of recognition. By the time this next generation appeared

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the political, social, and economic failures of the world seemed to have been reversed. Leviathan had a new birth and Mammon found new ways to satisfy human greed. The redemptive righteousness of God had to face the challenge of the institutional righteousness of royal government and capitalist business. And John Calvin, who could so eloquently express Luther's evangelical idea—"We are not our own. . . . We belong to God"—was impelled by his legalistic cast of mind to expound a Protestant variant of the Catholic institutionalist doctrine, so that old priest now became new presbyter.

Only in England in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, in a society again made pessimistic by the indecisiveness of government and the bewildering decline of prosperity, did the left-wing Puritans perpetuate the evangelical reformation of the young Luther, with momentous consequences for the religious and political development of the English-speaking world. It is true that the advance of Calvinism in later Tudor England committed Puritanism to the neo-medieval, institutionalist ideal of the authority of the holy community. But William Haller's *Rise of Puritanism* (1938) reveals the subtle transition by which Calvinist institutionalism was undermined by the Puritan leaders' need to emphasize the primacy of personal religious experience and the claims of individual conscience—the "trying of the spirit"—against the sanctions of an Erastian national church. The current of evangelical reformation, emerging in England with William Tyndale and the first generation of Protestants in the fifteen-twenties, welled up again in early seventeenth-century Puritanism.

The reformation in England is an integral part of the general European reformation of the sixteenth century and follows the same broad pattern as the movement of religious events and ideas on the continent. It is necessary to emphasize this obvious fact because so many nineteenth- and twentieth-century historians of the English reformation, although not the majority of either Protestant or Catholic writers in the sixteenth century, have for partisan purposes, whether national or denominational, interpreted the English development as a peculiar phenomenon, distinct from the course of religious change on the continent. The extensive historical literature on the English reformation produced in the second half of the nineteenth century and shortly after 1900 is so strongly inspired by

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Roman, high and low Anglican, and sectarian Protestant commitments as to be mainly of value for the student of religious controversy in the Victorian era. The same judgment can be made of F. M. Powicke's general interpretive essay published in 1936, because it views the English reformation in a grossly tendentious and one-sided way as simply "an act of the state."[4]

In the vast literature of the English reformation only two works of synthesis meet high standards of historical scholarship and these are products of the nineteen-fifties and sixties. The three-volume work by Father Philip Hughes (1950-54)[5] is the most careful account of the English reformation written by a Roman Catholic. Its minutely detailed, almost day-by-day narrative is apparently designed to demonstrate the selfishness, confusions, and doubts that were involved in the process of reformation in England. Father Hughes convinces us of the accidents and injustices that marked the course of religious change in Tudor England, and we are left with the indelible impression that there was nothing inevitable and predetermined about the actual course of events. There were plenty of social pressures, mixed motives, personal failings, and awkward misunderstandings and fumblings involved in the English reformation, and the religious settlement that finally emerged was by no means the only one within the realm of possibility. These lessons are salutary, but they are presented at the price of underrating the force and deep current of evangelical feeling, which, while it did not determine, certainly gave a logic and thrust to the course of events.

Both the qualities and defects of Father Hughes' imposing study stand in marked contrast to the even more recent synthetic interpretation offered by A. G. Dickens. The long polemic against sixteenth-century English Protestantism conducted by socialist and Catholic writers was challenged by S. G. Rupp's *Studies in the Making of the English Protestant Tradition* (1947), which asserted that the English reformation of the fifteen-thirties was partly inspired by an evangelical tradition rising out of late medieval Lollardy. It is only as a result of Dickens' researches, however, that sufficient evidence

[4] F. M. Powicke, *The Reformation in England* (London, 1941. Originally published as part of volume IV of E. Eyre [ed.], *European Civilization* [London, 1936]).

[5] Philip Hughes, *The Reformation in England*, 3 Vols. (London, 1950-54).

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has been adduced to sustain the thesis that Protestantism in England represented a continuous current of evangelical religion flowing from fourteenth century heretical Lollardy into the fifteen-twenties, when it was widened and deepened by Lutheran and Anabaptist ideas coming across the channel. Dickens' one-volume account of *The English Reformation* (1964) is the best book by far ever written on the subject; it is learned, eloquent, and persuasive in its general thesis. The defects of this work are a somewhat deterministic and dialectical tendency to assume the inevitable triumph of Protestantism in England, a too easy acquiescence in the liberal Protestant assumption that the decrepitude of the early sixteenth-century church directly induced and somehow morally justifies the schisms and upheavals that followed, the playing down of the dumb disinterest or bewilderment of large masses of landed society with respect to the dramatic events at the center, and the cursory and inadequate treatment of the second wave of evangelical upheaval in the last four decades of the century.

Amid all the twists and turns, fumblings, confusions, false starts, inconsistencies, and absurdities of the religious history of Tudor England, a recognizable pattern of meaningful change is provided, as on the Continent, by two fundamental movements, that of institutional and evangelical reformations. The institutional reformation had its conservative side—improvement in church discipline and learning while retaining loyalty to Rome—and its radical side—royal headship of the church, schism with Rome, the sovereignty of king-in-parliament, and extensive nationalization of church property. This separated Roman Catholics from Anglo-Catholics, papists from Anglicans—the conservative side of the English institutional reformation is depicted for us in R. W. Chambers' biography of Sir Thomas More and the radical side in G. R. Elton's studies of Henrician government[6]—but it had little or nothing to do with religious experience, and it was by no means an irrevocable split. In most countries which remained loyal to the Roman church in the sixteenth century, there was an increase of royal control over church government and some expropriation of ecclesiastical property for use by

[6] R. W. Chambers, *Thomas More* (London, 1935); G. R. Elton, *The Tudor Revolution in Government* (Cambridge, 1953).

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royal treasuries. The extent of institutional reformation in England was disputed between conservative and radical institutional reformers largely as a matter of how the world-order should be organized. It was the evangelical reformation, drawing its inspiration from Lollardy, early Lutheranism, and Anabaptism which pressed for profound and irrevocable religious change.

The English evangelical reformers, at least in the fifteen-twenties and thirties, were not primarily interested in world-order; they wanted to set man right with God, and this involved far more than royal or papal headship of the church or extent of nationalization of ecclesiastical property. It involved the nature of the sacraments, the means of salvation, the privilege of reading and interpreting the Bible, the forms and efficacy of prayer, and the content of the liturgy. The radical institutionalists and evangelicals had some common ground for temporary alliance against the conservative institutionalists. The radical institutionalists conveniently separated from Rome, while the evangelicals violently hated the papacy as Anti-Christ, the Whore of Babylon; on this single point the two groups were in agreement and the anti-papal evangelical polemic could be useful to the statists. Furthermore, the specter of anarchic evangelical upheaval could be employed to frighten conservative clergy and laymen into accepting royal headship and nationalization as by far the lesser of two evils. The English evangelicals of the first generation, on their part, vehemently extolled the power of monarchy because the king was their only protection against heresy-hunting conservative bishops and because their belief in the self-evident truth of their doctrines was so great that they expected to be able to win the king and the royal court to undertake a full-scale religious reformation. This hope would prove vain for the most part before 1547 because while Henry VIII's great minister in the fifteen-thirties, Thomas Cromwell, may have been a crypto-Lutheran, and the Archbishop of Canterbury, Thomas Cranmer, was somewhat under the influence of the radical Swiss reformer, Ulrich Zwingli, the king himself never swerved from loyalty to the theological and sacramental traditions of medieval Catholicism. But it was of momentous consequence for the subsequent history of the English reformation that the royal government in the fifteen-twenties and thirties had allowed the spread and entrenchment of Protestantism in England.

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No subsequent reaction, not even the momentary return of the monarchy to the Roman church, could extirpate it, or even greatly diminish its force, and in the century after Henry VIII's death the shape of religious change in England would be mainly determined by the waxing and waning of the movement for evangelical "reformation without tarrying."

In the later decades of the sixteenth century, the continual frustrations experienced by the radical reformers in trying to win the Tudor monarchy to their side would slowly wear thin the Protestants' enthusiasm for royal authority. In the first half of the seventeenth century the alliance between the monarchy and the evangelical reform movement would break down altogether, and out of radical English Puritanism would come a host of novel doctrines which we associate with the modern world: the liberal ideal of freedom of conscience, political democracy, republicanism, and on the extreme left the advocacy of communism. Thus, in the end, the sixteenth-century reformation was a harbinger of the modern world. But it was not liberalism, capitalism, and statism which produced the reformation. Rather it was the evangelical side of the reformation which was forced to turn against the established order in England and in so doing gave vent to political and social doctrines which sounded the death-knell of monarchical, aristocratic, and hierarchic European society.

If historians insist on isolating one aspect of human experience as the primary determinant of social change in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, they could make the most plausible case for the overwhelming thrust of evangelical faith, which, finding no satisfaction within prevailing social and political forms, eventually tried to supersede them by advocating a brave new world. When Luther in the fifteen-twenties discovered that evangelical reformation threatened the stability of society and aroused fear and hatred in princes and lords, he mitigated the radical tendencies of his teaching. The left-wing English Puritans did just the opposite; they tried to overthrow the prevailing social order. Although defeated by the landed oligarchy, the Puritans inaugurated a new era in European history when they announced, first, that "it is conscience, not the power of man, that will drive us to seek the Lord's kingdom," and, then, that "the poorest he that is in England has a life to live as the richest he."

The first great upheaval in post-Apostolic Christianity, the Gre-

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gorian Reform of the eleventh century, followed a similarly revolutionary and surprising course. There is no good reason to doubt that the ultimate effects of the twentieth-century reformation will be as shattering and as unanticipated by the first generation of reformers.

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Who Voted for Goldwater: The Wisconsin Case

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Barry Goldwater's 1964 presidential candidacy raised a number of interesting questions for professional students of voting behavior. For example, how valid is the theory, long expounded by conservatives, that millions of conservative voters have been sitting out presidential elections because a succession of "me-too" Republican candidates have offered them "not a choice but an echo"? For another, Governor Wallace's surprising showing in the Wisconsin, Indiana, and Maryland presidential primaries in the Spring appeared to result from a substantial northern "white backlash"; would it continue to operate in the general election and swing millions of normally Democratic votes to Goldwater? For yet another, was Goldwater the preference of most Republican identifiers or only of the most partisan Republicans?

The election results showed in unmistakable if scientifically gross terms that the Goldwater experiment was not a great success for the Republican party. Lyndon Johnson was re-elected with the largest popular plurality in history, and whatever satisfaction the Republicans gained from sweeping the deep South for the first time since Reconstruction was soured by the pain of losing all the other states except Goldwater's own Arizona. But for students of voting behavior some questions remain. Which Republican voters stayed with Goldwater in the face of his massive repudiation by the national electorate? Which normally Republican voters shifted to John-

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son? How many Democrats switched to Goldwater, and who were they? How valid is the post-election conservative claim that Goldwater's 26,860,000 voters are all convinced conservatives and provide a firm base for an eventual conservative takeover?

Wisconsin is a good state for answering some of these questions. It gave Johnson 62.2 per cent of its two-party popular vote, as compared with the nation's 61.4 per cent. It has traditionally been Republican in presidential elections, voting overwhelmingly for Eisenhower in 1952 and 1956 and more narrowly for Nixon in 1960. Moreover, the state's Republican party organization, consisting heavily of dues-paying activists rather than office-holders or patronage-seekers, was enthusiastically for Goldwater's nomination as it had been for Taft's in 1952. The Republican state chairman preferred Goldwater both before and after his nomination. Although the organization was pledged to a favorite-son candidate before the convention in order to avoid a Rockefeller-Goldwater primary fight, at the convention the great bulk of the Wisconsin delegates voted to commit the entire delegation to Goldwater.

So Wisconsin provides favorable ground for testing the conservative theory that the voters long for a true conservative. The election results demolished the theory, but the state remains a particularly useful place to study why the theory was wrong. It is also a convenient place for the present writers to study. The Survey Research Laboratory at the University of Wisconsin conducted a clustered area probability sample survey of 702 adult respondents in November and December of 1964.* Assuming the representativeness of the sample, our data show an over-report of voting: 78.8 per cent of the sample say they voted for president while only 70.1 per cent of the age-eligible population actually voted.[1] They also show an over-report of the Johnson vote: 54.5 per cent of the sample say they voted for Johnson and 24.3 per cent for Goldwater, while the actual figures were 43.6 per cent for Johnson and 26.5

* We thank the staff of the Wisconsin Survey Research Laboratory, under the direction of Professor Harry Sharp, for collecting our data, and the Data Processing Center of the School of Commerce, University of Wisconsin, for the use of its computer facilities. All tables follow the text.

[1] The seventy per cent figure is arrived at by taking Wisconsin's total popular presidential vote as a percentage of the estimated adult population of Wisconsin in 1964 (2,408,000).

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per cent for Goldwater. The over-report for Johnson is large, but, barring sampling error, it is likely that it reflects an unusually great halo effect stemming from a President just re-elected by the greatest landslide ever.

The survey-reported Goldwater vote, on the other hand, is 2.2 percentage points below the actual Goldwater poll. In the circumstances, it is reasonable to regard the twenty-four per cent of our sample who say they voted for Goldwater as almost certainly among the actual Goldwater voters. We cannot make a comparable assumption about those who say they voted for Johnson; probably a substantial minority of them did not vote at all, and perhaps a few voted for Goldwater. These considerations raise questions about the precision of our analysis, but they do not make it invalid. We believe we have the hard-core Goldwater vote well represented in our sample, and we believe it can be meaningfully compared with all those who say they voted for Johnson whether or not they actually did. We propose to compare the two groups in party identification, education, age, and attitudes toward certain campaign issues.

Party Identifiers

For eliciting party identifications, we used the questions made familiar by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan. In our sample, Democratic preferences outnumber Republican by a three-to-two margin, which is larger than the already notable Democratic margin in a comparable survey made eighteen months earlier,[2] and probably reflects the low prestige of Republicanism immediately after its crushing defeat. Thus our smaller-than-usual proportion of Republican identifiers is likely to have a good claim to being called "real Republicans" in the sense of loyalty in the face of disaster. It is noteworthy, therefore, that Goldwater lost appreciable numbers of these Republicans. In each Republican category (Strong Republican, Ordinary Republican, Independent Republican) Goldwater's percentage, while a majority in each group, is lower than Johnson's percentage in the comparable Democratic category (Table 1). Several other significant facts are apparent in Table 1. The Independents expressing no party leaning are four-to-one for Johnson. There are only a few Democratic defections to Goldwater,

[2] Party identification from two Wisconsin surveys in the spring of 1963 is given in Leon D. Epstein, *Votes and Taxes* (Madison, 1964), 42, Table 7.

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suggesting hardly any presidential switching by Democrats resulting from the much-discussed white working-class backlash on civil rights. And there is more reported non-voting among Republican than Democratic identifiers, notably in the largest category of ordinary party identifiers. This is a reversal of the usual relationships observed between party preferences and turnout rates.

The most striking fact evident in Table 1 is that Goldwater, the very model of the "real Republican" demanded by conservative theorists, did not bring out the stay-at-home Republican identifiers as he was supposed to do. On the other hand, he did far better among Strong Republicans, most of them voters, than he did in any other category, and the percentage of Strong Republicans defecting to Johnson is very small.

Other data support our finding that Goldwater's main support came from Strong Republican identifiers. Of course, any candidate can be expected to poll his highest percentage among his party's strongest supporters. What is striking in the Goldwater case is that he did so well in this category while doing so poorly in every other.

Goldwater was clearly the organizational Republicans' choice in the election as for the nomination. Table 2 shows this in its analysis of "activists"—respondents who said they had belonged to a party (in the sense of paying dues or having a membership card), done campaign work, and/or contributed money.[3] Altogether, 160 of our respondents said yes to one or more of these questions. They are compared with all others (called non-activists) grouped according to party preference. The table shows that Goldwater held the Republican activists almost as well as Johnson held their Democratic counterparts, but Goldwater did much worse among Republican non-activists than Johnson among comparable Democrats.

That Goldwater lost many ordinary non-activist Republican identifiers can be inferred from the election returns as well as from

[3] Both Wisconsin parties have dues-paying memberships and organized voluntary activities especially in urban counties. Among our respondents, fifty-four said they had belonged to a party, ninety-four that they had done campaign work, and ninety-four that they had contributed money to a party or candidate. There was considerable overlapping but by no means complete coincidence of affirmative responses; thus the total of 160 represents those who said yes to at least one of the three questions.

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our survey data. Still it is worth describing the nature of his loss in two other ways. Table 3 does so by relating gubernatorial voting to presidential voting. The simultaneously conducted Wisconsin gubernatorial election of 1964 provides an especially useful measure of potential Republican strength. It was a heavily partisan contest between an orthodox Republican candidate (Warren Knowles), who had neither opposed nor enthusiastically supported Goldwater, and an orthodox liberal Democratic incumbent (John Reynolds), who bore the usual gubernatorial liability of an association with higher taxes. The result was a Republican victory by a very narrow margin—smaller than shown in our survey data. Goldwater, it can be observed in Table 3, received little more than half of the Republican gubernatorial candidate's professed voters, while Johnson held almost all of the Democratic candidate's.

Another measure of Goldwater's weakness among Republican identifiers is displayed in Table 4, which shows the distribution of voters according to the party primary in which they cast ballots in the preceding September. Even in Wisconsin, whose open primary law allows Democratic identifiers to vote in Republican primaries and vice versa, voting in a given party's primary indicates at least a potential vote for that party's candidates in the subsequent general election. But roughly one quarter of Wisconsin's Republican primary voters deserted Goldwater in November (Table 4).

Education and Age

We have data for all the usual socio-economic correlates of voting behavior, including occupation, income, size-of-place, and religion. None of these discloses anything other than the expected decrease of Goldwater's percentage from the usual Republican percentage in each category. Accordingly, we omit all but our findings by educational and age classifications. The educational breakdown is worth attention in order to examine, in what is the most convenient setting, the widely held view that Goldwater suffered marked losses in the higher socio-economic status groups. In simple form this appears to be confirmed in Table 5. Goldwater failed to win even a majority of the college-educated despite the usual preponderance of Republican voting in this group. Table 6 clarifies what happened. Here each educational group is divided by party identification (collapsed to three categories of Republican, Independent, and Demo-

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cratic). It becomes evident that Goldwater did not lose many college-educated Republicans—not nearly so many Republicans as he lost in either the grade or high school categories.[4] What caused his failure to win a majority among all the college-educated was principally his severe loss among Independents. But even this loss was not so great as his loss among those Independents with only grade or high school educations. Accordingly, it cannot be said that Goldwater fared worst among the most educated. On the contrary, while he did poorly here as elsewhere, the college-educated Republicans, and to a lesser extent the college-educated Independents, stayed more Republican than the other educational groups. This is not surprising. Like Strong Republicans and Republican activists, also relatively loyal to Goldwater, the college-educated can be expected to have more stable partisan preferences.

Our findings on presidential vote by age categories (Table 7) are presented because they display so clearly the relatively strong Goldwater vote among those over sixty. It is sharply higher than in any other category over thirty, and it is also higher than the slightly better than average Goldwater poll in the group under thirty. Goldwater's good showing in the upper age group is consistent with the established fact that this group is generally more Republican and less changeable than other age groups.

Issues

We obtained data on issues by listing seventeen items on a card, asking respondents the degree of importance they attached to each item in influencing their presidential preference, and also asking them which item was the most important in influencing their presidential choice.[5] The latter question provided the more meaningful results, although they corresponded closely with the results from the

[4] It should be added, however, that college-educated Republicans were more frequently non-voters, by a substantial margin, than were college-educated Democrats.

[5] The seventeen items were: (a) First, how important to you was the candi- . . . date's political party? (b) the candidate's personality? (c) . . . the candidate's experience? (d) . . . the candidate's intelligence and judgment? (e) . . . the farm program he supported? (f) . . . the vice-presidential candidate he ran with? (g) . . . the candidate's attitude toward business? (h) . . . his attitude toward labor? (i) . . . his general conservative or liberal philosophy? (j) . . . his stand on

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first question. Interestingly, the "stand on Negro civil rights" of the presidential candidates was rated as most important by only six per cent of the respondents, and as very important on the prior question by only thirty per cent—lower than nine of the other items in the list of seventeen. The four leading items on the "most important" rating were: the candidate's intelligence and judgment (eighteen per cent), the need to maintain peace (sixteen per cent), the candidate's experience (sixteen per cent), and the need to fight Communism (nine per cent). All of these were also listed as very important by considerably larger numbers—over forty per cent in each case—and the need to keep the peace was so ranked by a striking sixty-four per cent. Generally the salience of foreign policy questions was apparent. Both Vietnam and Cuba were thought very important by over forty per cent. Ranking well behind were such domestic issues as the farm program, attitude toward business, and attitude toward labor, as well as Negro civil rights.

We have chosen the four leading issues for closer analysis. In Table 8 Goldwater can be observed to lose among respondents in the three largest categories, and to fall well behind his overall twenty-four per cent mark among the respondents for whom keeping the peace or experience of the candidate was the most important issue. However, among those for whom the need to fight Communism was most important, there is a sharp reversal. The net advantage to Goldwater is limited by the size of the group, and, as Table 9 indicates, by the fact that it is only in the Republican half of this group that Goldwater accumulates his margin. The small portion of Independents and especially of Democrats for whom fighting Communism is salient voted for Johnson almost as heavily as did other Independents and Democrats. In fact, the most striking pattern in Table 9 is Goldwater's poor showing among Independents on each of the four issues. Worth noting also is that even among Republicans Goldwater polled only a little more than one quarter on the experience item, and fell short of half on the peace issue.

As already stated, the salience of Negro civil rights was not high. Wisconsin's Negro population is too small to make much direct

Negro civil rights? (k) ... his stand on states' rights? (l) ... prosperity in the country? (m) ... the need to fight Communism? (n) ... the need to maintain peace? (o) ... the war in Vietnam? (p) ... the Cuban situation? (q) ... economy in government?

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contribution to the issue's salience, and evidently the "white backlash," while perhaps real enough in other aspects of Wisconsin politics, did not play a major role in November's presidential voting. Nevertheless, we have tried to examine the relation of civil rights views to presidential voting by tabulating responses to a question asking respondents whether the Republican party or the Democratic party was closer to the way they felt about government helping Negroes through civil rights legislation. As the numbers in Table 10 reveal, the Democratic party's perceived position was overwhelmingly the more popular (fifty-eight per cent preferred it, as compared with sixteen per cent for the Republican position and twenty-six per cent for the "neither" or "don't know" responses). Thus, while Goldwater held over two-thirds of those who preferred the Republican position, there were not many in this category to begin with; and Johnson held almost three-quarters of the much larger number preferring the Democratic position.

Conclusion

Contrasting the Goldwater voters with what are most appropriately called the non-Goldwater voters in the 1964 Wisconsin election, it is clear that Goldwater did well only among heavily committed Republicans, meaning Strong Republicans on the customary index of party identification, or activist Republicans in our own classification.[6] This is supported by his better showing among college-educated Republicans than non-college Republicans, by his better showing among persons over sixty, and by his particularly strong poll among Republican voters for whom fighting Communism is salient and among those voters for whom the Republican party's position on Negro civil rights is preferred to the Democrats'.

Since it is from such groups, notably the party activists, that the Wisconsin Republican organization derives its presidential preferences, there can be no doubt about the basis of the state party's

[6] Our findings, especially those based on the activist analysis, are consonant with the important fact, revealed in an innovative national study by the Survey Research Center, that the letter-writing public shared the ideological commitment of the Goldwater campaign in a way that the general public did not. Philip E. Converse, Aage R. Clausen, and Warren E. Miller, "Electoral Myth and Reality: The 1964 Election," *American Political Science Review*, LIX (1965), 321-36.

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support for Goldwater before and after the San Francisco national convention. Nor can there be any doubt that this support represented a significant segment of Wisconsin voters. Still, as the election showed, it was only a minority. And, as our findings show, it was a minority composed of the most confirmed Republicans—who are most likely to vote for *any* Republican candidate. Among ordinary Republicans, as shown by party identification, gubernatorial voting, and primary voting, Goldwater fared poorly. Finally, he did not successfully reach even the non-voting Republicans, as conservatives had predicted a "real Republican" would.

TABLE 1

Party Identification and Presidential Vote

	Party Identification						
	Strong		*Ind.*		*Ind.*		*Strong*
Presidential Vote	*Rep.*	*Rep.*	*Rep.*	*Ind.*	*Dem.*	*Dem.*	*Dem.*
Goldwater	78%	50%	55%	12%	4%	7%	3%
Johnson	9	22	20	54	70	78	87
Neither; didn't vote*	13	28	25	34	26	15	10
	100%**	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	79	116	44	76	84	176	121

*In this and subsequent tables, the "neither; didn't vote" category consists mainly of non-voters.

**In this and subsequent tables, the total per cent is given as 100 even though rounding off the component per cents sometimes produces a total of 99 or 101.

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TABLE 2

Party Activists and Presidential Vote

	*Party Identification**					
	Republicans		*Democrats*		*Independents*	
Presidential Vote	*Activ-ists*	*Nonac-tivists*	*Activ-ists*	*Nonac-tivists*	*Activ-ists*	*Nonac-tivists*
Goldwater	82%	51%	2%	5%	9%	12%
Johnson	9	21	89	77	64	52
Neither; didn't vote	9	28	9	18	27	36
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	68	171	81	300	11	65

*Party identification categories have been collapsed so that Republicans include Strong Republicans, Republicans, and Independent Republicans; Democrats include the comparable Democratic categories; and Independents include those with no party leanings.

TABLE 3

Gubernatorial Vote and Presidential Vote

	Gubernatorial Vote		
Presidential Vote	*Knowles (Rep.)*	*Reynolds (Dem.)*	*Neither; didn't vote*
Goldwater	54%	5%	1%
Johnson	46	95	6
Neither; didn't vote	*	*	93
	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	291	253	158

*Less than 0.5 per cent.

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TABLE 4

Primary Vote and Presidential Vote

	September Primary Voted In		
Presidential Vote	*Republican*	*Democratic*	*Didn't Vote*
Goldwater	74%	6%	17%
Johnson	24	92	49
Neither; didn't vote	2	2	34
	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	118	156	421

TABLE 5

Education and Presidential Vote

	*Education**		
Presidential Vote	*Elementary*	*Secondary*	*College*
Goldwater	17%	23%	43%
Johnson	55	57	46
Neither; didn't vote	28	20	11
	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	210	378	114

*Elementary means no more than grade school; secondary means at least some high school and/or vocational school; college means at least some college work.

TABLE 6—See page 94.

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TABLE 7
Age and Presidential Vote

	Age				
Presidential Vote	*21-29*	*30-39*	*40-49*	*50-59*	*60 and over*
Goldwater	26%	19%	20%	21%	34%
Johnson	52	58	63	54	47
Neither; didn't vote	22	23	17	25	19
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	123	140	132	128	178

TABLE 8
Issue Importance and Presidential Vote

	*Most Important Issue**			
Presidential Vote	*Experience*	*Intelligence*	*Communism*	*Peace*
Goldwater	9%	25%	48%	17%
Johnson	70	57	37	62
Neither; didn't vote	21	18	15	21
	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	110	128	60	110

*See text and footnote 5 for explanation and listing of issue items.

TABLE 9—See page 94.

TABLE 10
Views of Government Policy Toward Negroes and Presidential Vote

	Party Closer to Own View of Government Help to Negroes		
Presidential Vote	*Republican*	*Democratic*	*Other**
Goldwater	67%	10%	30%
Johnson	17	73	36
Neither; didn't vote	16	17	34
	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	113	408	181

*Includes "don't know," "both the same," and "neither."

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TABLE 6 Education and Party Identification Related to Presidential Vote

	Education*											
	Elementary			Secondary			College			All		
Presidential Vote	*Rep.***	*Ind.*	*Dem.*	*Rep.*	*Ind.*	*Dem.*	*Rep.*	*Ind.*	*Dem.*	*Rep.*	*Ind.*	*Dem.*
Goldwater	47%	10%	4%	66%	17%	5%	70%	29%	11%	61%	18%	5%
Johnson	24	53	76	11	53	84	18	57	85	17	53	81
Neither; didn't vote	29	37	20	23	30	11	12	14	4	22	29	14
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	58	49	100	87	120	167	51	35	28	196	204	298

*Education is as defined for Table 5.

**Party identification categories differ from those for Table 2: in Table 6 "Republican" includes only Strong and ordinary Republicans, "Democrat" includes only Strong and ordinary Democrats, and Independents all the remainder (Independent Republicans, Independents, and Independent Democrats).

TABLE 9 Issue Importance to Party Identifiers and Presidential Vote

	Party Identification*											
	Republicans				Independents				Democrats			
Presidential Vote	*Experience*	*Intelligence*	*Communism*	*Peace*	*Experience*	*Intelligence*	*Communism*	*Peace*	*Experience*	*Intelligence*	*Communism*	*Peace*
Goldwater	28%	70%	73%	48%	10%	14%	33%	12%	3%	4%	8%	4%
Johnson	56	12	10	30	57	53	56	59	82	90	75	82
Neither; didn't vote	16	18	17	22	33	33	11	29	15	6	17	14
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	18	34	30	27	30	43	18	34	61	51	12	49

* Party identification as in Table 6.

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Book Reviews

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Government Action and Morality *by R. S. Downie. London, The Macmillan Company, and New York, St. Martin's Press, 1964.—x, 149 pp. 21s.*

The Symbolic Uses of Politics *by Murray Edelman. Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1964.—201 pp. $5.00.*

Each of the three volumes under review deals with political theory in some sense, especially democratic theory; but otherwise they have little in common. Edelman confines himself to descriptive theory; Downie is concerned with moral and political philosophy and the application of morality to politics; and Catlin touches on both descriptive and prescriptive political theory. Downie's book is marked for its clarity of organization and expression; Edelman's is notable for the persistent application to all phases of politics and government of a fertile idea which, while not novel, is insufficiently explored in political science research and inadequately taken into account by political theorists.

Research has amply documented the weaknesses of public opinion; and the linkage between voters and the determination of public policy is well known to be extremely tenuous. Traditional democratic theory has been dealt heavy blows by these findings. How is the resultant gap to be filled? This is the question to which Edelman largely directs his attention. His answer is that the political institutions of democracy play a symbolic and expressive role. They provide the political consumer with needed reassurance, helping to close the gap between belief systems and reality, and between the demands of conflicting interests. Bagehot's dis-

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tinction between the "ceremonial" and the "efficient" organs of government is here brought up to date, showing, among other things, that symbolism is not confined to pageantry and that much that appears to be rationally functional actually performs different functions, through different psychological mechanisms, from what the naive observer would be likely to assume. Bringing together the results of many studies, including some of his own, the author provides the fullest and most systematic account of this subject presently available. Perhaps he lays rather too much emphasis upon the role of political and governmental institutions in producing public quiescence in the face of governmental failures to deliver what has been promised. He does not document his assertions that government does fail much of the time or his implicit assumption that vastly greater response to demands is feasible or even possible. Why government does satisfy demands and needs as much as it does, in view of the absence of effective voter control of policy, is a question to which the author does not address himself. This last statement is not made as a criticism of the book but as an indication of the niche it fills in democratic theory and of what remains to be done.

Mr. Downie is concerned, first of all, with the justification of justification—that is to say, with vindicating the role of the political philosopher not only as clarifier and recommender but also as justifier, pointing out that justification may operate on many levels, that it need not be based upon metaphysics, and that, at a very useful level, it may simply seek to show what is implicit in the assumptions shared generally by liberal democrats. At a slightly higher level, rules of moral philosophy may be shown to be essential to the production of social harmony and social cooperation, to the satisfaction of needs, desires, and moral ideals. The argument here is intriguing and persuasive—especially in showing the close correspondence between the roles of government and of morality. It would be interesting to know how the author would deal with Edelman's contention that what people desire is to an important degree determined—often unwittingly—by government itself. Yet his basic proposition—that liberal democrats do see government as acting as a moral intermediary, as a means for establishing rules that facilitate both the performance of duties and the furtherance of men's moral ideals—is a proposition that does not conflict with anything that Edelman says; it simply operates on a different level. One of Downie's prime concerns is to show that this proposition holds for the outward-looking acts of government as well as for domestic legislation and administration. Foreign policy, he persuasively contends, is not an area in which entirely different criteria of judgment apply. The liberal democratic tradition, when fully explicated, calls for governments to act morally in international relations

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and even, on occasion, to act contrary to national self-interest. There is, he asserts, no instance of a government having lost an election from being too humanitarian in its dealings with other nations. Moreover, "governments more often underrate than overrate the moral sense of the electorate" (p. 130).

Mr. Catlin's five rather rambling essays make no continuous argument; hence his book is impossible to summarize. At one point he comes close to accepting the theory that "the remedy for the ills of democracy is more democracy," and this without giving any notice or consideration to the weaknesses of public opinion or to the view of democracy exemplified by Edelman's book. He also makes frequent favorable references to the "theory of the political market," but shows no awareness of the contributions to this subject made by such writers as Anthony Downs, Buchanan and Tullock, or Charles Lindblom.

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Bureaucracy and Political Development *edited by Joseph LaPalombara. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963.—xiv, 487 pp. $8.50.*

The essays in this second volume of Studies in Political Development, a series sponsored by the Social Science Research Council's Committee on Comparative Politics, are of two sorts. One sort is conceptual, rambling, and speculative, with factual materials entering only as examples of some general point. The editor contributes two such papers, and there is one each by S. N. Eisenstadt, Fred W. Riggs, Bert F. Hoselitz, and Joseph J. Spengler. The other sort, while no less discursive, is historical and interpretative, and is limited to the relations between bureaucracy and political development in some particular country or set of countries over some particular period. Fritz Morstein Marx writes on the North Atlantic countries, Merle Fainsod on Russia, Carl Beck on Eastern Europe, J. Donald Kingsley on Nigeria, John T. Dorsey Jr. on Vietnam, and Ralph Braibanti on Pakistan. A chapter by Walter R. Sharp on the influence of international organizations on the polities of developing countries concludes the book.

On the whole, it is not a very good book. The conceptual essays are marred by obscurity ("Different types of political systems are able to deal with specific types of political demands and organizations which

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have different levels of articulation" [p. 97]), tautologies ("the degree of achievement orientation in political recruitment might diminish . . . as ascriptive considerations take on more importance" [p. 47]), probably wrong generalizations ("It is evident that the relative importance of the role of a bureaucracy will be greater in developing than in developed countries" [p. 232]), and an unabashed nationalism ("The point is that there should be more open and conscious effort to export not merely American technical know-how, but our political ideology and reasonable facsimiles of our political institutions and practices as well" [p. 60]). This last is particularly important. Practically everyone goes through the exercise of defining political development (although, oddly enough, only Eisenstadt defines it specifically in terms of changes in the *distribution* of power), but in context the phrase usually refers to movement toward an implicit, idealized version of Anglo-American democracy. As a result, analysis all too often gives way to ideology. For if, as seems to be assumed here, this kind of democracy rests on free enterprise and if, as is also presumed, public bureaucracy inhibits enterprise, then political development necessarily depends on limiting the growth of central planning structures, facilitating the evolution of price-making markets, and in general making the world safe for "the now harassed, bedeviled, and persecuted pariah entrepreneurial groups" (p. 58). It may be, as the editor believes, that "economic liberalism is associated with the emergence of political liberalism in the West" (p. 57). And, for the sake of argument, one might grant the implicit assumptions here that economic liberalism was causally responsible for political liberalism and that this historical generalization has universal applicability. It is still a bit parochial to define *the* course of political development or modernization in terms of political liberalism. But in fact neither of the assumptions has much warrant, and the suggestion that "the elite of the developing newer states . . . should be encouraged to limit the role of the public sector and to encourage the development of the private sector" (p. 57) forms the framework for much of the analysis rather than emerging from it as a reasoned inference. In such a setting, of course, "bureaucracy" and "bureaucrat" cease to be descriptive terms and become epithets. Eisenstadt avoids this pitfall by working with a formal or structural conception of development, rather than one deriving from the political institutions of a particular pair of countries, and with a Weberian rather than a populist conception of bureaucracy. But even Riggs, who is otherwise rather cautious, alleges without qualification that "because entrepreneurs have the greatest potential for group formation, the bureaucrats use their sharpest weapons against them" (p. 143).

The historical essays are largely free from these biases, and, indeed,

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aside from Fainsod and Beck, who report on Communist countries, the authors write with a certain degree of sympathy for those who staff a central government's offices. "Development" refers not to movement toward an idealized liberal state but simply to chronological sequences of actual events. And "bureaucracy" is used not pejoratively but descriptively, so that instead of seeming to be a monolithic edifice rising above and dominating the shacks and shambles of ill-constructed parties, legislatures, interest groups, executives, and entrepreneurs, it is seen as comprising a broad category of personnel who perform a wide range of activities, have a wide variety of interests, are subject to and exert many different kinds of pressures, and practically never act together in a unified fashion at all, much less inevitably in their own interest.

It is not, I think, that by looking closely at particulars the authors of the historical case studies lost their perspective and failed to see "the" bureaucracy as the self-aggrandizing, power-centered entity the earlier, conceptual essays make it out to be. It is, rather, that in its entirety "the" public bureaucracy of a country probably seldom operates as *an* acting entity, and to treat it as if it does, as the conceptual essays usually do, is to reify what is at best a congeries of identifiable acting units (the postal service, the education ministry, the central planning unit, and so forth). This misplaced concreteness, to use Whitehead's apt phrase, would introduce a surrealistic touch into the picturing of any set of political conditions. For the polities under discussion here, where the branches and agencies of the state structure generally constitute a majority of the society's large-scale, rationally organized groups, the resulting misrepresentation is so great as to amount to caricature. Descriptive accuracy, however, is not the only victim of this reification of "public bureaucracy" —superficially coterminous analytical concepts, such as the "public" versus the "private" sectors of a national economy (a distinction normally employed to depict flows of funds in national accounts) are here regularly used out of context in a punning, metaphorical fashion, and thus add not clarity to the analyses, but additional obscurity.

As was said, the historical essays are largely free of such errors. On the other hand, with but one major exception (and one minor one, Dorsey's introduction to his account of the Diem regime in South Vietnam, where he attempts to depict political development in terms of energy conversion and information-flows), they are so concerned with setting out the historical details of the cases under discussion—for example, Braibanti's illuminating study of the courts and the civil service in Pakistan in the nineteen-fifties runs to some eighty pages and is virtually a monograph unto itself—that they will probably appeal only to people already interested in and informed about the countries examined.

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The major exception mentioned above deserves a separate comment. It is a superb essay by Fritz Morstein Marx, entitled "The Higher Civil Service as an Action Group in Western Political Development," organized around the hypothesis that in the Western nation-states, the growth of merit bureaucracies chiefly influenced political development by "vastly increasing the viability of constitutional government" (p. 64). Clearly conceived, carefully worked out, well written (Affirmation and doubt are peculiarly linked in the bureaucratic mentality. Administrators wear worry like a coat"), it stands as a model of qualitative analysis and historical generalization. Unfortunately, it is the only essay in this otherwise undistinguished volume that does. One has a right to expect more from the SSRC.

TERENCE K. HOPKINS
Columbia University

The Rulers *by Renzo Sereno. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.—viii, 186 pp. $6.75.*

"The only conclusion we can formulate at this point is that the varieties of rule are endless and the elements which enter into them are endless" (p. 174). This statement reflects both the richness and the weakness of the book. The richness lies in the brilliant descriptions—the pageantry as well as meanness of rulers, ancient and modern, legitimate and illegitimate, of kings and mistresses, and all those who directly or indirectly have a share in power. Such a panorama yields many insights of value to anyone attempting to study the elusive but ubiquitous phenomenon of ruling. At the same time, the richness of detail is at the expense of any abstraction, systematization, or generalization, a weakness implicit in the descriptions and explicit in such statements as: "We do not know whether a positive system of social science is possible—in fact, we can easily say it is not possible" (p. 180). The variety of ways in which influence is exercised, and in which unique circumstances affect the political process, leads only to the conclusion that "it is impossible to define or circumscribe the people who, directly or indirectly, affect any given group or any given person" (p. 99); this goes far beyond what any critics of ruling class theory or of the elite model of society would assert. Thus, despite points of convergence with modern critics of classical elite analysis (such as Suzanne Keller's *Beyond the Ruling Class),* this book is a far cry from their efforts. Here, an infinite regression of the influences,

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contacts, and ties that constitute the social web serves to render futile any attempt at conceptualization or abstraction.

The first section of the book deals with such classical theories as those of Tocqueville, Taine, Marx, Mosca, Pareto, Michels, and Mannheim, generally critically, often quite selectively, and more often than not isolated from the wider theoretical implications of their work. In some cases, like that of Michels, we miss references to the particular historical and institutional contexts in which the theories were formulated. This reader, for one, found the treatment of Pareto, and particularly the comparison with Mosca, somewhat unjust. But more than the treatment of the classics, what strikes one as most unsatisfactory is the lack of any reference to the research and theoretical results derived from the confrontation of more recent generations with those classics. These studies, to mention only a few, would include: Robert Dahl's critique of the ruling class model, Lipset's work on oligarchy and democracy in trade unions, the elite studies inspired by Marxist hypotheses (including the work on community power, which should have rated at least a footnote), as well as the more basic problems raised by Lynd (in his writings on power as a resource) and by Parsons in his dealing with the notion of power as a zero-sum. Even Weber's contributions are mentioned only in passing, although an emphasis on belief and legitimacy is central to the approach of the author. The notion of charisma is diluted by the suggestion that all leaders are charismatic, without any serious effort to redefine the concept. Statements such as "all leadership is charismatic because myth and charisma are identical, and we cannot think of leadership or of ruling class without myth, formula or charisma" (p. 120) are not very helpful. There is no attempt to respecify or modify the overgeneralizations often found in the classics, only a debunking of their efforts. One could hardly expect otherwise, in as much as the author asserts: "The introduction of scientific methods and devices in social research (we observe this by the war) has constantly lowered the standards of social knowledge, because such knowledge has grown to depend more and more on a specific skill rather than on new vistas, new discoveries, or personal vision and capacity" (p. 129).

Even when the author concludes with considerations about rules, culture, and history we can discover neither a new and original contribution to the philosophy of history nor another "humanistic" approach to social life. Rules appear as "countless, endless and ever-developing," and "it is impossible to say who is a ruler and who is not, because human endeavors are always manifold and complex" (p. 133). All the erudition, the fascinating descriptions, and the pointed criticisms cannot obscure the essentially nihilistic character of *The Rulers*. Do we really need a book

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which tells us only that we cannot know anything about the rulers, except specific events, and which asserts the futility of social science? This reviewer thinks not.

JUAN J. LINZ
Columbia University

Man as a Subject for Science *by A. J. Ayer. London, Athlone Press, 1964.—26 pp. 5/–.*

The Age of Automation *by Leon Bagrit. London, Weidenfeld, Nicolson, 1965.—86 pp. 15/–.*

If one is told that there is a bear near one's house it is well to have an expert bear-shooter around, even if it may turn out that no bear exists. This is rather the position, in relation to social scientists, that the Oxford Wykeham Professor of Logic A. J. Ayer takes in this Comte Memorial Lecture at the London School of Economics. He clears away the dank undergrowth of ancient objection. He finds that the bear doesn't exist—which bear, oddly enough, is the proposition that the social scientists do not and cannot exist. From a philosophical eminence he issues them birth certificates. He raises the immemorial problem of free will and determinism and copes with it. (I would myself throw out the suggestion that free will is a necessary illusion, essential for practice, owing to invincible human ignorance of the total of operative causes.) He looks into the meaning of such words as "motive" and "cause." "The difference between these generalizations [in the social sciences] and those that can be found to govern [*sic*] other natural phenomena is nowhere more than a difference of degree. . . . There is nothing about human conduct that would entitle us to conclude *a priori* that it was in any way less lawlike than any other sort of natural process." The obstructive philosophical opponents are routed, muttering, in their British chairs. Those whose prestige and teaching methods are interfered with will doubtless resent Professor Ayer's intrusion. Political science can now proceed onward to Camelot—but I would add that it should also now produce something specific, experimental, useful.

Sir Leon Bagrit, Russian refugee (when aged 12), musician, sometime head of a great British industrial concern, and an expert on computers, shows himself in his Reith Lecture to be a practical man scanning, with a musician's vision, the horizons of one major socio-political problem

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of our future. As Dr. Sayre, dean of Washington Cathedral, has said: "I used to be worried about nuclear war. . . . Now our primary concern is cybernation, the application of computers to human life." There can, under automation, be a cornucopia of goods for every consumer; and every producer unemployed. This is the nightmare—not least for the unskilled, revolution-prone, "have-not" world. Or shall all become Polynesian beachcombers? These fears, Sir Leon tells us, are groundless. Automation is not a Frankenstein but "an extension of man," an apprentice for drudgery to our scientific sorcery. Patently for some it involves a vast and predictable extension of power. The "some" does not include directly the unskilled "workers of the world," the proletariat. This power is yet a Platonic joy, involving domination by exact knowledge. It is a method of eliminating, at the point of decision, the vague and indeterminate.

The real issue is whether automation is, as Sir Leon optimistically suggests, the slave or is it, by its own logic of means, the master. *If* every American is to have a car, *then* the city roads will be choked to stagnation. *If* you want maximum agricultural production by pesticides, *then* your song birds and butterflies must disappear. The answer, I suggest, is: "damn 'progress': we must firmly set the clock back, when too fast, in order to keep sun-time." Maybe we want fewer people and smaller, not larger, production—anyhow socially planned production. Sir Leon states that "we must make sure that our universities . . . are mobilized to produce . . . the inclination which is necessary to bring" automation about. Is, then, Communism the logical implication of automation, that is, the inventions of the few must, under law, produce the equal advantage of all in the community? The "power-station men" cannot have all. We must have mathematical equality, for each unit, in the advantages, subject to the lords technocrats and to a gadget clled "Arch" by Sir Leon. Personally, perchance I shall look forward to the day when political production can be fully and democratically automated in relation to the market of political demand ascertained, by computer and transistor, to a decimal point; and when a computerized budget will be the simplest thing in the world. Then, the thermostat having been set, along with Sir Leon we can go out as free men and enjoy ourselves, as the banana falls on the Pacific beaches.

Incidentally, in a strangely old-fashioned way, when Sir Leon says "science," he invariably means the physical and natural sciences—although it is perhaps only the social scientists who prevent the physicists from going quite mad, in their single-track-minded way, when they interfere in politics.

GEORGE E. G. CATLIN
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The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Volume VI, Parts I and II. The Industrial Revolutions and After: Incomes, Population and Technological Change *edited by H. J. Habakkuk and M. Postan. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1965.—xi, xii, 1040 pp. $19.50 the set.*

History may be on the side of the big battalions—but big battalions of authors are not always on the best side of history. Sometimes their cooperative productions seem a little like behemoths, roaming disjointedly through a modern landscape for which they were never bred, but doomed to be massy reminders of the incredibly long period of gestation of their particular species. Thus, the *Cambridge Economic History of Europe*, although among the most distinguished of its kind, was conceived a generation ago in the late nineteen-thirties: Volume I appeared in 1941; Volume II in 1952; Volume III in 1963; and here we are in 1966 (still lacking Volumes IV and V) with Volume VI! And, we should hasten to remember in all fairness, the fault lies neither with the editors nor with specific authors, but rather with an impossible system which relies so much on getting more than one or two academics to meet a deadline.

The conception of this sort of history is, of course, wholly admirable. To bring together the best qualified scholars, to give them a prestigious forum with generous space allocations, and to grant them the liberty of omitting footnote references and ignoring original sources—all this seems a most propitious basis for the creation of definitive and encyclopedic studies. That it so frequently fails is to be attributed partly to the ephemeral nature of much history writing, but principally to the weaknesses inherent in cooperative efforts designed to be "comprehensive": nearly all the authors end by being too specialized in their scope and insufficiently analytical in their treatment of their subject.

Given all this, the surprise with the volume under consideration here is not that it sometimes illustrates the drawbacks of its *genre*, but that it manages from time to time to transcend them. Thus, in some of its authors and large parts of its subject-matter it illustrates the concerns of this generation of economic historians—emphasizing some of the modern concepts of growth, industrialization, and technological change, and departing from the now outdated straitjacket of European affairs so far as to include chapters on the opening up of extra-European territories, the industrialization of the United States, and the industrialization of the Far East.

Although the dustjacket claims a terminal date in the mid-twentieth century, the book is predominantly concerned with that first sustained spasm of industrial growth which for most countries except Britain started

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after 1800 and finished with the First World War. It deals with this, however, in a somewhat eclectic and uneven way. Cole and Deane provide a useful, succinct, and country-by-country statement of the dimensions of income growth and a brief glance at the structural implications. Glass and Grebenik contribute a panoramic, but somewhat narrowly demographic, survey of world population experience to 1950. Youngson's chapter on new territories contains some fresh and "human" insights into the problems and processes of settlement, but is surprisingly bare of any substantial interest in the dynamics of trade, international investment, and migration which lay at its foundation. Chapters on transport and on agricultural change hold no surprises and, indeed, the latter manages to ignore most of the questions which should interest students of economic growth. North, in a mere thirty pages, can hardly hope to cover the industrialization of the United States, 1789-1914, in any really adequate manner, but at least he concentrates in a lively way on points of analytical and therefore general interest, and refuses to get bogged down in points of descriptive detail. By contrast, the chapters on the industrialization of Russia and the Far East are no more than adequate summaries.

The high spots of the volume are undoubtedly the two chapters which make the most original contribution: "Technological Change and Development in Western Europe, 1750-1914," a massive book-length (over 300 pages) survey by Landes; and "Agrarian Policies and Industrialization: Russia, 1861-1917," some one hundred well-tuned pages by Gerschenkron. The former is quite extraordinarily encyclopedic, and after navigating its detailed appraisals, its comprehensive narrations, and its searching explorations, one almost believes in the validity of its *sixty-five pages* of close-printed bibliography! The author obviously set out to make a monumental contribution to the industrial history of the period; and, although the weight of the monument is at times oppressive, he has succeeded in wrestling an unwieldy subject into a presentable shape. Gerschenkron's contribution, although smaller in size and scope, is hardly less substantial. Indeed, of all the essays in this volume it stands most alone—not only by virtue of its predictable scholarship and thoughtfulness, but also because it pays careful attention to its conceptual framework and asks the sort of penetrating questions which constantly and fruitfully link its ostensible subject-matter with broader interests. It would, indeed, be a great pity if its somewhat inconsistent presence in this volume indicated that analogous topics will not be dealt with in later ones.

Thus Landes' vast scope and Gerschenkron's keen historical analysis do more then provide foils for each other. They also cast a sharp light which illuminates the weaknesses of much of the rest of the volume. In particu-

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lar, they remind one that it is only in a limited and fragmented sense that most chapters, even taken together, really do deal with "the industrial revolutions." There is little on business, on finance, on urbanization, on occupations, on science, on investment, on the state, on labor—little, in short, which would help confront the historical problem of industrialization in the round. And although one can be reasonably certain that these topics will find a place in later volumes, one can be almost equally certain that the elements in the edifice raised in this volume will not be re-erected. To divide the study of great themes in history is almost to ensure that there will be no single synthetic vision. The *Cambridge Economic History of Europe* remains a mine which yields nuggets rather than continuous veins of precious metal.

BARRY SUPPLE
University of Sussex

Imperial Spain, 1469-1716 *by J. H. Elliott. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1964.—411 pp. $7.95.*

As a field of general interest and scholarly investigation, the spectacular rise and collapse of the Spanish Empire is rapidly overtaking its traditionally more notorious rival, the decline and fall of Imperial Rome. This is not difficult to understand in our day, which has seen the imperial scepter pass from British, French, and Dutch into Russian and Chinese hands, since Spain in the early modern era vividly exemplifies the full cycle of the imperial experience: abrupt creation of a violently expansionist nucleus, strident nationalism in the guise of supranational ideology, a drive for European and global hegemony, accumulation of dependencies, and, eventually, subsidence of energies, accelerating crises with concomitant incapacity to resolve them, defeats by colonials and rivals, descent into impotence and disillusion.

In this valuable book Dr. Elliott of Trinity College, Cambridge, makes no attempt to tell the whole vast story of Spanish imperialism. He virtually concludes around 1650 with only the most summary assessment of the still badly known age of Charles II and the Spanish Succession War, and treats the manifold entanglements in the Mediterranean, North European, and American theaters primarily as these impinge upon the metropolis. Thus, as its title correctly implies, this is a study of the Spanish nation in its age of empire, a survey of the problems, decisions, forces, and crises confronting the people and rulers of Spain from the accession

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of the Catholic kings through the reign of Philip IV. In these crowded two centuries four key moments are emphasized. First, the relative success of Ferdinand and Isabella in uniting powerful but long leaderless Castile with the decadent Catalan-Aragonese federation, imposing costly religious uniformity, and annexing the Canaries, Granada, Navarre, and the Indies. Then, the accidental transformation of the new Spanish state into a European empire circa 1517-21 through the unforeseen succession of Charles V and the dismal failure of the anti-Habsburg Comunero uprising. Thirdly, after Charles' setbacks in Germany and at Protestant hands, the reduction of this European structure to a smaller, more specifically Spanish, empire under Philip II. And, lastly, the descent from Great Power status in the grim decade of the fifteen-nineties following the climactic series of misfortunes in the Dutch War, the Armada, and elsewhere. In the seventeenth century the long-term effects of previous overstrain and defeat set in, despite spasmodic efforts to overcome the spreading deterioration, efforts that reach a peak in the well-conceived but abortive program of the capable Olivares and will only attain fruition under the Bourbons.

This is a book of many merits, not the least of which is its thorough familiarity with the important revisionist scholarship of the last three decades. Furthermore, as a profound student of the Spanish periphery (see his masterly *The Revolt of the Catalans*), Elliott pays unusually close attention to the evolution of Catalonia, Aragon, and Valencia within the Spanish union, and while no doubt is left of Castile's supreme, indeed inevitable, domination, this is far from the conventional history of Castile masquerading as a history of Spain. A commendable, although possibly somewhat strained, effort is also made to demonstrate the prime role of the American colonies in the making and breaking of the imperial system, not only through treasure exports but as a major market for Spanish industry and trade and as the object of international conflict. Finally, this balanced, penetrating, often strikingly original study indicates the many directions in which further research is required before anything like definitive conclusions regarding the rise and fall of Imperial Spain can properly be reached.

C. J. Bishko
University of Virginia

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The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich *by George L. Mosse. New York, Grosset and Dunlap, 1964.—vii, 373 pp. $5.95.*

The opportunism of the leadership of National Socialist Germany, and the bizarre, even comic, nature of some of their ideas, have tended to obscure the ideological characteristics of National Socialism. At the same time, the lack of interest in and attention to National Socialist ideology left open in the thoughts of many the question: How could respectable, solid, intelligent, and educated people accept National Socialism and all it stood for? The answer to this question lies in part in the fact that National Socialism was a popularization of an ideology already widely held in the circles of respectable, solid, intelligent, and educated people; and that it was precisely the high intellectual and social status of the adherents of that ideology which helped establish its validity in the eyes of much of the rest of the population.

What George Mosse has done in this book is to trace the major steps through which the Germanic ideology, as it may be called, developed and spread in Germany. This is done both chronologically and institutionally, showing how the content of the ideology was formed and underwent changes, and how different segments of German life and society were affected—perhaps one should say infected—by it. In part this is done by the very useful device of pointing to the themes and influence of some varieties of popular literature as well as the productions of the academic world. In his search for evidence Mosse has ranged far and wide through archives and calendars, novels and newspapers. Some significant areas have been overlooked, particularly that of the speeches of people in public life. Nevertheless, the book is convincing and lucid, or at least as lucid as the opaque nature of Germanic ideology allows. A particular merit of the book is its careful delineation of the manner in which the varieties of anti-Semitism fitted into various strains of the Germanic ideology.

Mosse's concentration on his subject has, however, produced two related distortions in perspective. He has underestimated the extra-German prevalence of many components of the Germanic ideology, and overestimated their prevalence in Germany before the First World War. The themes of anti-capitalism, anti-urbanism, and anti-modernism surely had their adherents outside Germany. The ideology of racism was not confined to the Second Reich. The late nineteenth century saw a flowering of racialist thought, especially in England and the United States; and the German racist writer Hans F. K. Günther, whom Mosse frequently cites, was himself a great admirer of Madison Grant and Lothrop Stoddard. On

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the other hand, Mosse's concentration on adherents of the Germanic ideology in pre-World War I Germany gives the impression that its influence was already more universal than was in fact the case.

The challenge to decent people presented by the ruralist, anti-capitalist, anti-intellectual, and racialist ideology was not met successfully in Germany; and George Mosse has gone far toward explaining how and why. But neither in the past nor in the present has this challenge been geographically limited. As there was a petition drive to try as criminals those Germans who had agreed to the Young Plan, so there is a petition drive to impeach America's Chief Justice. This book tells us much, but we need to know more.

GERHARD L. WEINBERG
University of Michigan

Friedrich von Holstein, Politics and Diplomacy in the Era of Bismarck and Wilhelm II, 2 Vols. *by Norman Rich. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1964.—xvii, xiv, 878 pp. $27.50.*

Having collaborated in the edition of the Holstein papers (see my reviews of Norman Rich and M. H. Fisher [eds.], *The Holstein Papers* in this journal, LXXVII [1962], 469-72 and LXXX [1965], 306-07) Norman Rich is well qualified to give us a sketch of the whole man, his political activity and his personal character. The accomplishment is an impressive one, which bears throughout the earmarks of painstaking scholarship and careful judgment.

Holstein's own life was remarkably uneventful, for, once he had made the decision to remain in the German foreign service, that activity absorbed his energies to an unusually exclusive degree; other than politics Holstein's ascetic life held no interests, not even that of a private family. Having served a long apprenticeship under Bismarck, more than anyone else Holstein became the permanent center of the direction of German foreign policy after the dismissal of the great chancellor. This he remained to the end, for even after his relinquishment of office in 1906 he maintained his contacts and his influence, sending Bülow advice from his deathbed on how to deal with the Bosnian annexation crisis in the spring of 1909.

Holstein's biography therefore amounts to a survey of German foreign policy during much of the second Reich. His own personality becomes

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an important element, and the fact that he preferred to remain in the background was conducive to the growth of legends. The image of Holstein as the evil genius of the Wilhelmstrasse is in large measure dissipated. Holstein was a typical Prussian civil servant, with a high sense of responsibility, sincerely dedicated to the welfare of his country and to the monarchical principle. But he had a high—and correct—estimate of his own capabilities, to the extent that his sense of duty did not prevent him from resorting to intrigue in opposing policies which he deemed wrong or personalities whose influence he considered nefarious. He was in addition, a highly suspicious man, his suspicions at times beclouding his judgment. The tale of his relationship with such characters as Eulenburg and Bülow, to mention but two in a long roster, illustrates this well.

Holstein had his own views, and even before Bismarck's dismissal he had come to disagree with the great man. The attempt to drive the Austro-Russian team in harmony he described as political bigamy; from the priority of the Austrian connection he never wavered. But he also set great store by an English connection; if he remained unduly suspicious and inflexible in his attitude toward the British, he saw clearly the futility and the dangers of Germany's imperial and naval policies.

Not the least interesting aspect of this book is the insight it furnishes into the inner workings of the German foreign office. Bismarck firmly controlled the direction of policy, but after him Holstein had to contend with a variety of divergent influences. He had good cause for despair in the lack of central direction, instead of which there was much working at cross purposes, making for inconsistency while arousing distrust and puzzlement in foreign quarters. The role of the mercurial and irresponsible Kaiser was unqualifiedly detrimental, and of him Holstein took a very dim view, hoping against hope that his influence might be curbed. Bülow, the smooth man of the world, but fundamentally weak and vain, was not the person for the task. The two in combination emerge as the real villains who led Germany on the path to ultimate disaster.

There are some minor reservations. It is loose to speak of British control of the Suez Canal in the seventies, and one is surprised to find no indication of the Franco-Italian agreement of 1900, in the light of which Italian behavior at Algeciras is hardly surprising. But these detract very little from the consistently high quality of the discussion and analysis of German foreign policy which make this book an important and valuable contribution to the diplomatic history of the period.

René Albrecht-Carrié
Barnard College

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Economic Planning: The French Experience *by Pierre Bauchet, Introduction by Sir Robert Hall. Translated by Daphne Woodward. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1964.—xvi, 299 pp. $8.75.*

This is the second and greatly expanded version of a book on French planning written in 1956. The French original of the second edition appeared in 1962. The English translation came out first in 1963 in Britain at a time when interest in planning was rising rapidly, leading first to the National Economic Development Council (Neddy) and later to the planning efforts under the Department of Economic Affairs headed by Deputy Prime Minister George Brown. American publication occurred in 1964. The delay in this review is the fault of this reviewer, who took on the assignment and forgot it. The consequence of this, however, is that in the autumn of 1965 Bauchet on French planning seems to have a somewhat musty historical flavor.

The institutional description remains useful. Hackett and Hackett in their book on French planning give somewhat more detail—too much in some opinions. Moreover, Bauchet raises the important questions about the plans: about their democracy—whether they are imposed from above, or developed from below; whether they are mere projections, market research, blueprints for optimum allocation, or industrial orders; whether the plan can in fact produce a desired distribution of income as well as a desired mix of outputs, or whether this would make the system overdetermined. But stopping in 1961 or 1962, and before the Fourth Plan and the promulgation of the Fifth, the book necessarily misses out on some current issues and questions.

It fails to deal, for example, with the interesting issue whether compatibility exists between planning in France and French membership in the Common Market (though the latter looks less assured in October 1965 than it might have when the book appeared in the United States in 1964). On one view (Sheahan, *Promotion and Control of Industry in Postwar France*) the unplanned character of French foreign trade was a benefit, preventing the industrial forecasts and projects from turning into cartel instructions; on the other, frequently expressed by Pierre Massé, which ultimately resulted in the European Economic Community undertaking middle-term projections (as close as the German free-marketers would allow it to get to planning), planning in one country inevitably extends to planning in her trade partners to replace uncertainty with certainty. A minor facet of the same problem is whether foreign enterprises located in France escape the "guidance" of the planning authorities because of their access to sources of capital outside governmental control.

The clash between planning for growth and short-term monetary and

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fiscal policy for internal and external stability is also inadequately treated because of timing. Rising French prices which threatened the wage-cost structure and the balance of payments led to stabilization action by the French treasury in the fall of 1963. Since that time, French growth has slowed down so that the question Bauchet attempts to answer, whether planning produced the rapid rates of growth from 1952 to 1963, is no longer posed. Nor is there much reference to the question, which bulks large in French internal policy in 1965, whether the flow of savings from households to firms can be organized in ways which accommodate the preferences of both groups, with or without involving the intermediation of the French government and its financial apparatus.

But if M. Bauchet was unable to anticipate the twists and turns in the course of planning in France—as who could have done?—he has provided us with a landmark in the literature on the problem. It is hoped that he, who is so well equipped by his intimacy with the planning process, will continue to revise and expand this work, to the great edification of the world with its intense interest in the French experiment.

C. P. KINDLEBERGER
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Interest Groups in Italian Politics *by Joseph LaPalombara. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1964.—xv, 452 pp. $8.50.*

Like most interest group studies, this volume affords important evidence of the discrepancy that exists in a country such as Italy between political reality and the formal structure of constitutional government. Originally Professor LaPalombara set out to investigate the influence which two major groups—Italian Catholic Action and the General Confederation of Industry—bring to bear on the national bureaucracy. Undoubtedly the chapters devoted to an analysis of this relationship are the most thorough and the most solidly documented parts of the study. The discussion of the *clientela* and *parentela* pattern of group influence makes important and valuable distinctions. The author felt, however, that he had to broaden his inquiry in order to avoid a distorted picture of group intervention in the Italian political process. Moreover, the impulse received from the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council induced Professor LaPalombara to establish a general (rather sketchy and unsystematic) inventory of interest groups and to depict group re-

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sponses to the political culture and to the national legislature as well as to the bureaucracy. The results are rewarding albeit quite uneven.

The book demonstrates anew how fruitful interest group studies can be if one wishes to see the political process, as it were, in the round, and to observe how in Italy the all-important function of political choice is exercised at various levels of a bureaucratized government and a fragmented society. Episodes and structures of Italian political life, both North and South, are dealt with deftly and often from a novel perspective. Although this work is a one-country study, Professor LaPalombara serves the field of comparative politics well. By abstracting from the still growing American and European interest group literature a number of propositions and by using them as a general framework for his inquiry, he makes his material relevant for systematic comparison. (The many parallels he draws explicitly between the behavior of groups and of the bureaucracy in Italy and in France are valuable enough. To extend the comparison to the Federal Republic of Germany would permit judging the impact of a recent totalitarian experience on such behavior.)

The study suffers from being at the same time over-systematic and under-analytical. The author is bent on ordering his evidence according to the categories proposed by Gabriel Almond in his rightly celebrated introduction to *The Politics of the Developing Areas.* Constant references to "aggregation," "boundary maintenance," "political culture," and the like make the analysis too rigid here and too fuzzy there. An ambitious "systemic view" and a highly refined terminology do not mix well with the rather impressionistic (and sometimes outright journalistic) descriptions which characterize the chapters on political culture and on the machinery of government.

After having first circulated a questionnaire, the author has conducted 130 well planned extensive interviews with group and party leaders and high-level bureaucrats. Many pages of the book are filled with passages from the transcripts of these conversations. In general the recorded statements are then subjected to a critical and well informed evaluation. But the overall effect is confusing. Since in a scholarly book it is never possible to convey the freshness of interview material, the author would have served his purpose much better had he used his interviews merely as illustrations and analyzed his findings and their meaning more rigorously.

An "Epilogue" attempts to do this by discussing the self-perception of the major groups and of the trends that are active in them. But this rather fragmentary effort tends to highlight the defects of the preceding chapters. Finally, the reader of so richly documented a book is left with a one-sentence conclusion. He feels like appealing to Professor LaPalom-

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bara to give us soon the more sharply focused study which his own scholarly investigations have made possible.

HENRY W. EHRMANN
Dartmouth College

Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Politics and History in Sixteenth-Century Florence *by Felix Gilbert. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1965.—x, 349 pp. $6.50.*

Renaissance humanists admired Sallustian brevity. When they wished to praise a work of history, they compared it to Sallust and said that it contained as many *sententia* as *verba.* Professor Gilbert's important new book is equally lean, elegantly shaped, dense with new facts ordered in original perspectives.

Part I is on politics, Part II on history. Its subject is the genesis, in Florence, between 1494 and 1530, of a "new way of thinking about politics and history" (p. 29). Its method is a successful fusion of the history of ideas with political, constitutional, military, and social analysis in a tight, subtle, and very convincing pattern of argument and explanation. Systematic comparison of Machiavelli's and Guicciardini's ideas with those of their contemporaries put both men back where they belong—in early sixteenth-century Italy—while at the same time it isolates precisely their real innovations. Machiavelli and Guicciardini come alive, not simply as abstract theorists, but participating in the bitter struggle for political control of Florence after the anti-Medicean revolution of 1494, grappling with concrete political and constitutional problems, reflecting and legitimizing the attitudes and pressures of clearly defined social groups, caught in that profound intellectual and political crisis precipitated by the French invasion and intensified by domestic strife, the overthrow of the republic in 1512 by the Medici with the aid of Spanish troops, and increasing Italian helplessness before the foreigner. "The Discourses," says Professor Gilbert, "were written—and must be read—in the light of the problems which disturbed and eventually destroyed the republican regime" (p. 156). His book makes it possible for us to do this. We follow the principal events of four decades of turbulent Florentine and Italian history; through the protocols of meetings of influential citizens (*pratiche*) we learn "of the way in which these events were seen by the Florentines of the early sixteenth century" (p. 29); we see in detail how Guicciardini's *Discorso di Logrogno* (1512) or Machiavelli's *Prince*

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(1513) "are tied to political immediacy, to questions that were being discussed when Machiavelli was writing" (p. 155); and when in the end we discern what was novel in their attempts to adapt traditional concepts to contemporary problems, we realize that Professor Gilbert has accomplished what he ambitiously set out to do: "to establish clearly Machiavelli's and Guicciardini's distinctive contributions to the development of political and historical thought and, insofar as possible, to define what constitutes their originality" (pp. 3-4).

Part II begins with a chapter on the theory and practice of history in the fifteenth century and ends—this the natural climax of the book—with a discussion of Guicciardini's *History of Italy*. I have only one reservation here. It seems to me that Professor Gilbert underestimates the humanist contribution to the development of a critical historical method. He shows abundantly that the critical methods used by humanists in their formal histories were rudimentary and inconsistent. He does not, I think, give enough weight to the techniques humanists developed in understanding, interpreting, and editing classical texts, in trying to determine the authenticity of documents like the Dionysian writings, or in systematizing the study of ancient coins and inscriptions. But this is a matter of emphasis. The complex argument of these chapters remains strikingly original and solid. In the early sixteenth century historiography was in crisis. Historical studies were dangerously split between what the humanists considered to be "true history"—an independent literary genre, but in the form they had given it, slavishly imitative of antique models, rhetorical, moralistic, uncritical, written in Latin, and without significant political relevance—and investigations of the past contained in political treatises, part of the great Florentine effort after 1494 to understand the existing political situation and discover the "laws of politics," normally in Italian, pragmatic, relatively accurate, and factually detailed. Professor Gilbert considers it to be a crucial fact in the development of modern historiography that this split did not become permanent. It was the distinctive contribution of Guicciardini to make the "true history" of the humanists the vehicle for a political narrative of incomparable vigor, psychological realism, and causal insight; to weld together what was most fruitful in the approaches of the humanist and of the pragmatic political analyst searching "for recurring and generally valid patterns"; and then magnificently to leap beyond them both "to the description of diverse and singular historical phenomena," finding the meaning of history in history itself (pp. 300-01). Guicciardini's *History of Italy*, begun in 1538, emerges, more clearly than ever before, as the greatest historical work of all the centuries between Tacitus and Gibbon.

Professor Gilbert's book will stand firm as a rock in a literature more

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often notable for the subjective distortion of texts than for archival expertise and critical balance. It is a brilliant performance.

EUGENE F. RICE JR.
Columbia University

A History of Soviet Russia, Volume 7. Socialism in One Country 1924-1926, Volume Three, Parts I and II *by Edward Hallett Carr. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1964.—xii, 1050 pp. $17.50.*

The monumental history of Soviet Russia which has engaged the energies of E. H. Carr over the last two decades gains in authority with the appearance of each new volume. The latest installment, which is titled volume seven even though it is made available in two separately bound books, is devoted to Soviet foreign policy and the world Communist movement during the mid-NEP period. As in earlier volumes, Carr has done an admirable job of tapping all the available sources, and the result is an exhaustive (and one may add exhausting) treatment of the subject. The style for the most part is cool and detached, "leaning," as T. R. Powell once remarked, "neither toward partiality on the one hand, nor impartiality on the other." Despite Carr's obviously sincere efforts to stand above the battle, an occasional note of *schadenfreude* intrudes as he records a British Conservative diplomatic reverse or a Soviet foreign policy triumph.

The study opens with a perceptive treatment of the principles of Soviet foreign policy. During this period which followed the German revolutionary fiasco of October 1923 and the recognition of the Soviet government by Great Britain and Italy in February 1924, the pursuit of national security took precedence over the promotion of revolution elsewhere. Stalin's theory of Socialism in one country undertook to rationalize the stalemate between the Soviet Union and its capitalistic antagonists. Building the economic and military might of the Soviet Union meant strengthening the base of the world revolution, and the supreme task of the world proletariat was defined as that of helping the Soviet Union hold the fort until the revolutionary advance could be resumed elsewhere. Despite current illusions to the contrary, the Soviet Foreign Office and the Communist International did not work at cross purposes. Each had its appointed role, and as Carr correctly points out, "the policies which both . . . carried out were ultimately decided in the Politburo of the Russian party."

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Massively overwhelming as Carr's erudition is, it cannot be said that he has successfully solved the problem of ordering his materials in this volume. In order to emphasize the relation between the history of Soviet foreign policy and world Communism, Carr resorts to a rather awkward scheme of contrapuntal chronology in which he weaves back and forth between Soviet foreign relations and Comintern history. After sketching Soviet diplomatic relations with Great Britain, France, and Germany at the beginning of the period, Carr moves on to analyze the proceedings of the fifth Congress of the Comintern (June 17-July 8, 1924) and to describe developments within the German, British, French, Italian, Czechoslovak, Polish, Bulgarian, Yugoslav, Swedish, and American Communist parties through the first months of 1925. He then addresses himself to Soviet-German relations during the Locarno negotiations and follows this with a careful examination of the fifth enlarged session of the Executive Committee of the Comintern (March-April 1925), which undertook to complete the Bolshevization of the foreign Communist parties. At this point he picks up the story of the Communist parties which he had sketched earlier (omitting the Swedish) and carries their histories forward to the early months of 1926. He then moves back to post-Locarno diplomacy, concentrating on relations with Great Britain, France, Germany, and the Western Borderlands. Separate chapters follow devoted to Soviet relations with the League of Nations and the United States. Carr then returns to the Comintern, examines the February 1926 meeting of the enlarged Executive Committee in detail, and concludes Part One of his study with a thorough examination of the relations between the Comintern and the trade unions. In Part Two Carr examines Soviet policy in the East with separate chapters devoted to the Middle East, Southern Asia, China, Outer Mongolia, and Japan and Korea. The volume concludes with a careful analysis of the organizational structure of the Comintern and its auxiliary bodies; separate chapters are reserved for the Communist Youth International and the Comintern program.

While every chapter in Carr's history is individually impressive and makes a solid contribution to the historiography of the period, their order and arrangement are to say the least confusing and repetitious. Surely it would have been possible to provide a unified treatment of the history of the Western Communist parties in the same admirable fashion as the author managed for the Eastern parties. While there is a good case to be made for devoting as much attention to the Comintern as Carr does, the effect of constantly moving back and forth between Soviet diplomacy and the Comintern is to obscure the main thrust of Soviet foreign policy by burying it in much secondary detail about the inner life of the Comintern. Yet when all these captious criticisms are made—and they re-

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duce themselves to questions of style and organization—one must still conclude on a note of profound respect and admiration for a great scholarly achievement. Surely there are few centers of scholarly research in the Soviet field that can match the accomplishments of this lone scholar. The next installment of his history will cover the period 1926-29, and all who work in the Soviet field eagerly await its appearance.

MERLE FAINSOD
Harvard University

Poland: Bridge for the Abyss? *by Richard Hiscocks. London, New York, and Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1963.—viii, 359 pp. $6.75.*

Poland Between East and West: Soviet and German Diplomacy Toward Poland, 1919-1933 *by Josef Korbel. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963.—xii, 321 pp. $6.50.*

Conversations with the Kremlin and Dispatches from Russia *by Stanislaw Kot. Translated by H. C. Stevens. London, New York, and Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1963.—xxx, 285 pp. $5.60.*

The appearance in a single year of three books dealing directly or indirectly with Poland should be welcomed by all persons interested in that country. Our knowledge of East Central Europe is still relatively meager and it can be assumed that any additional volume concerned with that area is likely to enrich the amount of available information. This, unfortunately, is not the case with the studies under review. The disappointment can perhaps be ascribed to a phenomenon common to all three. It would appear that in two of them (Hiscocks and Korbel) the writers have tackled subjects of which they knew little to begin with, while the third author found himself in the Soviet Union by accident, again without much knowledge of the Soviet situation. Hiscocks, the author of a well-known textbook on West Germany, is honest enough to admit his initial ignorance. Korbel's interests range widely, including, besides Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Kashmir. This reviewer is all in favor of diversification, but it must be admitted that sometimes attempts to enter new territory are not crowned with success.

The main trouble with Hiscocks' book is that it contributes little if anything to our knowledge of post-1945 Poland. The author apparently

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did not know Polish and had to rely mostly on translated material. Judging by his acknowledgments, his visits to Poland were sponsored primarily by Polish government institutions; one wonders whether he established any significant contacts outside official channels. This suspicion is strengthened by a good deal of naiveté which permeates his book and is particularly striking in his appraisal of Gomulka and other Communist leaders. Thus Gomulka "was always something more than the conformist Communist leader and his deep patriotic feeling was always apparent. From time to time in these [Gomulka's] speeches there were glimpses of his higher qualities of statesmanship, of breadth of view, and courageous magnanimity" (p. 97). These qualities were notably absent in the period after 1945 during which Gomulka was largely responsible for the ruthless suppression of anti-Communist opposition in Poland.

The rest of Hiscocks' story has been told by many writers. What makes his exposition rather unique is that it is preceded by a lengthy account of Communist developments in the world since 1848. One may speculate as to the relevance of a discussion of Engels' "The Condition of the Working Class in England" to conditions in Poland in the early nineteen-sixties.

Korbel's study stands on firmer ground. Its title, however, is misleading; the actual topic of the book is stated in the subtitle, *Soviet and German Diplomacy Toward Poland, 1919-1933*. Hence the author has little to say about Polish foreign policy, which is "analyzed only to the extent to which it reflected Moscow's and Berlin's diplomatic moves toward Warsaw." This reduces the value of the book. Author's disclaimers notwithstanding, both Soviet and German policies in the interwar period have been explored quite fully by a number of writers all of whom reached the same general conclusion as Korbel, that the disappearance of Poland from the map was the goal of both the Soviet Union and Weimar Germany. Consequently, Polish foreign policy still awaits separate treatment.

Although the author makes it clear at the outset that he was interested in Polish foreign policy only as a by-product of German and Soviet policies, he would have done well to consult a number of Polish sources that might have thrown additional light on the period in question. I refer particularly to the collection of documents concerning Polish- Soviet relations in the period 1918-20, published jointly by the Polish and Soviet Academies of Sciences (*Dokumenty i Materialy do Historii Stosunkow Polsko-Radzieckich*, Vol. II, Warsaw, 1961) and to an able study of Polish-German relations from 1919 to 1925 (J. Krasuski, *Stosunki polsko-niemieckie 1919-1925*, Poznan, 1962).

Likewise, Kot's account of his stay in the Soviet Union as Ambassador of the Polish government-in-exile adds little to what is known of the

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Soviet attitude toward Poland during World War II. Some of the recorded conversations, particularly those involving Stalin, are of considerable interest. They confirm once again the ruthlessness of Stalinist policies, as reflected in Stalin's, Molotov's, and Vyshinsky's callous refusals to divulge the fate of Polish officers found murdered in 1943 in the Katyn Forest.

The book is a condensation of two volumes which appeared in Polish several years ago. It should be stressed that while one cannot quarrel with the selection of particular dispatches and conversations, the English translation is quite atrocious.

ANDRZEJ KORBONSKI
University of California, Los Angeles

The Economics of Soviet Planning *by Abram Bergson. New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1964.—xvii, 394 pp. $7.50.*

Economic efficiency is the standard by which Abram Bergson evaluates the Soviet economy. Each set of economic institutions—labor, agriculture, investment, and so forth—is subjected to a searching analysis of the extent to which it conforms to the standards of efficiency. The reader is thus introduced to a description of the "working arrangements" of Soviet economic organization, and to a sophisticated application of theory to the analysis of economic institutions. The author finds that in the allocation of industrial labor, the system conforms broadly to the requirements of efficiency. In the allocation of consumer goods and industrial materials, there is some degree of conformity, but numerous divergencies. The least efficient institutions are found in agriculture and in arrangements for making investment decisions. Among the chief sources of inefficiency are: (a) the application of Marxian labor theory (or, in some cases, no theory at all) to problems for which it is inappropriate, (b) the administrative defects of excessive centralization, and (c) the use of criteria for rewarding successful management which lead to wasteful practices. By way of summary, the author presents an estimate of the overall, relative efficiency of the Soviet and U. S. economies, employing for this purpose the concept of "total factor productivity." The Soviet economy proves to be about fifty-five per cent as efficient as that of the United States by this method of estimation.

The argument throughout is tightly reasoned and carefully qualified,

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and although not excessively technical, the style demands a close reading. The author bases his analysis on published sources, both Soviet and Western, but permits himself to range more broadly where the course of argument requires some speculation. The occasion arises most often in those instances where the appropriate standard of efficiency is not the preferences of consumers but those of the system's directors, in which cases the author strives to infer from the evidence what the objectives of the leaders are. The question assumes crucial importance in the vital issue of the share of production going to consumption or investment. From an examination of past investment policy, the author concludes that under Stalin, the policy was to maximize the rate of investment, but under Khrushchev, the need to increase consumption dictated a "satisficing" rather than a "maximizing" investment policy.

The book concludes with a discussion of the relative efficiency of socialism and private enterprise, and the author suggests that the former has not demonstrated any capacity for greater efficiency. One might suggest, however, that the inefficiencies explored in the study may be ascribed as much to the centralized nature of the Soviet economy as to its socialist character. Many of the sources of inefficiency analyzed by the author might be eliminated by such measures as decentralized planning and rational price policy, without changing the basic socialist character of the economy.

JOSEPH S. BERLINER
Brandeis University

Federalism in the Commonwealth *edited by William S. Livingston. London, Cassell for the Hansard Society, and New York, Oxford University Press, 1963.—xviii, 237 pp. $4.80.*

There has been a variety of experiments in federalism in the British Empire and Commonwealth during the last hundred years, and it has been particularly in fashion since 1945 as countries of the Commonwealth came to achieve independence. Indeed, as the editor of this book, Professor William S. Livingston, says in his introduction, "depending somewhat on how terms are defined, it may be said that there are as many federations in the British Commonwealth as in the rest of the world put together" (p xi). There is in the Commonwealth, therefore, a great deal of experience of federalism, though it is proper to add that it is for the most part an experience of the inadequacy or of the failure of federalism and of the inappropriateness of adopting it, rather than of its success.

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The study of this experience is, nonetheless, fascinating, while at the same time it is extremely difficult, for the material available is vast and heterogeneous and scattered. For this reason the book which has been compiled by Professor Livingston and his collaborators—the majority of whom, like Professor Livingston himself, are teachers of political science in American universities—is most timely and valuable. It is described as a "bibliographical commentary," and it consists of a series of chapters or sections containing full and critical descriptive bibliographies of the material available for the study of the federal experiments or experience in eight countries of the Commonwealth—Canada, Australia, the West Indies, India, Pakistan, Malaya, Nigeria, and Rhodesia and Nyasaland. These sections are preceded by a thoughtful and illuminating short introduction and by a section on general works about federalism, both by Professor Livingston.

The editor is to be congratulated upon getting together such an excellent team of contributors and for ensuring that, while each of them has been able to make his own distinctive and individual contribution, the resulting book has a unity and coherence which is not always found in a cooperative enterprise of this sort. It is, indeed, possible to read the book for what it tells us about federalism in the Commonwealth and not merely to treat it as a bibliography for consultation on particular countries or problems. It is a most valuable contribution to our knowledge both of federalism and of the Commonwealth, while for the student of federalism in the United States it suggests stimulating questions and fruitful comparisons.

K. C. WHEARE
Exeter College, Oxford

Cabinet Reform in Britain 1914-1963 *by Hans Daalder. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1963.—x, 381 pp. $8.00.*

Patronage in British Government *by Peter G. Richards. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1963.—284 pp. $5.75.*

These two books are carefully done, well documented, highly specialized studies of British government administration. In the main, both books are concerned with describing administrative arrangements and chronicling various changes which have taken place in them during the twentieth

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century. Both books are detailed and informative; both should be of some use to those professionally interested in the institutional arrangements of British government administration.

Daalder's book is concerned with changes in the organization of the British cabinet during the last fifty years. It contains a chronological description of changes in cabinet organization since 1914, a more detailed history of administrative arrangements within the cabinet for handling defense and economic policy during this period, and a final section concerned with a critical analysis of three conceptions of cabinet reform which have dominated thought on that subject since 1914.

The first part of the book, although a useful compendium of information on changing institutional arrangements within the cabinet and various opinions about them, is still a rather disappointing, tedious, and unsatisfactory performance. In his effort to compress a survey of cabinet change into something less than 140 pages, Daalder has chosen to cast his account in the form of a chronicle. Any reader concerned not only with what happened in the way of organizational change but with why this change took place is likely to feel that the account includes too little about too much. The author proceeds on the apparent assumption that a history of institutional change can be meaningful without a detailed consideration of the objectives sought and the results achieved through various institutional arrangements. Explanation is not ignored—the author obviously realizes its importance—but it is put aside and treated as a problem separable from an objective description of a very limited class of events. Convinced that "the workings of central government in any country are the results of a complex interplay of institutional traditions, the ever-changing forces of personality, party, interest groups and bureaucratic organizations, and the rise of intractable problems demanding government action" (p. vi), the author has made no serious and sustained effort to apply this convenient portmanteau of possible causes to explain the administrative changes with which he is concerned. Rather he has limited himself to narrowly conceived institutional description graced with intermittent brief references to political and personal factors which may have played some part in what occurred.

The second section on defense and economic policy machinery suffers from the same failing. The treatment of economic policy machinery is particularly sketchy. The reader is treated to an account of rapidly changing institutional arrangements but relatively little attention is given to the political and economic issues which lay behind this administrative kaleidoscope. Careful description of the facts of a limited class of events is hardly enough to allow "the facts" to speak for themselves.

The third part of the book does, however, redeem some of the weak-

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nesses of the earlier parts. Daalder begins with an analytical recapitulation of trends in British central government during the last fifty years which is excellent. He pulls out from the welter of detail in the previous sections major administrative changes and, incidentally, provides a framework of organization which might well have been substituted for the chronological description of earlier sections of the book. The remaining chapters contain analyses of three proposals for cabinet reform: rationalization of interdepartmental structure, establishment of a non-departmental policy cabinet, and the restriction of the cabinet to the most important ministers. In each case the author goes beyond a simple account of the arguments pro and con to an examination of the underlying political assumptions and motives which are associated with each point of view. There is an explicit recognition of the dependence of administrative change on political factors and a perceptive effort to pin down the particular factors that have been important in each case. In this discussion there appears a general thesis which the reader, with the benefit of hindsight, will find implicit in much of the previous exposition in the book; that is, that the essential functions of the British cabinet—administrative coordinator, clearinghouse of policy, and "the focus of the chief politically articulated forces in a society" (p. 315)—are such that they can only be reconciled in practice through a process of continual and rather inelegant piecemeal engineering. With reluctance and numerous qualifications, Daalder ends, for all practical purposes, by accepting the conventional wisdom of the practical British administrator.

Patronage in British Government is, in the author's words, "a critical survey of patronage exercised by Ministers of the Crown." It covers in considerable detail practices in relation to ministerial appointments, appointments to various boards, commissions, and tribunals, judicial appointments, appointments of justices of the peace, honors, life peerages, and church appointments. Description is laced with a number of sensible, if rather conventional, judgments concerning the effect of various kinds of patronage on the going political system. Despite the possibilities of some abuse, particularly (and predictably) in the selection of those awarded honors for political services, Richards finds no serious cause for complaint or alarm. On the evidence adduced, capable administration and "a sound democratic instinct" have reduced patronage to a minor problem of contemporary British democracy.

LANE DAVIS
University of Iowa

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British Political Parties: The Distribution of Power Within the Conservative and Labour Parties *by R. T. McKenzie. New York and London, Frederick A. Praeger, 2nd ed., 1965.—xv, 694 pp. $3.95.*

This thorough and important book, the chief authority on the working of the British parties, has been improved by revision, and its theses have been applied, in a lengthy epilogue, to developments since the first edition in 1955. The revisions slightly modify the original argument about the "fundamental similarity" between the two parties, and that is welcome; yet in the epilogue, where McKenzie struggles to explain processes in the Conservative party such as the one whereby Harold Macmillan became Prime Minister, in terms applicable also to the Labor party, it is plain that some of the book's theses still do not stand up very well to the tests of recent history. If McKenzie had been able to discuss the process whereby Douglas Home became Prime Minister in October 1963, the "fundamental similarity" thesis might have been further put in question.

In a generally very good discussion of party leadership, it is argued that the system of cabinet government makes it inevitable, in practice, that the parliamentary section of the party is in full control of the party. An illuminating treatment of the office of leader of the parliamentary party shows how the Labor party, contrary to its claims of party democracy, builds its leader up so much—Ramsay McDonald is the supreme example—that sometimes even majority sentiment within the parliamentary party is not enough to remove him. The historical method employed reveals to the reader the growth of the mass organization of the Conservative party, in response to the democratization of politics, and the growth in power and prestige of the office of leader in the Labor party, in response to the demands of governing the country and the pervasive influence of the customs of the British Constitution. The comparative method employed, whereby the two parties are analyzed alongside the two structural bases of British democracy—the final authority of the electors, and the cabinet system—makes possible a realistic appraisal of the actual operation of the parties, and produces new insights.

A number of propositions are set forth, most of them well-supported. For example, that "the influence of the mass organisation [of the Labor party] varies inversely with the strength of the Parliamentary Party" (p. 455); that in both parties the influence of the extra-parliamentary section of the party is greater when the party is in opposition than when it is in power (p. 75); and that once a party has selected a leader it must "back him or sack him" (pp. 134, 145). One of the less convincing prop-

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ositions is that in both parties revolt against the leader is more likely to happen when the party is in opposition than when it is in power. It is true for the Labor party, but only one Conservative leader has been harried from office when the party was in opposition (Balfour in 1911), whilst four have been in some sense harried into resignation when the party was in power (Austen Chamberlain in 1922, Neville Chamberlain in 1940, Anthony Eden in 1957, and Harold Macmillan in 1963).

Three shortcomings of the book, brought to focus in the epilogue, should be mentioned. The phrase "fundamentally similar," which is used from beginning to end, is not very precise, and it seems at times to give an oddly static character to the analysis. It is argued that the cabinet system determines the working of the parties, but the *interaction* of the system and the parties is not explored. The Labor party has in fact had a marked influence on the system. Secondly, the role of the extra-parliamentary section of the Labor party is probably still, despite revisions, underestimated. The two great controversies of the Gaitskell years—"unilateralism" and "nationalization"—illustrate this, as does the matter of the breakup of the wartime coalition, when Attlee and his colleagues were rescued by the power of the extra-parliamentary section from their inclination, which now seems incredible, to continue the coalition.

Thirdly, McKenzie's argument that the authority of the leader is similar in the two parties rests upon very selective evidence. He selects Balfour, the two Chamberlains, and Baldwin, from the Conservative party; and McDonald, Attlee, and Gaitskell, from the Labor party. It happens that these four Conservatives all faced strong battles over their leadership, and that these three Laborites were those, above all others, who firmly entrenched themselves in the leadership. McKenzie is arguing that the authority of the leader is fundamentally similar in both parties. Yet what if the selection were Salisbury, Bonar Law, and Churchill, from the Conservatives, and Clynes, Henderson, and Lansbury, from the Laborites? McKenzie has really selected three strong Labor leaders, and then shown that they were as strong as four rather embattled Conservative leaders. The book remains an important one, yet it is not quite as good as it might have been.

Ross Terrill
University of Melbourne

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Canada's National Policy, 1883-1900: A Study in Canadian-American Relations *by Robert Craig Brown. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1964.—xi, 436 pp. $9.00.*

In Defence of Canada: From the Great War to the Great Depression *by James Eayrs. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1964.—xiv, 382 pp. $7.50.*

The history of Canada has been a struggle for national identity against the obstacles presented by geography, by the heritage of colonial subordination to Great Britain, and by the overshadowing presence of the United States on the North American continent. Robert Brown and James Eayrs have concerned themselves with different aspects of this struggle.

Canada's National Policy contains an analysis of four problems in Canadian-American relations that produced diplomatic crises in the late nineteenth century—the North Atlantic fisheries, the Behring Sea seal industry, the Alaska Boundary, and trade relations. Of each of these Mr. Brown gives an account based on a fresh examination of the sources. But his interests go beyond diplomatic history as strictly defined. The four disputes were linked with the deeper question of Canada's "National Policy." Mr. Brown shows that the "National Policy" meant more than Sir John A. Macdonald's program of fostering Canadian business and industry. More broadly understood, it meant that the purpose of all Canadian statesmanship was to promote the growth of a distinct Canadian nation. All parties accepted the National Policy as so defined, although they disagreed over the means to the end.

The main title and the subtitle of Mr. Brown's book are thus in agreement. He supplements diplomatic history by reference to public opinion and party politics to show that by the end of the century "Canada existed as a separate nation on the North American continent and expected to be treated as a separate nation. By 1900, then, Canadians had renewed their faith in the achievement of 1867 and in the National Policy." This is a good monograph on an important theme.

James Eayrs of the University of Toronto picks up the theme at a later date. Canada's efforts to formulate a defense policy after 1918 had some of the ungainliness of a child learning to walk. She shared American misconceptions about world affairs—the belief that danger was remote from North America, a revulsion from the Europe that was held responsible for the outbreak of war, suspicion (in spite of Canada's membership in the League) of Article X, Locarno, and other schemes and contrivances of the Old World. Her public was uninformed and apathetic about military matters. Her governments were mostly concerned to keep down ex-

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penditures. Against these obstacles, not to mention Mackenzie King's aversion to the sight of uniforms, a few men struggled to provide the country with adequate forces and a doctrine as to their use. Sometimes they were slightly ludicrous in their attempts, but they laid the foundations. Canada was more nearly ready in 1939 than she had been in 1914.

Professor Eayrs tells the story of this change as far as 1935. He has used the papers of cabinet ministers, military officers, and civil servants, the debates of Parliament, and other materials, both published and unpublished. He has also interviewed a number of survivors of the era with which he deals. He writes with wit and lucidity. This pioneer work is the first volume in the series, "Studies in the Structure of Power: Decision-Making in Canada," which is sponsored by the Social Science Research Council of Canada. It is an excellent beginning.

THOMAS P. PEARDON
Barnard College

Colonial Currency Reprints, *1682-1751 edited by Andrew McFarland Davis, with an Introduction by Joseph Dorfman. New York, Augustus M. Kelley, 1964. Vol. I: xx, 471 pp.; Vol. II: xii, 470 pp.; Vol. III: xix, 496 pp.; Vol. IV: xvi, 503 pp.; $57.50 the set.*

All sorts of people will be in the debt of Augustus M. Kelley for this magnificent reprinting of Andrew McFarland Davis' compilation of colonial currency pamphlets, newspaper editorials, and public documents: university libraries that long have sought copies and those scholars who had read of the doughty controversialists second-hand but with no access to the original writings.

When Davis sat down to make his collection (his four volumes were published in 1910 and 1911) the echoes of 1896 still rang in his ears. His own predilections—and those of the economists of the day he followed: Charles J. Bullock, Frank W. Taussig, J. Laurence Laughlin—were on the side of the contraction of the money supply, and his introductions and notes clearly say this. But Davis was an honest and scrupulous archivist, for he painstakingly gathered together *all* he could find then extant about what colonial Americans had to say about money. Indeed, he gave more space to the advocates of monetary expansion than he did to their opponents.

The modern-day reader will find the perusal of these documents a

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wholly pleasurable exercise. He will note how acute and knowledgeable the colonial debaters were and what a large and diversified company of talents they represented. There were among them clerics (Cotton Mather, John Wise), public officials (Paul Dudley, Thomas Hutchinson), a printer (Benjamin Franklin), a doctor (the redoubtable William Douglass), as well as merchants and land-bank promoters. And they talked of the money supply (some wanted more, some wanted less) with all the skill and not a few of the subtleties of the contemporary analysts; and not simply of money, but of money and its effects on trade, the balance of payments, immigration, business recession, and growth.

Then, as today, the controversy heated up because of the unfavorable balance of payments: gold and silver were leaving the colonies due to the excess of imports over exports. What to do? Limit imports and live within our own means, said the more temperate contractionists. Debtors, hard pressed and squirming to escape, imposed upon their creditors by the issuance of legal-tender paper which quickly depreciated, thundered the choleric and very clever Douglass. Adam Smith was taken in at one point by Douglass and repeated his acerbities ("a scheme of fraudulent debtors," said Smith about the legal tenders); and then he thought better of it, and toward the end of *The Wealth of Nations* proclaimed quite judiciously that Scotland and the American colonies—bereft of the hard metals—resorted to paper issues because "it is not the poverty, but the enterprizing and projecting spirit of the people, their desire of employing all the stock which they can get as active and productive stock, which has occasioned this redundancy of paper money."

So it was not debtors (dishonest farmers who had overextended themselves, said the economists of 1896; honest farmers in the thrall of the "Money Power," say the Progressive historians of today) who clamored for monetary expansion, but merchants, business promoters, projectors of public improvements: all those, if you please, who were aware of the problems, perplexities, and frustrations of inadequate liquidity in a developing economy. Benjamin Franklin entered the lists in 1729, and his pamphlet is the best theoretical, and amazingly modern, discussion of money in the whole collection: a larger money supply will encourage shipbuilding and other arts and crafts, stimulate immigration, and give a lift to investment and employment.

It was the amazing Douglass—physician, dabbler in a hundred and one enterprises in many lands, a crotchety, quarrelsome man—who finally scored. He is represented by four pamphlets, one of 1738, one of 1740 (this is the celebrated one read by Smith and the men of 1896), one of 1741, and one of 1743. Douglass reached the policy-makers of London and he it was who raised the wind. Beginning with 1741, and continuing

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by its legislation of 1751 and 1764, Parliament opted for contraction and the outlawing of the legal tenders; from thence forward the breach widened until it became an unbridgeable chasm.

Earlier historians of America minced no words about this; present-day historians back and fill. Said the excellent John Jay Knox in his *A History of Banking in the United States* (1900): "This interference by Parliament with the right of the colonies to avail themselves of the supposed blessings of paper money either directly by their Treasuries or by means of banks, excited the most intense indignation, and was one of the causes that led to the final break."

Professor Joseph Dorfman has written a too short and too modest introduction, modest because in 1946 in the first volume of his *The Economic Mind in American Civilization* he had already pointed out that the colonial debaters were not talking of hard-hearted creditors and innocent bucolic debtors. In any event, the whole enterprise—Davis, Dorfman, Kelley—merits high praise.

LOUIS M. HACKER
Columbia University

Number 7: Alexander Hamilton's Secret Attempts to Control American Foreign Policy *by Julian P. Boyd. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1964.—xvii, 166 pp. $4.00.*

For a century and a half historians have repeated Thomas Jefferson's charge that Alexander Hamilton as Secretary of the Treasury interfered, clandestinely and openly, in Jefferson's conduct of United States foreign relations. Julian Boyd, the editor of the definitive *Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, attempts in this volume not only to prove the charge but to convinct Hamilton of nefarious deeds of which even Jefferson was unaware.

Professor Boyd's story involves the important contemporary issue of British recognition of the newly inaugurated government of the United States and its position on the Nootka Sound controversy. The chief characters in his suspense story are Major George Beckwith and Alexander Hamilton, and on its outcome, so Boyd believes, the solution to major principles of United States foreign policy depended. Boyd relates that in 1789-90 Hamilton, posing as the representative of the Washington administration, held private conversations with Beckwith in which he sought

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to promote his own cherished policy of an Anglo-American alliance and he then skillfully and deliberately lied to President Washington about what was said in them.

This book is something more than a tale of international intrigue and individual chicanery. Its author serves as prosecutor for the state. The indictment against Hamilton is succinctly stated in the foreword:

> What the Secretary of the Treasury did on this occasion was to commit almost the gravest offence of which a cabinet officer can be guilty in his role of responsible advisor to the head of state. At a time when general war in Europe threatened and in the face of urgent decisions . . . Hamilton misrepresented the attitude and intent of a foreign power . . . and fabricated rumors about the President's own official representative in London. . . . There can be no doubt that the misrepresentation and the fabrication were deliberate and calculated.

Of the succeeding 160 pages, eighty-five consist of the author's brief for the prosecution, and seventy-five are given over to the supporting documents.

He does not satisfactorily prove his case. That the elaborate web which Boyd weaves in order to trap Hamilton is spun of conjecture, is suggested by the frequent use of such phrases as "it appears likely that," "it should have been," and "he must have believed." Even if one were to grant the author's suppositions, the conclusions which he draws from them are not always logical. Take, for example, his description of Washington's rejection of an opinion submitted to him on July 10, 1790, by Jefferson on what the President's reply to Beckwith's alleged proposal for a United States-British alliance should be. To Boyd "it is surprising that Washington did not insist on an expression of the concern voiced" in Jefferson's statement over possible British seizure of Spanish territory. The President's alarm over such a possibility, Boyd explains, "grew so vigorously that by the end of the summer it had become a certainty in his mind." Having found it "surprising" that Washington did not express in July a concern which became a certainty only at the end of the summer (and having ignored other explanations for Washington's silence) Boyd asserts that "Hamilton was aware of the President's concern, a fact that may have affected one aspect of his report of the next interview." On the basis of this supposition he then jumps to the unwarranted conclusion: "Thus the course to which Hamilton had pledged his honor collided with that Washington was determined to follow in maintaining the dignity of the nation" (p. 49).

Boyd's case against Hamilton finally rests on the assumptions that Hamilton was "as devious as he was bold" (p. 30) and that his reports to Washington of what was said in his conversations with the Englishman are untrustworthy, while George Beckwith's reports of the same conversations are reliable. To Boyd "the glaring discrepancy between what Beck-

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with was authorized to say and what Hamilton quoted him as saying forces the question of responsibility to be raised. . . ." Since Beckwith and Hamilton were both men who wrote and spoke with "clarity" and "precision," "the contradiction can only have resulted from deliberate choice" (p. 43). Boyd argues, to cite one example, that Hamilton's report of a conversation with Beckwith on July 8, 1790, "cannot be accepted as other than a deliberate and gross distortion" (p. 45). Why not? "Beckwith could have had no reason for wishing to misrepresent his superiors, while Hamilton had every inducement to soften the impact of Dorchester's words" *(ibid.)*. That Beckwith had no reason for misrepresenting Dorchester scarcely proves that he could not inadvertently have done so. It is possible that Beckwith, more fallible than Boyd assumes, misinterpreted what Grenville and Dorchester said to him, and it is by no means impossible that Hamilton, allowing for the human failing of less than a perfect memory, correctly reported what Beckwith said to him. In any event, one should hesitate to accept "possibilities" or "plausibilities" which are predicated on unproved assumptions about the comparative honesty of two men. After all, it is perhaps plausible to accuse a man of theft if one first assumes that he is a thief.

Professor Boyd insists that Beckwith's conversations with Hamilton and others were "extraordinary" (p. 37) or "remarkable" (p. 13) and met with "astonishing success" (p. 12). It is unlikely, however, that the British ministry considered them as important as Boyd does. For one thing, Hamilton clearly differentiated between his own opinions and those of the administration. For another, British officials scarcely could have believed that Hamilton was Washington's authoritative spokesman on foreign affairs. The position of the American President, Beckwith wrote to Grenville in 1791,

> has lately become extremely embarrassing from a difference in the political opinion of the officers at the head of the executive departments, which affects more or less every measure of this government. He balances amidst discordant advice, sometimes leaning to one party, and occasionally to the other. The great point of difference is on an English and a French connexion. . . .

Hamilton "conceives the best interest of this country will be greatly promoted by a solid and permanent friendship with Great Britain," while Jefferson "is blindly devoted to a French influence. . ." (pp. 83-84). Grenville was thus fairly warned that Washington, not Hamilton, was the architect of the foreign policy of his administration. With such a conclusion Professor Boyd presumably would not agree, for in *Number 7* Washington appears to be weak and vacillating, buffeted by hidden forces he cannot control, the master dupe of Hamilton's schemes. If the man on

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whom Washington leaned so heavily for advice and trusted so completely was as devious and dishonest as Hamilton appears in the pages of Boyd's book, then historians must surely revise their estimate of Washington.

The results of Hamilton's sacrifice of his "honor" were, ironically enough, nil. The British decision to appoint a minister to the United States "resulted not at all from the proposals and suggestions made so insistently" by Hamilton to Beckwith, and Jefferson's policy toward Spain was doomed not by Hamilton but by "the failure of the House of Bourbon to respect the family compact" (p. 76). Such an end to Boyd's elaborately documented charge of treason (a word that he carefully avoids) might appear somewhat anti-climactic. But he rises to the occasion. For the next four years, he says, Hamilton "moved undaunted along the same course," eventually "foredooming the major objectives of Jefferson's policy to failure and making his continuance in office intolerable. . ." (p. 85). The conclusion of this book is thus particularly fitting. Unable to produce a corpus delicti, Professor Boyd indicts Hamilton for crimes yet to be committed.

Even if the case against Hamilton had been proved, an appeal might be taken from Professor Boyd's harsh sentence on the grounds of historicity. In the decade of the seventeen-nineties the notion of a party administration, of cabinet solidarity, of the relationship of president and cabinet was in process of formation. Censure of Hamilton's interference in the operations of the State Department should at least be tempered by the observation that such a practice was a common one at the time, as the career of Timothy Pickering, to cite one example, abundantly shows. In brief, to judge statesmen of the Federalist era by the standards of our own day is perhaps unavoidable, but it is surely unhistorical.

That Hamilton tried to influence foreign policy has been the consensus of historians from his own day to our own and there are surely no grounds for objecting to yet another statement of this fact. The difficulty with Dr. Boyd's book is that in going beyond this assertion to the charge that "in forgetting the national dignity, Hamilton also sacrificed his own honor and official character" (p. 76), he leaps further than the evidence allows. Until solid proof can be substituted for conjecture (however plausible) one must say of Hamilton's conversations with Beckwith what Dr. Boyd said of Gouverneur Morris' conversations with Leeds and Pitt—"his action has been called honorable but imprudent" (p. 69).

JACOB E. COOKE
Lafayette College

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From Prairie to Corn Belt: Farming on the Illinois and Iowa Prairies in the Nineteenth Century *by Allan G. Bogue. Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1963.—iv, 310 pp. $6.95.*

The amount of attention given by historians to the many parts of the story of the occupation of the land of the United States varies a great deal from region to region. Thus the first movement of people beyond the mountains into the dark and bloody ground of Kentucky has had many chroniclers. Similarly the movement to the cotton lands of the Old Southwest, the growth of the range livestock industry, and the struggles of farmers to make farms in the rain-deficient parts of the Great Plains have attracted the attention of numerous historians—perhaps in part because of the special problems encountered in these areas. In contrast, the relatively easy occupation of the fat land areas of Iowa and Illinois has received proportionally little attention from historians. The settlement and development of this area was a comparatively simple matter and much of the land was so rich that it often seemed that a pioneer farmer, in order to fail, had to be both unlucky and incompetent to an unusual degree. The book under review will help to offset some of this neglect and is accordingly most welcome.

Professor Bogue states quite correctly that "there are remarkably few accounts that consider the whole range of problems confronting the operator of a farm business on the prairies." In this study he seeks to place "the various parts of the prairie farming process in perspective. . . ." He is mostly concerned with the great prairie triangle of the Midwest which constitutes the heart of the Corn Belt. Thus the book is primarily a study of the development of the Corn Belt in Iowa and Illinois up to the end of the century. The author seeks to present a general picture of this development without losing sight of individual farmers.

The book consists of thirteen chapters and a brief conclusion. The first four chapters discuss the quality of the land, something of the origin, age, and background of the settlers who came to the area, and the processes by means of which men obtained title to the land. The next five chapters take up a number of matters relating to the farms that were laid out and developed. One chapter deals with the problems encountered in making farms on the prairie lands, two deal with the introduction and improvement of livestock on these emerging Corn Belt farms, and two deal with the field crops and the development and use of farm machinery. The last chapters are concerned with discussion of some of the costs of production, the processes of innovation, and the problems encountered by those farmers who were among the first to arrive and those who came later and sought to obtain farms after farming had become established on the

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prairies. The last two chapters are based on a careful examination of farmers' diaries and account books and are particularly useful because they give much specific detail about specific men in definite places at a particular time.

Although this book is somewhat marred by inattentive proofreading, though Professor Bogue may press a little too hard to demonstrate the fairly obvious point that there was little if any "self-sufficient" farming on the prairie farms, and though he seems to be quite intent on showing that not all who came prospered, these are only trifling objections. The book is based on extensive research and is a solid contribution to historical literature of Midwest agriculture. Economic historians and many others will look forward to the additional studies that Professor Bogue promises to do on the Midwest—studies that will illuminate further the story of this remarkably productive land.

VERNON CARSTENSEN
University of Washington

The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels 1913-1921 *edited by E. David Cronon. Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1963.—x, 648 pp. $8.50.*

As Secretary of the Navy in the Wilson administration, Josephus Daniels kept a diary, not for publication but for his own future reference. Written hurriedly in his own hand, it is more a newspaperman's collection of notes for future transcription and elaboration than a polished account for posterity. In consequence it is exasperating because some of the allusions are now cryptic beyond the point of deciphering or so brief as to be tantalizing; yet authentic because of its fresh day-by-day detail on President Wilson and his cabinet meetings, and on the administration of the Navy Department through the defense crisis and the First World War. It is a supplement and sometimes corrective to Daniels' mellow, discursive memoirs, which were at points more discreet and less accurate. This diary is not to be pursued by the general reader in search of anecdote, scandal, and venom, like the Ickes diary of the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration, but rather as a considerably less biased and occasionally quite illuminating source for researchers on the Wilson era.

The Daniels diaries cover both Wilson administrations except for 1914 and 1916; volumes for these years were not found, if indeed they had

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ever existed. If a researcher wishes he may consult the originals in the Daniels papers at the Library of Congress, but he will be saved infinite eyestrain and puzzling by making use of the excellent printed version which David Cronon has deciphered, and the remarkably detailed annotations he has added. He has run down innumerable obscure names and references, and has seldom been thwarted or slipped into error.

It is instructive to compare the diary with the two volumes of Daniels' memoirs covering the Wilson era. Scattered through the diary are evidences of his occasional irritation at the continued insubordination of his Assistant Secretary, Franklin D. Roosevelt, for whom nevertheless he bore considerable affection. In it also is the only hint I have seen that President Wilson at one point also was irritated. As might be expected, the affection but no trace of the irritation carried into the memoirs, written when Roosevelt was wartime President.

On the other hand, Daniels, following the habits of a working newspaperman (rather than a conscientious historian) used his diary rather freely as notes for much of the more elaborate account—although the notes were three decades cold. Thus one of the few mildly critical remarks about Roosevelt to be taken from the diary, an allusion to Roosevelt's wish to construct quantities of fifty foot boats for harbor patrol, is transcribed with only one minor inaccuracy, to be followed by several sentences of elaboration ascribed to the diary, which do not appear in the original (p. 118; see also *Wilson Era*, II, 254). Again, concerning the dramatic cabinet discussion of March 20, 1917, which led to the decision to declare war against Germany, he declares in his memoirs:

> I wrote in my Diary that night: "If the American people possessed television and a dictaphone and could have seen and heard our President as he spoke of the gravest issues our country had faced, they would have felt a confidence in him and an admiration which nothing else could have imparted . . ." *(Wilson Era*, II, 24).

Of course no such prophesy of television appears in the diary, but in point of fact it provides a more vivid account than the memoir of Wilson's (and Daniels') perturbation:

> He opposed G[erman] militarism on Land and E[ngland's] militarism on sea. Both were abhorrent. He was disinclined to the final break. Spoke of the glorious act of Russians, which, in a way, had changed conditions, but he could not give that as reason for war. . . . The Pres said "I do not care for popular demand. I want to do right whether popular or not" (pp. 117-18).

FRANK FREIDEL
Harvard University

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Wilson: Confusions and Crises, 1915-1916 *by Arthur S. Link. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1964.—ix, 386 pp. $8.50.*

In this fourth volume, which is concerned with the period from autumn 1915 to June 1916, Professor Link continues his masterful study of Woodrow Wilson. The title, "Confusion and Crises," would seem to suggest that this was a period of transition and uncertainty in Wilson's life, but, in fact, Link succeeds in revealing the underlying unity in Wilson's political thought.

We are made aware of Wilson's *reactions* to the incidents stemming from the European war, and we are shown the *positive action* taken by him. Seen in this new perspective, Wilson attains greater stature; he is more flexible and imaginative and a greater realist and humanitarian than in many previous stereotyped portrayals. This Wilson in no way resembles the blind and deaf "Don Quixote" depicted by Keynes. The first chapter, which treats of his remarriage to Edith Bolling Galt (in itself potentially dangerous to his political career), is a touching revelation of a man who, at fifty-nine, has fallen as ingenuously in love as a young man of half his years.

Concerning Wilson's "reactions" to the acts of the aggressors, Link examines the aftermath of the Lusitania affair (Chapter 3) and its prolongation by the Sussex affair (Chapters 8 and 9) as well as the grave problems presented to the neutral United States by the anti-submarine arms employed by the merchant marine vessels of the Entente (Chapters 5 and 6). In these matters, Wilson exercised rare wisdom. For example, nine months after the torpedoing of the Lusitania, Secretary of State Lansing hoped to persuade Germany to admit her guilt for the act, a maneuver which was manifestly impossible. After having assured himself as to the way things stood, Wilson wisely reversed his position at the beginning of February 1916. Public opinion would never have accepted that war be declared over a mere question of principle.

On the other hand, Wilson the realist profited fully from this affair by inducing the German government, which was temporarily hesitant to trigger an all-out submarine war, to reduce the activity of its submarine fleet.

The *positive* acts of Wilson are even more interesting. He believed that the American people had a "mission" to perform but had, as yet, no idea whatsoever as to what this mission was; he considered simply that it required naval and military preparedness, and thus maintained a middle path, adroitly resisting the attacks of warmongers and pacifists alike. For this reason he let Colonel House perform an adventurous attempt at mediation in Europe. The "House-Grey" memorandum of February 22,

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1916, implied that the United States would go to war ("in all probability," added Wilson) if one of the two sides refused an American peacemaking attempt. When England refused in June the terms of this agreement—which proposed the dropping of the blockade in return for the cessation of the German submarine war—it was a disaster for House, who had been playing a complex game and who had "grossly misrepresented the President and misinformed him as well" (p. 113).

Also worthy of note is the best study yet made of the beginnings of the "punitive expedition" to Mexico (Chapters 7 and 9).

This excellent work lacks, however, an examination of Wilson's views concerning the continental war which was in progress in Europe. Perhaps Link intends to present this in Volume 5. The Battle of Verdun was waged from February to June 1916, but the name of this battle does not appear in the index (one stumbles upon it in the text, pp. 131 and 140). It would be interesting to know if this gigantic battle, the bloodiest in all history, preoccupied Wilson, and what strategic and political conclusions he formed as a result of it.

In all, Professor Link's book brings us not only a new image of Wilson; it is as well a work of great importance in the field of political science. It is, in effect, a first class case study destined for those who seek to achieve a better understanding of the relationship between the personality of a statesman and the varied and powerful forces of his world and his age.

J. B. DUROSELLE
The Sorbonne, Paris

A History of the Los Angeles Labor Movement, 1911-1941 *by Louis B. Perry and Richard S. Perry. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1963.—xvi, 622 pp. $10.50.*

Prior to World War II, the history of the American labor movement, unlike that of its European counterparts, which often posed issues of political power and revolutionary changes in the social order, was a peculiarly American history of struggle against the "open shop." The United States was dotted with major industrial and urban centers, which were agressively and often brutally maintained as citadels of the open shop. *A History of the Los Angeles Labor Movement, 1911-1941* describes three decades of events which prepared the breakthrough for Los Angeles, a sprawling metropolis which was perhaps the most famous, the most spectacular symbol of the open shop.

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A carefully written, thoroughly documented labor history of such a city is a work of no small importance, even as a source book. The authors pick up the story following the bombing of the Los Angeles *Times* and the McNamara case, where Grace Stimson, who authored *The Rise of the Labor Movement in Los Angeles*, issued by the same publishers, leaves off. Of particular interest to the reviewer are the developments and events in the maritime and movie industries, which are given exceptional and extensive treatment. The account of the 1934 maritime strike is marred in one glaring instance by the apparent extremes to which the authors go in preserving a Los Angeles focus. No mention is made of the historic San Francisco general strike as a factor in bringing about a settlement. The story of how unionism came to Hollywood is an absorbing one. Of particular importance in the organization of the talent unions was the role of the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences, known now largely for its annual Oscar awards. The Academy, formed by the producers in 1927 to forestall unionization, ultimately had just the opposite effect. Summarizing its activities, the authors write: "Although the AMPAS was not a true union, it introduced the principle of collective bargaining. Thus, when opportunities to develop labor unions came along, the talent groups were able to use the experience gained in Academy relationships to good advantage in establishing collective bargaining through the various guilds" (p. 359); an important point, which those interested in the unionization of professional groups might well note.

Although resistance to unionism in Los Angeles was exceptional in its ferocity, another exceptional development favored the labor movement. Until the mid-nineteen-thirties, the Los Angeles economy was heavily based on service trades. An unusual growth of manufacturing industry, much more conducive to unionism, was a decisive factor in turning the tide. One need have only a remote interest in labor history to find this book fascinating reading.

EDWARD PETERS
Department of Industrial Relations, Los Angeles, California

The United States and World War II *by A. Russell Buchanan. Edited by Henry Steele Commager and Richard B. Morris. New York, Harper and Row, 1964.—Vol. I: xvii, 296 pp. $6.00; Vol. II: ix, 339 pp. $6.00.*

World War II is perhaps the most heavily documented, and is rapidly

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becoming the most written about war in history. Almost every aspect of the war has been covered in great detail, and many of the nations as well as most of the statesmen and generals have published extensive and often multi-volume series recounting their contribution in this greatest and most nearly total of all wars. The preparation of a comprehensive and scholarly history of the war, even though it be limited to U. S. participation, is therefore a time-consuming and extremely difficult task, requiring the use of a vast body of material in a variety of fields. It requires also the ability to deal with military operations on land, sea, and in the air, and a knowledge of the diplomatic, political, strategic, social, and economic factors affecting the conduct of the war as a whole.

Mr. Buchanan has faced and solved in satisfactory manner most of the problems inherent in so large a subject. Perforce, he has limited his researches largely to secondary works, relying on the labor of official historians and others who have mined the mountains of source materials accumulated in the archives of a dozen countries. This was undoubtedly necessary, but the feeling for detail, the sense of familiarity with events, and the subtleties of interpretation that come from intimate and long contact with the primary sources have had to be sacrificed. The result is a narrative based on the best research available, strong where the supporting studies are strong, but breaking no new ground, offering no fresh interpretations, and settling none of the controversies that marked the war.

The bulk of the records was only one of the problems Mr. Buchanan faced. Others were how to organize his materials and how much weight to give to the various aspects of the war. About one third of these two volumes is concerned with non-operational and non-military matters—the diplomatic events preceding the outbreak of hostilities in Europe and the Far East, strategy and organization, politics and diplomacy, and the home front. Of the remaining chapters, half deal with the Allied war against Germany and Italy and half with the war in the Pacific, almost entirely an American effort. Only one chapter is devoted to the China-Burma-India theater, where the problems were largely political and logistical.

The organization of the volumes is partly topical, partly chronological, and partly by theater. There are weaknesses in such an organization, but almost any other would probably have created as many or more difficulties. In a war so vast in extent and varied in nature, with large-scale operations conducted simultaneously in widely separated parts of the world, a major problem for the historian is to discern and trace the strategic threads that give unity and purpose to events, and to weave the operational, logistical, and strategic strands of the war into a meaningful pattern. In this respect Mr. Buchanan has been only partially successful.

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The relationship between the major theaters does not emerge clearly and the strategic patterns can be only dimly perceived. The reader follows military operations first in one theater, then another, in a series of chapters that are not really related to each other. Nor are the diplomatic and political aspects of the war integrated with operations. Perhaps it is impossible to do so, and the only way in which the war can be seen as a whole rather than as the sum of many parts is to view it from the level of the heads of state and the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Despite these limitations, some of which are inherent in the nature of the subject, Professor Buchanan has succeeded in providing a reasonably complete account of American participation in World War II that is both scholarly and readable. The twenty-eight maps are adequate for the text, and the bibliography includes virtually everything of importance published to date on the American side of the war. Though it is not, as the editors claim, "original and compelling," it is a notable achievement and stands virtually alone in the field.

LOUIS MORTON
Dartmouth College

The Troublesome Presence: American Democracy and the Negro *by Eli Ginzberg and Alfred S. Eichner. London, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964.—viii, 339 pp. $5.95.*

Professor Eli Ginzberg has long been interested in the problem of American democracy and the Negro. In his *The Negro Potential*, published in 1956, he examined the possibilities that the greater utilization of Negro manpower held for the growth of the American economy. And he was unequivocal in his insistence that wisdom and common sense required this country to appreciate the importance of Negroes as a human resource. In this volume he and his collaborator, Alfred S. Eichner, explore the impact of the Negro's presence on the development of American democracy. This is not, however, a history of the American Negro; and the authors did not intend it to be so. They have directed their attention specifically to the manner in which the United States itself has been unable to realize full democracy because it has been unable or unwilling to extend democracy to the Negro. They freely use periods and incidents from history, but these are merely examples to illustrate the problem that their subject poses.

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In illustrating what they call the "counterpoint between American democracy and the Negro," the authors have sought to reconstruct the major episodes in the history of race relations and to delineate the major themes that underline this history. "What happened, or failed to happen, to the Negro minority can be explained," they assert, "by the way in which the white majority read its past, responded to its presence, and sought to shape its future." They see in the racial atavism of the white man, the rejection of integration before and after slavery, the conflict among whites that produced some progress for Negroes, and the refusal of the American economy to utilize Negro manpower as the principal themes in the counterpoint between American democracy and the Negro. Recent themes have been the increased political power of the Negro and his growing ability to take the initiative to secure his rights.

While the larger portion of this book is a crushing indictment of American democracy because of the country's refusal to make a place for the Negro as an equal, it is excessive in its view that until recently the Negro was a passive observer of what was happening. To be sure, the Negro was often a pawn in the power plays of white politicians, the object of incredible racist policies, and the helpless victim of unspeakable barbarism. But long before the recent protest movement, when the Negro had little more than his voice, he raised it to speak for his own freedom and for the salvation of America. In the revolutionary period it was not merely the handful of Quakers lobbying for emancipation measures but the Negroes of Massachusetts who remonstrated with the whites for seeking political independence while upholding the institution of slavery. In the abolitionist movement Negroes were active as authors, journalists, agitators, and fund-raisers. During the Civil War they were among those who pressed Lincoln to issue the Emancipation Proclamation; and 186,000 of them fought in the Union Army. It was Negroes who kept the agitation for equality alive when the Republicans deserted them at the end of Reconstruction. And when the whites rejoined the drive for justice in the twentieth century the Negroes had already organized local and national groups that provided a grass roots base for the new crusade.

The authors are doubtless aware of these facts, but it is likely that some of their readers are not. These facts are a part of the picture, for at various points in the country's history it was the Negro who kept alive the ideal of real American democracy. This gives greater perspective to the current drive for equality, and it indicates that even when the Negro did not have the power he was struggling to shape his own future and the future of his country. There is no disagreement with the authors' view that both Negroes and whites must exert even greater efforts in order to achieve real equality. Their delineation of the economic disad-

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vantages under which Negroes labor today is striking; and they are eloquent in their call for greater opportunities for Negroes in education and employment.

It is difficult to understand why there is no index for a book that contains so much detail on such an important subject.

JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN
University of Chicago

Foreign Policy in the Sixties: The Issues and the Instruments *edited by Roger Hilsman and Robert C. Good. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965.—xii, 299 pp. $6.95.*

Here is a *festschrift* worthy of the man whom it honors. Fourteen men who had studied under Professor Arnold Wolfers contributed fifteen essays inquiring into contemporary foreign policy. How pleased their former teacher must be with their outstanding progress in the fields of diplomacy, research, and teaching so clearly revealed in this book!

Foreign policy has been defined as a highly complex and continuous social, political, and economic activity with no clear beginning and no clear end. It has no clear beginning because contemplated foreign policies take into consideration traditions, past principles, and historic style. It has no clear end because each executed foreign policy changes political conditions, demanding additional foreign policies. The authors of this book are concerned with the environment of the nineteen-sixties—affected or altered by grand designs of foreign policies of the major powers in the nineteen-fifties. The work is divided into three sections: The Contemporary Arena, The Instrumentalities of Foreign Policy, and Statecraft and Moral Theory. The first essay, by Raymond L. Garthoff, is an excellent and incisive analysis of Communist (Soviet and Chinese) purposes and objectives, their successes and failures. It is clear and bold, reflecting astute scholarship and logical acumen. Following are equally well-written, timely, and scholarly essays on the future of the Atlantic security system (Laurence W. Martin); the problem of colonialism (Ambassador Robert C. Good); nonalignment, as based on the experience of India (Charles H. Heimsath); and the United Nations (Harold K. Jacobson). Part II consists of six essays on foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy (Lucien W. Pye); political development (W. Howard Wriggins); the role of intelligence (Fred Greene); the United Nations as an instrument of foreign policy (Ernest W. Lefever); the Geneva summit confer-

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ence of 1955, which Paul C. Davis sees as an example of modern diplomacy, and whose conclusion—though seemingly valid—is marred by inaccessibility of primary sources which would have supplied a more authoritative and objective evaluation of John Foster Dulles' statecraft as well as that of the other diplomats at the Big Four meeting; and a summing up by Roger Hilsman, former Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, "Orchestrating the Instrumentalities: The Case for Southeast Asia." (This is a somewhat expanded version of his article which appeared in the New York *Times Magazine*.) Part III is made up of essays on the balance of power using French-Soviet rapprochement as an example (William E. Scott); the political style of Dean Acheson, which seeks to analyze his mode of leadership and decision-making—a phrase upsetting to Acheson—(David S. McLellan); and two pieces on morality, ethics, and national interest—perennials in discussions of foreign policy—(Richard W. Sterling and Robert C. Good).

It is not easy to avoid imbalance in a *festschrift*, and this book is no exception. Some essays are better than others, some more significant than others—depending, of course, on the interest of the reader. But as a whole it is an important contribution in the field of international relations and foreign policy.

LOUIS L. GERSON
University of Connecticut

Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1963 *edited by Richard P. Stebbins. New York and Evanston, Harper and Row for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1964.—xxiv, 480 pp. $7.50.*

The United States in World Affairs, 1963 *edited by Richard P. Stebbins. New York and Evanston, Harper and Row for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1964.—xi, 400 pp. $6.95.*

The continuing racial crisis in the United States; the crucial "Nassau" meeting between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan; de Gaulle's veto of Britain's bid for membership in the Common Market and his rejection of a multinational NATO nuclear force; congressional emasculation of President Kennedy's foreign aid budget; the nuclear test-ban accord; the revolutionary ferment in Yemen; the chronic instability in Southeast Asia; the Congo rebellion and other upheavals on the African continent—these represent merely a sampling of the problems confronting the United States in foreign affairs during 1963. And over all

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these crises hung the pall created by the assassination of President Kennedy on November 22. It was a tribute to the resiliency of the American democratic system that this tragedy disrupted the stability of the nation's foreign policy less than many friends and allies might have feared and than Communist nations might have hoped.

The latest installments in the two well-known series by the Council on Foreign Relations evaluate these and other significant developments during the year. As always, the summary appraisals in *The United States in World Affairs* are logically organized, engagingly written, objective, and sophisticated. For a treatment in which the emphasis is more on breadth rather than depth of coverage, it is an admirable job. Mr. Stebbins quite obviously understands his subjects and is skillful, within the space available, in presenting them in their proper perspectives. The informed reader may not agree at every point with Mr. Stebbins' judgments, as when he says that Sukarno of Indonesia "had no consistent policy of curbing Communist influence" in his country, or when he describes Nasser's Pan-Arabism as the "principal divisive factor" in Arab political disturbances. Yet nowhere does Mr. Stebbins exceed the bounds of editorial license. Now and again, the editor does not hesitate to resort to what seems grim irony to lighten his treatment, as when he reproduces without comment a high military estimate that the contest in South Vietnam was gradually being resolved favorably and records that the Pentagon expected to *reduce* its troop commitment by one thousand men by the end of 1963. Such data provide perhaps the most eloquent testimony available concerning the hazards of prediction and the imponderables confronting the policy-maker in the field of foreign relations.

As in previous years, the *Documents* contain a wealth of useful excerpts drawn from official and secondary sources. Whether used in conjunction with the survey volume, or utilized independently, it provides the serious student of American foreign relations with an excellent compilation and a guide to further research, which is unsurpassed in any other brief collection.

CECIL V. CRABB JR.
Vassar College

Political Power: USA/USSR *by Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington. New York, The Viking Press, 1964.—xiii, 461 pp. $7.50.*

In view of the importance of its subject and its outstanding quality, this book would deserve more than a brief review. For all the way

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through the comparative study of the two political societies, and beyond the set of analogies and contrasts, the pregnant theme here examined—and so often bungled—is that of their eventual "convergence." It is treated with exceptional skill as regards both the composition of the work and the *finesse* of the explanations offered. An initial analytical part is felicitously completed by a second part in which individual cases succinctly analyzed allow the reader to grasp the dynamics of relationship between power and society, and introduce into the whole picture the historical dimension from which political science derives its very substance. That historical dimension is also to be found in the deliberate practice of both authors to search for the explanation of certain behaviors in the centuries which have preceded the twentieth. The fundamental problem of convergence then appears in all its complexity. It is no longer permissible to limit oneself to a casual pronouncement based on some vaguely Marxist forecast as to the probable evolution of societies labeled "industrial" and as to the end of the so-called "ideologies." The task to be undertaken is rather to retrace the interplay of forces and influences which over more than one century have molded and swayed the two political societies, that of the U.S.A. and that of the U.S.S.R., and to observe the confrontation of that duly revolved past with the present, while trying fully to grasp the perspective in which each one approaches the present. As the authors forcefully submit, it is that very difference in perspective which seems to preclude a convergence. Their analysis is keen enough and their reasoning compelling enough to carry the conviction of the reader, who cannot but subscribe to their conclusion: "The evolution of the two systems, but not their convergence, seems to be the undramatic pattern for the future" (p. 436).

JACQUES FREYMOND
Geneva, Switzerland

The United States and the Middle East *edited by Georgiana G. Stevens for the American Assembly. Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1964.—viii, 182 pp. $3.95.*

In October 1963, The American Assembly, an organization founded by Dwight D. Eisenhower when he was president of Columbia University, held its annual meeting to discuss the United States relationship with the Middle East. The seventy-five participants, representing a broad cross-

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section of leaders from the worlds of business, universities, press, foundations, churches, and government, were offered six background papers which served as a basis for discussion. These papers were prepared by experts and edited by Mrs. Georgiana Stevens, the well-known author of *The Jordan River Valley* (1956) and *Egypt: Yesterday and Today* (1963). The present book is the outcome of this joint effort.

The first chapter, "Middle East Background," by William Sands, editor of *The Middle East Journal*, introduces the readers to the basic geopolitical and demographic data of the area as well as to its main issues, such as the position of Islam, nationalism, neutralism, and modernization. In the second chapter, William R. Polk, of the Policy Planning Council of the U. S. Department of State, discusses "Social Modernization" with special emphasis on the new middle class, the changing patterns of education, and the role of the military in the modernization process. "Economic Modernization" is the subject of the third chapter, contributed by A. J. Meyer of the Middle East Center of Harvard University. Mr. Meyer advances the thesis that land reform programs in Egypt, Syria, Iran, and Iraq should be viewed primarily in terms of their psychological rather than economic impact. With reference to development, the author finds that the unplanned economies of Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria before 1958, compare favorably with the planned ones of Israel, Egypt, and Iraq.

Chapter 4, authored by Professor J. C. Hurewitz of Columbia University, discusses comprehensively "Regional and International Politics in the Middle East." The author reviews such issues as the struggle for emancipation from Western control, nationalism and Arab unity, alliances and non-alignment, and the policies of major powers in the area. "The Arab-Israeli Conflict Today" is the subject of the fifth chapter by Harry B. Ellis, chief correspondent of *The Christian Science Monitor* in Paris, formerly stationed in Beirut in a similar capacity. His treatment of the subject matter is objective, testifying to his thorough familiarity with the attitudes of all parties involved. His account is brought up-to-date by including such issues as the Arab-Israeli rivalry in Africa and the Jordan waters dispute.

The sixth and last chapter by Richard H. Nolte, executive director of the Institute of Current World Affairs, deals with "United States Policy and the Middle East." It shares with other chapters meticulous attention to empirical data, but differs from them in that the author takes a definite position in evaluating American policies in the area. He views the latter as having passed from friendly indifference to involvement, first, via the Truman Doctrine, in the Turkish-Greek-Iranian area, "for reasons of national security," and then, "in spite of them,"through intervention in Palestine, in the Arab area. Involvement became intensified during

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the Dulles era. But, beginning with 1958-59, the United States has followed a policy of "disengagement" which, according to Mr. Nolte, has brought it success and resulted in a "favorable westward shift in Arab opinion." Mr. Nolte claims that the "overriding objectives" of the Arabs are entirely compatible with the American objectives and that the present turn of events—which includes moderate friendship with and aid to Nasser as well as abandonment of the empty "vital interests" concept—vindicates Nasser's long-standing contentions in this respect. "His victory," asserts the author, "and the victory of the decisive new force of Arab nationalism of which he remains the towering leader and symbol, has turned out in the sequel to be a United States victory too." This equation of Nasser's and American success is not likely to be accepted by critical readers without some major challenges. It is the author's merit that, by taking such a determined stand on this issue, he has opened the door to a lively discussion.

All contributors should be congratulated for the thoroughness and clarity of their expositions, and Mrs. Stevens for her excellent work in planning, organizing, and editing the volume.

GEORGE LENCZOWSKI
University of California, Berkeley

Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis *by Samuel J. Eldersveld. Chicago, Rand McNally, 1964.—viii, 613 pp. $8.00.*

Despite its unfortunately grandiose title, this book reports an interview-based study of the party organizations of Wayne County (Detroit), Michigan, as they were during the presidential campaign of 1956. By questioning the party leadership and samples of precinct chairmen and adults of the county, Professor Eldersveld has been able to analyze the recruitment and social composition of the party aparatus; the web of goals, roles, and perceptions within it; its ability to make decisions and perform its tasks; and its impact on groups of citizens exposed to it and its campaigning.

In short, we have here the first study in depth of the internal life and processes of a series of related party organizations. It is, consequently, a very important book. I doubt very much that any serious scholar of political parties can afford to be unaware of it—both for its conclusions and,

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perhaps more importantly, for the theoretical and methodological directions in which it points. For, as its subtitle suggests, it signals the incorporation of the approaches of the "new" political science into the study of political parties.

The conclusions of so long and so analytical a book—there are 186 tables by my count—are impossible to summarize in a few words. Chiefly, in the author's words:

> . . . we have emphasized that the party is not a neatly pyramided bureaucracy, an elite class, or an oligarchy . . . . The party is an open, clientele-oriented structure, permeable at its base as well as its apex, highly preoccupied with the recruitment of "deviant" social categories, and willing to provide mobility and access for these categories into the major operational and decisional centers of the structure. The party is also a "stratarchical" control structure, rather than an elitist command structure . . . . Finally, we see the party, not as a singular body of elitists, but as an aggregate of career classes performing differential structural functions . . . (pp. 526-27).

(I might add that the author may overestimate the extent of "oligarchism" among scholars of the parties, and thus overestimate the novelty of his conclusions.) There are, of course, many other conclusions and insights which cannot be listed here.

At the risk of seeming ungrateful for a major contribution to the study of parties, let me record a few words of reservation. First of all, many readers—at least those whose concentration is no greater than mine—will find themselves awash in a sea of data, concepts, monographic prose, tables, analysis, and speculation. A greater selectivity in dwelling on the most significant relationships and a little greater attention to the reader's limitations would have helped. Secondly, it seemed to me at a number of points that the author was erecting a weightier theoretical and analytical edifice than the data warranted. To take only one example, on the basis apparently of a single question ("Aside from your routine duties, what do you consider to be your most important job or task?") the author places the respondents into a number of leadership role categories (" a 'power-productive' orientation, an organizational 'managerial' or 'integrative' orientation, or environmental 'adaption'?") (pp. 246-48). Types so derived are then often employed in establishing further relationships. Finally, his total dependence on survey data forces the author to deal with the respondents' perceptions—perhaps casually given—of real events or relationships. For example, the assessment of the precinct leaders' place and power in the party decision-making processes must rest on their responses to questions about how much "say" they think they have in the party and about their degree of satisfaction with it (pp. 393ff). There is no use of supplementary data drawn from direct observa-

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tion, from electoral outcomes, or from supplementary interviewing. Not surprisingly, therefore, important kinds of political data necessary for a full view of the party are missing. Office-holders and office-seekers do not appear, and neither do party activities such as selecting candidates, holding conventions and meetings, raising money, and maintaining contact with governmental officials.

Nonetheless, the accomplishment is substantial and significant. Professor Eldersveld has asked the important questions, asked them in sophisticated terms, and devised ingenious attacks on them. It is no real criticism to say that he has not answered all of them. Those of us who have not even asked them in the first place are greatly in his debt.

FRANK J. SORAUF
University of Minnesota

Law and Politics in the Supreme Court: New Approaches to Political Jurisprudence *by Martin Shapiro. London and New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964.—ix, 364 pp. $6.95.*

Elements of Judicial Strategy *by Walter F. Murphy. Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1964.—xiii, 249 pp. $7.50.*

The most that political scientists generally achieve in writing about the Supreme Court—so it often seems to the lawyer—is to organize the obvious, and one is grateful when they do not disorganize or misstate it. But in its unorganized, as it were, natural, state, the obvious may be sensed by the experienced observer, and yet not assimilated or put to use. For this reason there should be no doubt that both of the books under review make a contribution. Both moreover, while aiming to document generalizations that cannot be deemed startling, produce along the way a number of sharp, original insights.

Mr. Shapiro is out to demonstrate that the Supreme Court "plays a wide variety of roles" (p. 328) rather than the unitary role subsumed by what he calls the "soap-opera debate" over judicial review. He proves it, because it is indeed so, although not all of the soap-opera debate assumes the contrary. That debate rages around one of the roles, which is more distinct and important than Mr. Shapiro seems to allow. Yet the emphasis on the Court's non-constitutional activities, as an organ of government

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contending and cooperating with other organs of government, is valuable. Among other things, and most successfully, Mr. Shapiro covers labor and tax cases, which he understands well and shrewdly, and in his own fresh way. He calls for more such particular studies, and he is quite right in suggesting that they would add more to our understanding than a rash of behavioral statistics.

Mr. Murphy has examined the papers of such men as Taft, Hughes, Stone, Sutherland, and Murphy with a behavioral inquiry in mind: "How can a Justice of the Supreme Court most efficiently utilize his resources, official and personal, to achieve a particular set of policy objectives?" (pp. 3-4). Well, one should say, by using his vote, by a certain amount of negotiating over opinions, by genteel bargaining, by patient efforts to persuade, by being courteous always, firm sometimes, malleable occasionally, and pigheaded never, and by economically spending whatever influence he has in Congress with respect to relevant bills and in the White House with respect to judicial appointments. And so it turns out. This is how "a Justice . . . [can] most efficiently utilize etc. . . ." Mr. Murphy gives examples, including some that are quite illuminating. In one instance (pp. 72-73) he offers an entirely brilliant analysis of an interplay between the late Justices Murphy and Jackson. Throughout Mr. Murphy is dealing with things that may have been widely surmised before, but rather vaguely. Mr. Murphy makes them known, which is a different matter.

But it does not add much for Mr. Murphy also to give us "a conceptual scheme" of judicial decision-making, which has a justice reaching (and not right off, either) an "*individual evaluation* stage" when he has to weigh "*inputs*" (pp. 32, 34). Nor does it help to be told that when two justices have become attached to each other, "what Pepitone has called 'facilitative distortion' may set in" (p. 38). So may garden-variety friendship. Mr. Murphy is an able and interesting student of history and of the Court. Why should he demean his own work by calling it "capability analysis" (p. 199)? Such jargon attempts to give an impression of a larger significance than can justly be claimed for the work. Perhaps it is useful shorthand for some. For everyone else it obscures true worth.

ALEXANDER M. BICKEL
Yale Law School

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The Politics of the Budgetary Process *by Aaron B. Wildavsky. Boston, Little, Brown, 1964.—xi, 216 pp. $4.00.*

The concept of "checks and balances" is uniquely American. Rather than concentrating power, the American political system diffuses it. A law cannot become effective unless it is passed by Congress, itself not a monolithic organization, signed by the president and consciously implemented by his administrators, and implicitly, if not explicitly, sanctioned by the judiciary. But these same "checks and balances" which prevent sudden, ephemeral changes in public opinion from imposing their often unfortunate effects on the nation and serve to assure full consideration of legislation are viewed by the parties interested in specific bills as "blocks and hindrances." The practitioner of the art of politics must learn to minimize the hurdles placed in his path to impede or prevent passage of favorable legislation. At the same time, he either must circumvent those traps set up to snare him or jump over them.

The problems involved and the strategies used to accomplish these feats in one particular phase of American politics are described masterfully by Professor Wildavsky in this book. The work has four main sections: "Calculations," "Strategies," "Reforms," and "Appraisals," of which the first two are by far the most fascinating. These two sections examine how the agencies of the federal government walk the budgetary tightrope, neither asking too much for fear of being deemed profligate nor asking too little for fear of being thought lacking in initiative.

In the process of obtaining appropriations, the request of an administrative bureau or agency travels through a complex maze. The request must be consistent with the requirements of the department and of the president as expressed through the Bureau of the Budget. It must obtain the approval of the relevant appropriations subcommittees and committees in the House and the Senate. All along the line the request can be modified, and those with the power to withhold approval either must be appeased or overruled by higher officials. The agency must calculate how much to ask for, which is often a compromise between its estimation of its needs and how much it can get. The department must calculate how much it can obtain for all its agencies and how much each particular bureau should receive. The Budget Bureau, working on the agency, department, and aggregate levels, must decide where to prune and by how much. Congress faces the same choice, but may very well disagree with the decisions of the department and the Bureau of the Budget. Consequently, the BOB and the departments must calculate the probable actions of Congress, since their prestige and future effectiveness rest upon the treatment given their decisions by Congress. Thus, each link of the

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chain must be conscious of the likely actions of those above it if it is to function successfully.

But the links above must also be conscious of the ones lower down the chain, for these latter groups are unlikely to remain passive. Indeed, those lower down can use a variety of strategies to neutralize opposing pressures. Such strategies are the subject of Wildavksy's second section. Developing an organized clientele whose protests carry weight, cultivating influential congressmen, accenting the positive, and avoiding the negative are but some of the more obvious methods used to force the opposition to succumb. Members of Congress have become adept at economizing even on programs backed by a vociferous public while managing to shift the blame elsewhere. Inclusion in this volume of a case study, describing the various strategies as a specific appropriations request moved from conception to final passage, would have added immensely to the interest of this fine piece of work.

The last two sections of the book are shorter, fifty-two pages to the 120 pages of the first half, and less satisfactory. Section 3 on budgetary reform dismisses such proposals as the Legislative Budget or program budgeting. Wildavsky concludes by arguing that the present system, while less than perfect, works tolerably well. As long as everyone understands the rules of the game and adheres to them, the appropriations that are approved are the desirable ones. In short, "checks and balances" works.

Wildavsky's conclusion is disputable. In focusing his attention upon the budgetary process as a mechanism which allocates scarce financial resources to meet the manifold requirements of a modern democratic society, he neglects another aspect of government budgeting. Since the size of the budget and its balance or imbalance have major implications for economic growth, employment, and price stability, the budgetary process must also be judged on its contribution to the achievement of these goals. On this criterion, procedures are woefully inadequate. Congress follows a piecemeal approach, never viewing the total budgetary picture. Is this adequate? Should not reforms such as the legislative budget or a review of budgetary actions by a joint congressional committee be reconsidered and not, as in Wildavsky, be dismissed?

In disagreeing with the author's conclusions one does not detract from the value of the publication. Wildavsky's book is stimulating, non-pedantic, and deserves a wide audience.

JONAS PRAGER
New York University

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The Third World *by Peter Worsley. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1964.—x, 317 pp. $5.50.*

This is a study in the political sociology of the newly independent states. The field covered is vast, and the range is increased by comparisons with the political attitudes of agrarian populations in some older countries. What all the new states have in common is the fact that machine technology was brought to them by alien rulers; it has been pointed out that this experience is in some ways paralleled by that of European peasants.

The "third world" is at one in its opposition to colonialism and to capitalism. But different political attitudes can be seen in different countries. Most of them embarked on independence with constitutions modeled on those of their former rulers. Their politicians have studied theories evolved in other countries, but they do not accept these in a doctrinaire fashion; they modify them to make them consonant with their own cultural values.

Dr. Worsley examines the influence of communism, remarking that it derives its strength less from Marxist theory than from admiration of Russian and Chinese achievements in modernization. But it has triumphed only in China, where nationalism was a spent force. Socialism has had little success because it has failed to enlist the support of the peasantry.

The prevailing political theory of Africa is, Dr. Worsley considers, essentially populist. He compares the aims of African political leaders with those of the CCF and Social Credit in Canada, as well as with nineteenth-century Russia. He examines the class structure, or absence of one, in Africa in some detail and remarks that for the new states the proletariat/capitalist opposition is essentially an international one between the poor countries and the rich ones on which they depend. He gives reasons, structural as well as theoretical, for the one-party system that now characterizes nearly all of them, and remarks that it does not preclude the "participation" of the masses. One would like to ask, Participation in what? The answer seems to be, In community development; and if one countered that this does not amount to a share in major decisions that affect their destiny, the retort might be that few people really have this anywhere.

Dr. Worsley rightly deplores the attitude which interprets all internal developments in the new states in cold war terms and all "aid" policies as means of buying political support. From the point of view of the new states themselves, the significant opposition is not that of East and West, but that of north and south. This is not new wisdom to those who try to keep up with current events in these countries, but it is good that it should have wide circulation.

There is a convention that people who paint on a broad canvas are excused inaccuracies of detail. This may be accepted where no pejorative

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judgment is involved. Some such judgments can be found in this book. For example, the shortage of graduates in Malawi is due in part to a short-sighted educational policy and in part to a boycott of the university at Salisbury, but simply *not* to "a direct colour-bar."

LUCY MAIR
London School of Economics and Political Science

Nationality and Wealth: A Study in World Government *by Evan Luard. London, New York, and Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1964.—viii, 370 pp. $6.75.*

The argument of this book is that the inequality of wealth in the world is increasing in all possible ways, relatively and absolutely, short term and long term, among individuals, families, and social classes, and especially among nations. The solution proposed is a welfare superstate, evolving out of the United Nations, to regulate investment and the flow of capital, create and operate new forms of production, offset the effects of inheritance, regulate communications, and equalize cultural opportunities. This is to develop gradually, as international agencies gain wider powers and authority by means of superior bureaucratic effectiveness. "The effective basis of sovereignty," writes Mr. Luard, "may be undermined not by storm but by stealth" (p. 359).

The notion that nationalism will quietly wither away in deference to the administrative skill of international agencies is part of a broad exercise in wish fulfillment. In the first chapter, for example, we read that conflict has probably not influenced the development of human societies, that economic classes do not exert any direct impact on history, that the quest for power is not normally self-conscious, and that primitive communities are usually governed by an all-powerful state. Mr. Luard writes as if all the records of human history had been destroyed and pure supposition were the only basis of knowledge. The existing literature is barely mentioned.

Behind this confused discussion looms the outline of a vast problem that our author is reluctant to face. He describes the eventual aim of international investment planning as "similar rates of growth everywhere" (p. 228). In fact, this *is* the condition the world now exhibits, and there's the rub. Similar rates of growth applied to dissimilar national inven-

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tories produce a nearly universal increase of real income and welfare and simultaneously increase the absolute differences between rich and poor nations. Under existing conditions, it is difficult even to imagine a situation wherein growth rates would be *inversely* correlated with level of development. Hence the prospect of perpetual inequality. The problem is intricate; it deserves a more thoughtful analysis than this volume provides.

THEODORE CAPLOW
Columbia University

Histoire de l'Algérie Contemporaine. Volume I: La Conquête et les Débuts de la Colonisation (1827-1871) *by Charles-André Julien. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1964.—632 pp. 60 F.*

M. Julien demonstrates with this work that French scholarship at its best is very good indeed. He has painted the drama of the first fifty years of French control over Algeria with such mastery that other historians must surely applaud the work of so great a craftsman. Such a work is only possible where a historian has immersed himself totally in his subject. One has only to study the author's admirable bibliographical essay to recognize how total his immersion has been. His biographical sketches of the principal actors in this drama, that add such color and human interest to the account, demonstrate further the extent of the author's involvement in his subject.

The author is less an impartial judge of past events than an active participant in the struggle, and while this makes the book tendentious, it heightens the interest of the reader in the subject and forces him to take sides also. M. Julien leaves no doubt where his own sympathies lie. Through his inexorable marshaling of the evidence that indicts both the French military rulers of Algeria and the *colons*, the author argues his case most persuasively. So complete is the indictment, so shocking is the material he presents, that one begins to suspect that the picture may be overdrawn. If this is the case, then a corrective that in every event is lacking in this otherwise excellent work would be a detailed account of the institutions of the indigenous population and how they operated in fact. It is not enough to give a sketchy outline of Ottoman institutions before the arrival of the French. Only if we know the inner workings of

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Algerian society can we understand, for example, the reason for at least some Jewish cooperation with the French before and after the conquest. The love of profit, as M. Julien implies, does not seem sufficient justification, especially since so many of the French officers in Algeria were, by M. Julien's own testimony, anti-Semitic, and when later on the Jews seemed reluctant to give up the advantages of the millet system for French nationality.

A description of the political, social, and economic aspects of the Arab, Berber, and large Jewish communities and precisely how the "bureaux arabes" functioned would have added a dimension to this study that is much needed. The inclusion of such material might well have strengthened M. Julien's case against French colonization, for the spoliation of the native population which he describes and the viciousness of the *colons* that he condemns would justify beyond any shadow of a doubt the Algerian struggle for independence and remove any sympathy for the European settlers that one might otherwise have had. Perhaps M. Julien did not wish to risk introducing material that might have blurred the image he could create by its omission.

While it is possible that all was not either black or white, an impression created by the author, yet the book goes far in explaining the intensity of feeling both in France and Algeria that the Algerian question has evoked during the past century. One wonders, with the author, what would have resulted had the policy of Napoleon III that favored the Algerians taken effect. Frankly, when one considers the emperor's policy toward Egypt and Lebanon, one cannot be sanguine about the sincerity of his pro-Arab feelings. The author, profiting from hindsight, sees the failure to deal fairly with the Arabs as the loss of a great opportunity. Perhaps he is right, but one wonders if the outcome may not have been the same after all. We need only to point to Great Britain's experiences to doubt whether different methods might have produced different results.

While the indigenous Algerians fade into the background of this work except as the objects of exploitation, M. Julien has succeeded magnificently in providing a very full description of the chaos that reigned in the early period of the conquest, the inadequacy of the French army in Algeria, the conflict that developed between the French military regime and the *colons* who resented the military dictatorship which interfered with their colonizing efforts, and the struggle with the local population who from the beginning resisted French rule. All this is seen against the backdrop of events in metropolitan France and the disastrous interplay of political forces that produced France's defeat in 1870. Add to this a description of the cultural influences—in literature and art—and the in-

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clusion of some very interesting illustrations, a list of French ministers, army chiefs, and governors of Algeria, a glossary of Arabic, Berber, and Turkish terms, a long bibliography, an index, and several detailed maps, and one has a work of outstanding merit. The French proclivity for omitting footnotes that indicate the source of various quotations and pertinent details that are aids to other scholars may be regretted, but aside from this shortcoming that is characteristically French, M. Julien's book will long serve as an important reference work for those interested in Algeria. The book should be translated into English and made required reading for all students of North African, Middle Eastern, and colonial history.

HELEN ANNE B. RIVLIN
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Africa in World Politics *by Vernon McKay. New York and Evanston, Harper and Row, 1963.—xii, 468 pp. $6.75.*

Africa in the United Nations *by Thomas Hovet Jr. Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1963.—xiii, 336 pp. $8.50.*

The foreign relations of Africa is an important new subject which came into its own in the sixties, when it became apparent that one third of the membership of the United Nations was African. For Africa this is a decade of continuous imbalance. Each time a new state becomes independent there is a shift. For example, Ghana, when she became independent in 1957, considered herself the sole, the elect spokesman of free Africa; Ghana was the Black Star State that spoke in the name of the still colonized millions. Only three years later Ghana was in a vastly different position. By then Nigeria, representing eight times as many people, was independent, the Congo was born, and so were fourteen former French colonies. The independence of Algeria in 1962, of the East African and Central African states shortly after, brought still other basic shifts. Two pioneer studies in the field of African foreign relations are *Africa in World Politics* by Professor Vernon McKay, and *Africa in the United Nations* by Thomas Hovet.

Professor McKay writes from the standpoint of the American policymaker. The book is divided into four sections: Africa and the UN; Pan-African, Afro-Asian, and Eurafrican movements; African relations with

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India and the Soviet Union; American policy in Africa. The last section is the core of the book. Professor McKay is chairman of the State Department Advisory Committee on Africa, a former member of the Department of State, a former member of the United States delegation to the United Nations, and now professor of African studies at Johns Hopkins University; these years of experience place him in the role of elder statesman. This gives special force to his observations:

> Our white superiority complex subtly and unconsciously induces us to prescribe what Africans ought to have, and keeps us from giving adequate recognition to African wishes (p. 423).

> After long years of having to accept decisions by Europeans, African leaders feel a strong compulsion to form their judgements, not only about Africa but about the outside world as well. Their attitudes towards us will be more and more affected by our ability or inability to understand their view of the world. Naturally we want them to appreciate our view of the world too. In the long run, however, it is the prosperous West, not impoverished Africa, which has the most to lose from misunderstanding (p. 425).

Professor Hovet's book is restricted to the impact on the United Nations of the birth of the African nations. He points out that the founding members of the United Nations were not concerned with African problems and did not expect to be. The "Gentleman's Agreement" on which non-permanent members of the Security Council are elected reserves two seats for Latin America but none for Africa. In 1946 there were four African members; by 1965 there were another thirty-three. (These figures include South Africa, not normally included in the African group at the United Nations.)

Professor Hovet provides a most valuable hard core of data on the votes of the individual African countries, the African group as a whole, factions within the African group; and on the relationship of these voting patterns to the votes of the total General Assembly, of the United States, the Soviet Union, and in a more limited sense the various other caucusing groups and blocs. Professor Hovet has analyzed 789 roll call votes from January 1946 to June 1962, in plenary session of the General Assembly. Happily he prints his data in more than one hundred pages of appendix which should save other scholars thousands of hours. Professor Hovet is the first to point out that there are limitations on voting analysis; votes are "but one aspect reflecting relations among states" (p. 231). Votes need not even indicate a nation's policy. Mr. Hovet is careful to say that this is an "initial study." It is a splendid contribution to the field.

Mr. Hovet is aware of the larger issues, posed by the problems of the survival of the United Nations. The League of Nations broke when it

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became clear that the major powers were unwilling to answer Ethiopia's appeal for help. The United Nations, too, was set up without African participation. Yet it has had to cope with an increasing number of African issues—Algeria, the Congo, Southwest Africa, and inevitably South Africa. A generation after the United Nations was born African issues are putting the organization to its severest test. Already the place where most of the United Nations' peace-keeping operations are determined has shifted several times. The founding members gave most of the responsibility to the Security Council. The uniting-for-peace resolution in 1950 shifted much of the responsibility into the General Assembly. During the first phase of the Congo crisis, Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold took onto the Secretariat much of the work; in the second phase U Thant has not tried to keep this initiative. By 1965 the clash between the Soviet Union and the United States over financing the Congo operation had the effect of shifting responsibility back to the Security Council from which African states are so sharply excluded. Mr. Hovet is quite right to conclude that "the future impact of Africa on the decisions of the United Nations may be decided as much by the major powers as by the African states" (p. 228).

RUTH SCHACHTER MORGENTHAU
Brandeis University

Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876 *by Roderic H. Davison. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963.—ix, 479 pp. $12.50.*

This is a well documented work on an important period in Turkish modernization. It will undoubtedly retain its value as a guide to the study of the post-1856 period of the Tanzimat for a long time to come. Both Turkish and non-Turkish sources have been used by the author in elaborating a new, synthetic view of the currents which made up Ottoman reform at the time.

As the author points out himself, Turkish archival materials have not been consulted in preparing the monograph and in this as well as in other respects it remains a presentation of the "European" point of view on Ottoman reform. One of the characteristics of the work, for example, is that while Turkish published sources have been used, often they round out a historical judgment based on European appraisals in the first

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instance. It is only such a perspective which can explain why Professor Davison does not fully succeed in conveying to his readers the deep concern for the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire that was gnawing at the entrails of many protagonists of the drama on one hand, and the idiosyncratic views on reform of some of the Turkish authors he has relied upon, on the other. Thus an investigation of what reform meant to Mahmut Celalettin Paşa or to Ahmet Mithat Efendi would have added illuminating insights to the monograph. A variation of this outsider's view is the author's tendency to adopt an approach to Turkish reform which is somewhat dated and which is that of the comic opera. (Palgrave's anecdote on p. 34; mention of people "rabid for bahşiş," p. 35, note 54; the story on "gâvurs," p. 43). Professor Davison is too good a historian to succumb to the temptation of gilding a good manuscript with Baedeker glitter. The author also seems to have had greater familiarity with the feelings of the men about whom he is writing than one could expect in view of the time lag involved, thus the "immense irritation of Vefik Paşa (p. 182) is unconvincing. Sometimes this self-assurance leads the author to outright errors; Şinasi's "monumental lexicon" never existed.

Jauntiness is no sin in such a widely footnoted book, but presents some dangers, for in so far as the author does not grapple with the problem of the internalization of the values of the Tanzimat for the men involved in it, the feelings attributed to them are sometimes wide of the mark. An illustration of what is involved here may be given in relation to Professor Davison's treatment of Osman Hamdi Bey's *Les Costumes Populaires de la Turquie en 1873*. The author states that Hamdi Bey's praise of the "bourgeois Muslim of the old school" is "not current before 1870 in official Tanzimat circles" (p. 278). Yet this is exactly what statesmen like Hüseyin Avni Paşa, Ahmet Vefik Paşa, Mütercim Rüştü Paşa, and Ahmet Cevdet Paşa felt in those years.

One area which has not been explored and which the author's researches into European archives would have given him the opportunity to articulate into his theme is the economic background of reform, the state of commercial relations between Turkey and the Great Powers after the Crimean War, and the policies pursued by these powers in the Ottoman Empire. After all, Urquhart's view (or non-view) of Turkish reform was determined by his free-trading sympathies and the change in Ottoman legal structure can be analyzed as a function of a newly developing commercial pattern and the foreign pressures that came with it. This is somewhat different from the "stretching" of capitulatory privileges and the "concession racket" mentioned by the author. The author does not, incidentally, include David S. Landes' brilliant *Bankers and Pashas* (1958)

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in his bibliography. Neither does he mention the fact that the commercial theme is an extremely important one in the writings of the Young Ottomans.

Professor Davison has given considerable space to the rise of the Turkish intelligentsia and its role in the opposition. One is gratified to find that a number of developments in Turkish intellectual history which do not appear in his Ph.D. dissertation—the basis of the book—have been added and that his treatment of the Young Ottomans has been considerably and ably enlarged.

There are a number of minor errors which it might not be entirely useless to point out: "Jean Pietri" (p. 231) is in fact "Giampietri." It is doubtful that Reşid's son bore the name of "Mehmet Cecil" (p. 82). It is not true that Young Ottoman conspiratorial activities were motivated by "first-hand observations of Western Europe" (p. 173). The heterodox sect is "Kızılbaş" and not "Kızılbaşı."

In sum, even though a considerable amount of work will be needed to fasten on to the *ding an sich* which lies beneath the murky eddies of the Tanzimat, Professor Davison has provided us with a remarkably balanced and complete coverage of what is known about the 1856-76 period. The work will be of invaluable assistance to those who study Turkish modernization in the nineteenth century.

ŞERIF MARDIN
Ankara University

Syrian Politics and the Military, 1945-1958 *by Gordon H. Torrey. Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1964.—438 pp. $7.00.*

This is a serious effort to penetrate the intricate pattern of Arab politics and should be welcomed as a worthwhile addition to the scant literature on the subject. Important shortcomings, however, detract from its value. In short, the author endeavors to reduce Syrian politics to the traditional denominator of Right, Center, and Left and to present the entire period under discussion as a swing from Right to Left, culminating in the union with Egypt. His efforts complicate the already entangled situation and lead to confusion if not outright contradiction. The difficulty in classifying Arab politicians is illustrated by the case of Khalid al-Azm, a noted

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Syrian statesman. Referred to as an independent, anti-U.S. Francophile, "red millionaire," conservative and pro-leftist, Azm throughout his public career baffled outside observers. Leader of a bloc working to institute a "more leftist government" in 1956 (p. 326) and a spokesman of the (unexplained) "leftist trend" in 1957 (p. 359), Azm emerged as the leader of the conservative revival after the collapse of the U.A.R. in 1961.

The author insists that in 1956-57 Syria was governed by "leftist cabinets" headed by Premier Asali (pp. 356-57). Since his administration did not favor "leftist" economic or social reforms, this classification appears to be based on Asali's foreign policy. It is true that during and after the Suez crisis Syria maintained a pronounced anti-Western attitude and channeled large portions of her trade to the Communist bloc, but do these accepted neutralist practices suffice to label Asali's cabinets "leftist"?

As Mr. Torrey correctly notes, the political history of Syria is a tale of rapidly changing tactical alliances intended to secure for its members political dominance and other rewards which accompany power. Their disentanglement is not helped by attempts to reduce most Syrian politicians to the familiar but, in this instance, alas, not entirely applicable classification. And although objectively Syria may have moved to the "Left," the extent and depth of the shift remain to be explored.

Another serious shortcoming is the inadequate treatment of the formation of the U.A.R. The author tells a familiar story: the socialist Baath, determined to secure total domination of the Syrian government, encountered strong Communist resistance and pressed President Nasser for a union between Egypt and Syria. It is not clear why the Baath with the support of the army was incapable of handling the alleged Communist threat, as in February 1958 it was "demonstrated how a fusion of the Baath with its ideology and the like-minded army officers could capture the center of power" (p. 394).

It appears unlikely that in early 1958 the Syrian Communists were planning a *coup d'état*. Why then did the army officers and their Baath allies press Nasser for a union with Syria? Possibly, in part, because the politicians had proven themselves incapable of providing the country with an efficient government and the army had been hopelessly disunited. Why did Nasser acquiesce in their demands? His decision was probably motivated not so much by fear of a Communist takeover as by the lesson he learned during the Syrian crisis of 1957: he had to support unbridled Syrian nationalism which could eventually play into the hands of the U.S.S.R. to Cairo's detriment without any formal authority to restrain his Damascus allies or guide their policies.

Despite these serious shortcomings and numerous factual errors, the

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study, with its wealth of documented material, will remain a valuable handbook for students of Arab politics.

O. M. SMOLANSKY
Lehigh University

Report from a Chinese Village *by Jan Myrdal, illustrated and with photographs by Gun Kessle. Translated by Maurice Michael. New York, Pantheon Books, 1965.—xxxiv, 374 pp. $6.95.*

This book is a grain of sand through which one sees the vast world of China. It is a microscopic study of one of the tens of thousands of villages in China which are not large enough to deserve a dot on the map. The author's visit lasted one month—a flash for that land of antiquity—and his book deals with no more than scores of people, a drop in the Chinese human sea. The author has neither the language proficiency nor the academic training of a modern sociologist, and he admits that he has certain biases.

But what may appear to be strikes against him has proved to be the very strength which has made his book a refreshingly readable success. Myrdal proceeds from the unchallengeable position that the peasantry still forms the backbone of contemporary Chinese Society, with whom he has a temperamental affinity if not cultural identity. Shunning "show" places, he chooses a spot in the heart of that ancient land least affected by modernity; and living among the peasants, he extracts from them their life stories, long or short, joyous or tearful. The book is a report from a Chinese village, no more, no less.

There are three angles from which to look at and assess this work. Because of the peculiar character of China's international posture and attitude toward foreign observers, the very circumstances under which Myrdal obtained official permission to undertake a study of this nature are revealing. His account of negotiations with the Chinese authorities, high and low, over both major and insignificant issues, is illustrative of the political and ideological climate in which business is conducted in China today. In this respect, the few words he exchanged with Mao Tse-tung and the long conversations he had with some of the villagers are equally meaningful, for they show the frame of mind and the outlook

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of the mainland Chinese, about whom regrettably we have such inadequate knowledge.

Myrdal disclaims any competence in rural sociology or its ultra-modern methods. Nevertheless, he is keenly aware of the crucial importance of the methodological approach adopted for a study of this type. The way he pursued his objective is simplicity itself, but in this case simplicity seems to be the greatest of virtues, for peasants everywhere are simple folk, without affectation and sophistication. He obviously has succeeded in establishing the necessary rapport with the villagers from the very beginning. No words are put into the villagers' mouths, no "trick" questions are asked, no editing is done to suit any particular purpose. The margin of error by misinformation is thus reduced, and even the practice of interviewing through the medium of an interpreter, in this case, does not seem to present serious problems.

Then there is the report itself. Myrdal tells his readers that is is not a novel, but it is more absorbing than most novels. The whole range of human life in the village is brought under scrutiny: child-rearing, marriage customs, sexual morality, education of both the young and the old, utilization of land, housing, political activities, economic aspirations, relations with towns and the nation at large, and the people's own image of themselves. The villagers have much in common, yet they are so different, as most human groupings tend to be. And under the placid surface of this ageless village, new forces are emerging, with new leadership and a new direction.

Bearing in mind that the ultimate outcome of transformation of the Chinese countryside is bound to have world-wide implications, Jan Myrdal has performed an invaluable service by providing us with an avenue that leads straight to the minds and hearts of the Chinese villagers.

C. T. Hu
Teachers College, Columbia University

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Book Notes

Most historians and political scientists are tolerably well acquainted with the dramatic confrontation of agrarian and industrial forces which Bryan and McKinley symbolized in 1896. General readers and even experts know less than they ought to know of the three political parties which fought it out that year. In recent scholarship national politics is being increasingly—and profitably—viewed as the interplay of organized parties. *The Whirligig of Politics: The Democracy of Cleveland and Bryan* (Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1963; xii, 263 pp., $5.00) by J. Rogers Hollingsworth offers for the first time a general account of the party which, having gained what had appeared to be a smashing triumph in 1892, lost seven out of the next nine national elections and for forty years was unable to attract a majority of the presidential vote. Though Hollingsworth's story covers only twelve years and ends in 1904, it offers a convincing portrait of intransigent—and hence unsuccessful—party leadership and goes far to explain why for so long a period the Democrats botched opportunities to build a winning coalition of supporters and popular issues. Relying on a judicious selection of manuscript sources to piece out an extensive use of published scholarship, Hollingsworth attributes the fall of the party to Cleveland's unbelievable lack of political finesse (he scarcely understood what a national party was), and to Bryan's equally stubborn refusal to recognize after 1899 that the Republicans had skillfully, even brilliantly, defused each of the explosive issues of silver, imperialism, and trusts. ("You are simply a damn fool!" shouted Tillman in a party showdown with Bryan in 1904. "Silver is dead and you know it. You may dearly love your grandmother, but if she has lain in the grave for eight years, you surely will not insist on digging her up for the edification of your friends.") By 1904 conservatives from New York and from the South captured the party from the twice-defeated Bryan, but their management of the election and the nar-

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rowness of their appeal were so dismal that the more skillful urbanized Republicans, led by Theodore Roosevelt, virtually buried them at the polls and forced the party at last to adopt strategies and principles in keeping with the new progressivism. True, in the Cleveland and Bryan era the Democrats were burdened with national discontent over depression, and geography and history had combined to make them the party of agrarian and mining interests at a time when the great mass of voters was becoming urban and industrialized. But the chief virtue of this lively and careful book is its consideration of the numerous opportunities open to these national leaders to have built strength on compromises and, by skill in party affairs, to have prevented economic and social problems from becoming unmanageable and even destructive of party influence. Dealing with these matters in his preface, Hollingsworth promises a little more than he later delivers. His analysis of national coalition politics turns out not especially profound or conceptual, and historians will regret his failure to discuss the farm vote adequately or to probe into the significance of Tammany politics at a time when both were crucial to Democratic party fortunes. But these flaws are not conspicuous amid his solid and competent political narrative. The book closes with a superior bibliographical essay.—Otis Pease, *Stanford University*.

In this carefully prepared, tightly written, and sympathetic study—*Prairie Rebel: The Public Life of William Lemke* by Edward C. Blackorby (Lincoln, Nebraska, University of Nebraska Press, 1963; ix, 339 pp., $6.50)—the author sees Lemke's public career as falling logically into three categories. The first phase concerns Lemke's work in North Dakota, roughly from 1915 to 1933, as a member of the radical faction of the Non-Partisan League. The second focuses on his congressional career from 1932 to his defeat as a senatorial candidate in 1940. This phase includes Lemke's heading the Union party ticket in 1936, and manifests his concern for agricultural aid beyond what Lemke considered the weak programs of the New Deal. The last portion of Lemke's career covers the years from 1942 until his death in 1950, when as a North Dakota congressman he ably served his state but supported no positive programs such as were connected with the earlier phases of his career. Blackorby calls these years "anticlimactic," though Lemke's underlying convictions remained the same.

In addition to presenting a fine full-length portrait of a significant, controversial, ill-tempered but not illiberal "Prairie Rebel," this volume casts light on other important areas of recent American history. It is in-

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dispensable for an understanding of the workings of the Non-Partisan League and of the faction-ridden Republican politics of the state of North Dakota during Lemke's lifetime. For example, it makes clear that Senator Gerald P. Nye was a victim of this strife in 1944 when he failed in his efforts for renomination. His ardent isolationism, similar to that of Lemke and other North Dakota political figures, was hardly a factor in his defeat. The volume also tells much about another important and equally controversial prairie rebel, William Langer. And it is indispensable because it presents the best account available of the abortive Union party in 1936 when Lemke, out of bitterness toward FDR, joined forces with extremists such as Gerald L. K. Smith and Charles E. Coughlin. Blackorby convincingly clears Lemke of any connection with the anti-Semitic and fascistic views of his associates in this party; Lemke's chief concern in the movement was for more radical agricultural legislation than the New Deal was willing to consider. In short, this is an important study that contributes much to an understanding of significant segments of American history during the past half-century.—RICHARD LOWITT, *Connecticut College.*

Written on the basis of solid knowledge of both the constitutional antecedents of the Fifth Republic and of its daily experience, Pierre Avril's *Le Régime Politique de la V^e^ République* (Paris, Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1964; iii, 397 pp., 44,40 F) constitutes a highly provocative and severely critical analysis of the principles and usages of de Gaulle's *principat.* It shows how presidential arbitration was quickly jettisoned for a "heroic leadership style." The Prime Minister functioning within the framework of a streamlined and chastised parliamentary system converted correspondingly into the position of an administrative subleader who controls the machinery of the bureaucracy within the margin set by the princeps' habits of reserved competences and frequent special delegations. What is the basis for legitimacy of such a regime? Is it the personal authority of the princeps, the eagerly sought for popular approval, or, more simply, the unique conjunction of a one-time historical situation with the man? To what extent are we simply facing a new reincarnation of that old standby, the administrative state?

When parliament disappears from the preoccupation of the administrator and from the horizon of the ordinary citizen, parliamentary control becomes a faint memory of bygone days. One of the stages of the vanishing of that control is dealt with in Michel Ameller's *Les Questions Instrument du Controle Parlementaire* (Paris, Librairie Générale de

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Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1964; 227 pp., 27,50 F). The author shows how written questions had long been rather in the nature of a free customer service furnished by the administration to the voter through the good services of the deputy.

Oral questions might have had a chance to survive as a parliamentary weapon of control in the Fifth Republic in spite of the strictures applied to the exercise of this prerogative by the Constitutional Council in 1959 and 1963. But to obtain such a result the questions would have had to be more carefully selected, the ministers or their colleagues substituting for them would have had to be prepared to enter a dialogue rather than to read a technical brief prepared by their services, and the deputies including the questioners should not have been in the habit of going home the very Friday afternoons reserved for their discussion. The author's study is unfortunately more directed toward points of procedure than to an analysis of the various categories of questions. But even from the material he gives, it becomes evident that the still existing small entering wedge for control of the administration has never received the tryout it deserves.—Otto Kirchheimer, *Columbia University.*

Professor Henry W. Broude has written an admirable book, *Steel Decisions and the National Economy* (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1963; x, 332 pp., $7.50), but not, in view of his objectives, a very successful one. This (relative) failure is especially regrettable since the book is aimed at an important and little cultivated audience—"the policy maker in government and in industrial fields where the types of decisions discussed are relevant." Broude is mainly concerned with two issues: Does the steel industry behave in a socially responsible way most of the time? How do we define social responsibility?

The principal merit of the study is that these issues are discussed with care, insight, and the use of up-to-date professional techniques. The principal defect is that the discussion does little to clarify, and virtually nothing to settle them. Broude sympathizes with top management in the steel industry without giving it high marks for professional competence, particularly in the areas of investment planning and capitalist self-criticism. Benjamin Fairless is quoted with mild disapproval for his perceptive remark on leadership, "You don't know how you do it; you just do it."

No recommendations are ventured. The author appears to reject, for the steel industry, control by regulatory commission, nationalization, a TVA-type of yard stick, trust-busting, and laissez-faire. By a process of

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elimination only one policy remains: the present arrangement whereby government and the industry intermittently collaborate, clash, and go their separate ways without the aid of firmly established ground rules.—DONALD DEWEY, *Columbia University*.

It takes some large measure of intellectual acumen to construct from the very disparate works of Lynd, Hollingshead, Warner, Hunter, and several others, enough of a common frame of discourse to deserve the label "stratification theory." This intellectual *tour de force* has been accomplished by Nelson Polsby in *Community Power and Political Theory* (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1963; xiv, 144 pp., $5.00). According to Polsby's careful reading of the community studies undertaken by these men, their analysis of community decision-making and the distribution of power is a manifestation of a theory which assumes that the distribution of power is highly correlated with status, and that community decision-making processes are entirely dependent upon the directives and wishes of those at the top of the stratification pyramid. By textual analysis, Polsby shows that these authors ignore evidence against their viewpoint and do not put their theory to the test of empirical research. As an alternative to stratification theory, Polsby advocates a posture of "pluralism," in which the distribution of power is a matter of empirical investigation and it is assumed that specific community decisions are made more often by *ad hoc* groups of notables, office-holders, and pressure groups than by a "ruling elite." As an appropriate research design for the study of community decision-making and power, Polsby suggests the careful analysis of specific decisions as they are made in the communities. Polsby's critical faculties, however, are stronger than his theory-building abilities. One must admire the analysis of stratification theorists, but the pluralistic posture he poses as an alternative is not yet a specific enough guide to empirical research, nor has it yet provided enough of a theory to make it possible to understand what it is that communities in our society have in common or how decisions are made on the wide variety of issues which are presented to local communities.—PETER H. ROSSI, *University of Chicago*.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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